Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN by Lord, Montague J.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Moving towards a Common External
Tariff Regime in ASEAN
Montague J. Lord
ASEAN Secretariat
December 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41154/
MPRA Paper No. 41154, posted 9. September 2012 18:23 UTC
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN  
- i - 
 
 
Capacity Building for the ASEAN Secretariat: Common External Tariff Regime 
ASEAN E06/08 
 
 
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN 
 
Draft Final Report 
 
 
 
Submitted to 
 
InWEnt – International Weiterbidung und Entwicklung gGmbH 
and 
ASEAN Secretariat 
 
 
 
Submitted by 
 
Montague Lord International LLC 
PO Box 501197 
Marathon, Florida 33050 
United States 
 
 
December 2008 
 
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN  
- ii - 
 
 
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN 
Table of Contents 
 
Table of Contents ii  
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations iii 
List of Boxes, Figures and Tables vi 
Executive Summary vii 
1. Background and Introduction 1 
1.1. Background  1 
1.2. Objectives and Outputs  1 
1.3. Coverage  2 
2. Moving towards a CET Regime in ASEAN: An Overview 4 
2.1. Regional Trade Agreements 4 
2.2. Potential Benefits of a Common External Tariff 5 
2.3. Historical Developments of ASEAN Trade Arrangements  6 
2.4. Free Trade Agreements and Implications for CET 7 
2.5. Common External Tariffs in Other Regional Trade Arrangements 10 
3. Option for a Common External Tariff 21 
3.1. Existing Tariff Structures 21 
3.2. The Optimal Tariff 23 
3.3. Alternative CET Structures 24 
3.4. Revenue Sharing and Compensations 25 
4. Modeling Welfare Effects of an ASEAN Common External Tariff 29 
4.1. Methodology for Estimating Welfare Effects  29 
4.2. Estimates of the CET Welfare Effects under Alternative Regimes  29 
5. Sequencing FTAs and a Common External Tariff Regime 35 
5.1. Estimates of ASEAN FTAs before versus after a CET 35 
5.2. Dynamic FTAs and CET Sequencing Effects 38  
6. Designing and Implementing the CET 40 
6.1. Key Issues for the CET Design and Implementation 40 
6.2. Transition and Adjustment Issues for CET Implementation 42 
7. Recommendations for Further Studies 45 
Annexes 
A. The Empirical Model 47 
B. Product Lines having Similar Tariffs Applied by ASEAN Member States 51 
C. Welfare Effects of 6.1% CET on ASEAN Member States at HS 2-Digit Level 54 
D. Meetings Held with Representatives of ASEAN Member States 58 
 
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN  
- iii - 
 
 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations   
 
AEC   ASEAN Economic Community 
AFTA   ASEAN Free Trade Area 
APEC   Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
ASEC   ASEAN Secretariat 
ASEAN-6  ASEAN original signatories  
ASEAN-CLMV ASEAN Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
ASEM   Asia-Europe Meeting 
CAP   Common Agricultural Policy, EC 
CARICOM  Caribbean Common Market 
CCCA   Coordinating Committee for the CEPT implementation of AFTA 
CCT   Common Customs Tariff 
CEPT   Common Effective Preferential Tariff, ASEAN 
CET   Common External Tariff 
COMESA  Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
CGE   Computable General Equilibrium 
CTS   Consolidated Tariff Schedules 
CU   Customs Union 
DDA   Doha Development Agenda 
DG Trade  Directorate General of Trade, EC 
EAC   Eastern African Community 
EC   European Commission 
ECOWAS  Economic Community of Western African States 
EEC   European Economic Community 
EPA   Economic Partnership Agreement 
EPZ   Export Processing Zone 
ESCAP  United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
EU   European Union 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA   Free Trade Agreement 
FTAA   Free Trade Agreement for the Americas 
GATS   General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GNI   Gross National Income 
GPA   Government Procurement Agreement 
GSP   Generalized System of Preferences 
GTAP   Global Trade Analysis Project 
HS   Harmonized System 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
InWEnt  International Weiterbidung und Entwicklung gGmbH 
IPR   Intellectual Property Rights 
ITA   Information Technology Agreement 
ITC   International Trade Centre  
LDCs   Least Developed Countries 
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN  
- iv - 
 
MERCOSUR  South America’s Southern Common Market 
MFN   Most Favoured Nation 
NGO   Non-governmental Organization 
NTB   Non-Tariff Barriers 
RoO   Rules of Origin 
RTA   Regional Trade Agreement 
SACU   South African Customs Union 
SADC   Southern African Development Community 
SEOM   Senior Economic Officials Meeting, ASEAN 
SME   Small and Medium-Size Enterprise 
SPS   Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
TBT   Technical Barriers to Trade 
TOR   Terms of Reference 
TREATI  Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative 
TRIPs   Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights 
TRTA   Trade-related Technical Assistance 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
WB   World Bank 
WCO   World Customs Organization 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
 
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN  
- v - 
 
List of Boxes, Figures and Tables 
 
 
Boxes 
2.1 Free Trade Agreements and Negotiations Involving ASEAN and the Member States 8 
2.2 The 2002 SACU Revenue-Sharing Formula 14 
3.1 Characteristics of Member States’ Tariff Structure 22 
 
Figures 
4.1 Total Change in ASEAN Consumer Welfare and Government Revenue Changes 31 
 
Tables 
3.1 Profile of Tariffs in ASEAN Member Countries 23 
4.1 Change in Government Revenue from MFN Tariffs Applied to Non-ASEAN Imports  
 under Alternative Common External Tariffs 30 
4.2 Change in Consumer Welfare from MFN Tariffs Applied to Non-ASEAN Imports  
 under Alternative Common External Tariffs 32 
4.3 Welfare Impact of 6.1 Percent CET on ASEAN Member States 33 
5.1 Percent Distribution of ASEAN Country Imports from Actual and Forthcoming ASEAN-FTAs,  
ASEAN Countries and Rest-of-World, 2006 35 
5.2 Welfare Impact on ASEAN Member States: Moving from Pre-CET to CET Rate 36 
5.3 Welfare Impact of 4.2% CET Rate on ASEAN Member States 37 
5.4 Welfare Impact of 4.2% CET Rate and FTAs on ASEAN Member States 37 
5.5 Welfare Impact of FTAs on ASEAN Member States 38 
5.6 Welfare Impact of FTAs and 4.2% CET on ASEAN Member States 38 
C.1 Impact of Uniform CET Rate of 6.1 Percent on Government Revenue  
 from Non-ASEAN Country Imports 54 
C.2 Impact of Uniform CET Rate of 6.1 Percent on Consumer Welfare  
 from Non-ASEAN Country Imports 56 
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN  
- vi - 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Motivation for Study – Under the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint signed at the 13th 
ASEAN Summit in November 2007 in Singapore, ASEAN Leaders agreed to the realization of a 
single market and production base by 2015. The Coordinating Committee for the 
Implementation of the CEPT for AFTA (CCCA) was tasked by the Senior Economic Officials 
Meeting (SEOM) to do further work on the possibility of establishing an ASEAN common 
external tariff (CET), a process that is likely to involve a number of challenges since existing 
MFN tariffs of ASEAN Member States vary widely. 
Objective – The objective of this study is to provide a preliminary analysis on a range of CET 
options that could be adopted by ASEAN and to quantitatively assess their implications for each 
ASEAN member state and the region as a whole. The results of the study are intended to assist 
the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN member states in considering options under 
deliberations by the CCCA, which will eventually be presented to the Senior Economic Officials 
Meeting (SEOM) for its deliberation on the application of a CET as a long term objective of 
economic integration in ASEAN. 
A. Overview and CET Experiences in Other Regions 
Stages of Regional Trade Agreements – Regional blocs are based on trading arrangements 
that aim to harmonize rules and regulations governing trade flows between member states and 
the rest of the world. The stages of these arrangements normally consist of the creation of, first, 
a free trade area with a zero tariff on intra-regional trade and the retention of individual member 
tariffs on third countries; second, a customs union with free trade between members and a 
common external tariff; third, a common market with unrestricted mobility of labor and capital, as 
well as goods and services; and finally, an economic union that harmonizes macroeconomic 
and sector policies.  
CETs in Other Regional Trade Arrangements – There are several customs unions operating 
with CETs throughout the world. The European Union is undoubtedly the most well-known and 
has moved beyond a customs union to become a common market on a path to becoming an 
economic union. However, the range of existing customs unions with CETs includes several in 
Africa, Latin America and Central Asia.  
 European Union – In 1968 the founding members of the European Union (EU) agreed to 
the common customs tariff (CCT), which was set at the unweighted average of the six 
member states’ tariff rates. The transition to the CCT included provisions that (a) each 
member state should move by three stages at least by 30 percent, 30 percent and 40 
percent closer to the common external tariff rates; (b) the European Commission (EC) had 
the right to authorize any member states with special difficulties to postpone the adjustments 
of duty rates towards the common customs tariff for a limited period of time; and (c) the CCT 
should be applied in its entirety by the end of the transitional period. In the financing 
arrangements, member states were required to transfer part of their customs revenue to the 
EC budget, as well as making contributions to the EC budget according to their gross 
national income (GNI) shares. 
 Africa – the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is the oldest customs union in the 
world. The 1910 SACU Agreement created the following structure: (a) a common external 
tariff (CET) on all goods imported from the rest of the world; (b) a common pool of customs 
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duties as per the total volume of external trade; and common excise duties based on the 
total production and consumption of excisable goods; (c) free movement of SACU 
manufactured products within SACU, without any duties or quantitative restrictions; and (d) 
a revenue-sharing formula for the distribution of customs and excise revenues collected in 
SACU. Two additional provisions were later added: (a) the inclusion of excise tax in the 
revenue pool; and (b) a multiplier in the revenue sharing formula that would boost the 
revenue of some members. The revenue sharing formula uses three components: (1) a 
share of the customs pool; (2) a share of the excise pool; and (3) a share of a development 
pool. Other customs unions in Africa include the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS); the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); and 
the East African Community (EAC). 
 Latin America – In the Western Hemisphere one of the principal customs unions is that of 
the Southern Common Market (Mercosur).  Although the common external tariff was 
formally launched in Mercosur in 1995, enforcement of the CET has been quite weak, which 
has given rise to the need to enforce rules of origin for all trade in the region. More recently, 
Mercosur member states have agreed to circulate the imported goods freely if the CET was 
at zero in all member states or if Mercosur granted the third parties 100 percent 
concessions. The other important customs union in the region is the Central American 
Common Market (CACM). 
B. Options for a Common External Tariff 
Optimal Tariff – The economic motivation for applying a tariff is base on the argument that it 
should improve a country’s overall well-being to the extent that any welfare improvement should 
exceed the losses incurred by the tariff. A large country that has the ability to impact world 
market prices of a product can derive welfare gains by taxing its imports. If any of the ASEAN 
countries were large enough that it imports a significant share of the world’s supply of a 
particular product, a tariff on that product could lower the price it had to pay to world suppliers, 
which in turn would improve its terms-of-trade. While this argument is theoretically valid, there 
are unlikely to be any products in ASEAN where countries possess sufficient monopsony power 
to influence the terms of trade of that internationally traded product. In that case, the actual 
tariffs in the ASEAN member states are typically larger than the values that optimal tariffs could 
reasonably be expected to take, and for all practical purposes, tariff policy in ASEAN can be 
established without reference to the theoretically optimal tariff. 
Alternative CET Structures – There are two types of structures that broadly reflect the 
preferences of ASEAN member states. The first is a cascading tariff structure in which higher 
tariffs are applied to final goods than to production inputs, that is, intermediate and capital 
goods, as well as raw materials. The advantage of this type of structure is that it promotes local 
industries that would otherwise be unable to complete with internationally produced goods in the 
domestic markets. The problem is that it is difficult to design, and government authorities often 
find themselves making recurrent tariff adjustments in response to lobbying interests of different 
industries. These adjustments are confusing to enterprises, fail to reflect a long-term vision or 
ASEAN’s policy priorities, and undermine sustainable private sector development. The second 
type of tariff structure is a uniform tariff that is applied to all goods equally. It has the advantage 
of providing simplicity, ensuring that a country’s trade reflects its comparative advantage, and 
maximizing consumer welfare by setting the cost of the domestically produced goods at those 
established in global markets. 
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Trade Tax Dependencies –Several ASEAN members use tariffs as an important source of 
government revenue. In our interviews conducted with government tax authorities, it was 
generally recognized that trade taxes are not optimal instruments to achieve revenue objective 
because they significantly distort production and consumption choices. However, the use of 
tariffs to raise revenue is motivated by the lack of trade-neutral tax instruments, with the result 
that the domestic tax base is fixed either because the tax base cannot be enlarged rapidly 
enough or the marginal costs of increased domestic tax collection are high.  
Revenue Sharing – All customs unions must establish procedures for sharing common 
customs revenues and those revenue sharing procedures have followed different rules in 
different customs unions. The revenue sharing experience of existing customs unions will be 
useful guides for ASEAN, but it is clear that a practical system suitable for the characteristics of 
the region’s countries will need to be designed in a somewhat independent manner to those of 
other regions. Most customs unions adopt the destination principle whereby tariff revenue 
accrues to the country where the import is finally consumed. This option is administratively 
attractive and politically appealing since it means that member states retain control over the 
revenue they collect. Revenue sharing arrangements can be used to compensate members for 
losses in revenue deriving from CET-related tariff restructuring. It would require that that 
revenue be collected at the point where it first enters into the ASEAN region, and that it then 
distributed between members countries based on additional agreements on how the revenue 
should be shared. 
Sequencing and Implementation Arrangements - The level of effort and time horizon for an 
ASEAN CET depends on the types of policies being implemented. Immediate short-term 
initiatives, like the CET rates to be implemented, are unrelated to the operational system of the 
government, and they usually involve stroke-of-pen reforms of tariff structures. The more 
challenging measures, such as monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, often involve a strong 
institutional base for their successful implementation. The prioritization and phasing of the 
recommended tariff initiatives are based on discussions with government authorities of ASEAN 
member states based on the impact that specific initiatives would have on the following areas: 
(1) a revenue-neutral effect, (2) the promotion of private sector, market-driven development, and 
(3) and compensation for tariff revenue losses suffered by high tariff countries by those with low 
tariffs during the transition period towards a CET. 
Tariff Strategy – Based on the preference structures of ASEAN member states, the 
recommended tariff strategy is based on complementarities and adjustments in the overall 
design of trade policy reforms among ASEAN member states. The approach is motivated by the 
empirical findings that individual policy initiatives are less effective in promoting economic 
growth that are a combination of tariff policies that are mutually reinforcing to one another in the 
AEAN region. The strategy consists of the following sequence of arrangements for the CET: 
Stage I: Apply uniform tariffs to those HS 8-digit tariff lines that are most similar to one another 
across the ASEAN member states. Annex B shows that tariff lines that are most similar across 
member states under the current tariff structure of each country. No compensatory action would be 
required at this stage. 
Stage II: Reduce the number of tariff bands to three or four rates with a small standard deviation. 
Revenue compensation would be provided to those countries with existing high tariff rates that would 
suffer substantial tariff revenue declines in moving towards the common tariff band under the CET. 
Stage III: Move tariff regime to a neutral incentive system by implementing a uniform tariff across all 
HS 8-digit tariff lines. 
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C. Welfare Effects of an ASEAN CET 
Model Summary –To measure CET-related welfare effects, we applied a detailed partial 
equilibrium model for commodity-level imports and tariffs at the level of the 6-digit Harmonized 
System (HS). Application of the model to the ASEAN member country imports relative to total 
world trade in those products implies that the import supply of each of those products is infinitely 
price elastic so the effect on other markets of a change in tariffs can be ignored, since both the 
country and the region as a whole is unlikely to be able to influence world market prices of an 
single imported product. Import demand is calibrated for each country and product using 2006 
trade values with non-ASEAN member countries and tariffs at the 6-digit HS product level. The 
aggregate results for total imports of each ASEAN member state apply to both uniform and 
multiple tariff rates structures. They differ at the disaggregated level and it is straightforward to 
calculate the effects of multiple rates since the model is based on disaggregated welfare 
estimates at the 6-digit HS product level. 
Treatment of Singapore and Brunei – Two exceptions have been made in the application of 
the CET to member states. First, Singapore has expressed its intent to maintain zero tariff rates 
on all its imports regardless of the CET adopted by other ASEAN members; the welfare impact 
assessment therefore maintains Singapore’s rates at zero throughout the modeling exercise. 
This position could be approved by ASEAN member countries under the ASEAN Minus X 
formula in which a member state can opt out from certain economic schemes in which it is not 
yet ready to participate, although it has taken part in determining and approving such economic 
schemes in the first place. The formula is permitted under the newly signed ASEAN Charter. 
Second, Brunei has indicated that it would like to maintain low tariffs and the present welfare 
effects are therefore only calculated for that country at rates that are near its current trade-
weighted average tariff of 3.8 percent. In particular, alternative CET rates have been applied to 
Brunei up to a limit of 7 percent, after which the 7 percent tariff upper bound is maintained 
despite CET increases by other member states.  
Range of CET Options – The ASEAN-level welfare effects from CET rates ranging from 0 to 15 
percent are examined in detail in this study. At low CET rates the change in consumer welfare is 
large, while government revenue changes from their existing current levels fall sharply. The 
opposite occurs at high CET rates, where government revenues increase sharply from their 
present levels and consumer welfare falls. At a CET rate of 5.5 percent government revenue at 
the ASEAN regional level is nearly unchanged from the trade-weighted average of the existing 
tariff rates of the member states. For consumer surplus, it is a CET rate of 6.5 percent that 
yields no change from its regional level. At a CET rate of 6.1 percent, the net change in 
consumer welfare is equivalent to the change in government revenue. Above-average tariff 
rates exist in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Thailand, while below-
average rates exist in Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. The 
6.1 percent CET rate would produce an overall contraction of ASEAN imports of 2.5 percent as 
a result of trade contractions in Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand. These imports changes refer to trade with countries other than ASEAN member states 
and have been calculated at the 6-digit product level for each country. 
Tax Revenue Gains – We benchmarked the effects of a 6.1 percent ASEAN CET rate to 
provide illustrative details on the welfare effects. Tariff revenues would increase in Brunei, 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia and the Philippines as a result of their average tariff increases; in 
contrast, there would be significant revenue shortfalls in Cambodia and Vietnam. Total ASEAN 
tariff revenue would increase by over 10 percent on imports from non-ASEAN countries, which 
would represent an overall 7 percent increase in trade taxes from all sources of imports.  
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Consumer Welfare Effects – The consumer welfare effects are large in absolute dollar terms 
but small in percentage terms since consumer welfare is generally much larger in absolute 
terms than government revenue effects in a country. Tariff rate increases and the associated 
declines in the goods imported into Brunei, Myanmar, Malaysia and the Philippines would drive 
down consumer welfare in those countries. In contrast, there would be net positive consumer 
gains in Cambodia and Vietnam because of the larger volume of imports and the lower prices 
that consumers would need to pay for imported goods. While government revenue 
compensatory schemes are sometimes provided to countries that experience tariff revenue 
shortfalls during the implementation of a CET, the fact that they benefit from consumer welfare 
gains also needs to be considered when designing revenue sharing mechanisms in a CET. 
Therefore, what matters in determining whether or not compensatory payments should be made 
to countries is not limited to government revenue losses from the implementation of the CET, 
but rather whether the overall welfare situation for any one member country is inferior to that 
which existed in its pre-CET situation. 
Static versus Dynamic Effects of Sequencing FTAs and a CET – In this study, we compare 
the welfare effects of ASEAN FTAs relative to pre-CET and post-CET rates. While the static 
effects are unlikely to be large since, in the end, the final trade-weighted average tariff is the 
same, the dynamic effects could be significant and give rise to questions about revenue 
compensations prior to joining new FTAs. The welfare effects of the two sequencing paths can 
vary considerably. Implementation of a customs union and an FTA can also move forward 
simultaneously since the implementation of a customs union may be phased and FTA 
negotiations initiated during that time. In those cases, the existence of customs union 
commitments by the ASEAN member states can be considered as preceding the FTA, even 
though the customs union commitments are not fully implemented. 
D. Transitional Issues 
Transitional arrangements – A transitional arrangement should be considered to help move 
from the current tariff regimes of individual ASEAN members to an ASEAN CET. In particular, 
CLMV countries are likely to need more time to implement a CET. For example, if the ASEAN 
CET can be designed and negotiated for a specific start-up year, ASEAN-6 members could be 
given three years to transition their tariff rates to those of the CET, while CLMV countries could 
be given another three years for the adjustment. During the transitional period, each of the 
ASEAN members would move their national tariff schedules incrementally towards the ASEAN 
CET regime.  
Free Trade Zones and Export Processing Zones – Singapore is a free port in ASEAN and it 
does not levy customs duties on its imports. Once the CET is introduced, Singapore has 
indicated that it would like to retain the zero tariff rates on its imports. Brunei has also applied 
zero tariffs on many of its imports. One of the options is to treat Singapore and possibly Brunei 
as free trade zones within an ASEAN Customs Union. If products come from non-ASEAN 
countries to Singapore and Brunei, they would not pay customs duties. However, if they were to 
move from Singapore and possibly Brunei to other ASEAN member states, they would then pay 
the ASEAN CET duty.     
E. Recommendations for Further Studies 
Country-Focused Studies – During consultation held with ASEAN stakeholders, several 
member state representatives requested that case studies be conducted of their countries on 
the proposed CET. The objective of the studies would be to allow policymakers to better assess 
the impact and consequences of changes likely to occur in moving from current tariff regimes to 
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the CET system. Country case studies could be conducted individually for each member or for 
sub-groups like the CLMV as a means of providing comparative analytical information for 
policymakers. It is recommended that additional studies be supported to address the CET 
impact on individual country members as a benchmark to determining the desirability of 
alternative implementation strategies, as opposed to the welfare analysis of a CET to the 
ASEAN as a whole. It is important that these studies focus on practical CET-related issues that 
are understandable and useful to policymakers. 
Capacity Building – The CLMV countries have also requested training and capacity building 
programs for government officials, trade negotiators and other individuals to better understand 
the CET and related initiatives. Several countries have also requested capacity building in 
drafting and preparing legislative and regulatory procedures for the transition from current tariff 
regimes to a CET system.  
Analytical Extensions – The following are key analytical areas that would support the interests 
of ASEAN member stakeholders in moving towards an ASEAN CET: (a) a set of studies on 
sector-level trade flow prospects under an ASEAN CET; (b) a set of studies addressing the 
macroeconomic consequences of an ASEAN CET; (c) a large-scale study on an ASEAN CET in 
the global economic context; (d) a set of studies on tariff revenue sharing rules and their 
measureable consequences on the ASEAN member states; and (e) and a set of studies on 
modeling the political economy effects of CET determination by ASEAN member states. 
Roadmap – An essential part of the (CCCA) work on the possibility of establishing an ASEAN 
CET will involve the preparation of a roadmap on sequencing and implementation arrangements 
that would be required for the establishment of a customs union and the associated common 
external tariff. That work should involve a detailed study of the process needed for the adoption 
of a common external tariff, the transition arrangements required for its eventual 
implementation, institutional and structural arrangements, and possible options for ASEAN 
members to consider. By accepting a model of integration that requires successive steps, the 
time scale of benchmark targets and the overall commitment to the roadmap, ASEAN member 
states would be able to move forward in achieving the integration goals for the establishment of 
a customs union and ASEAN CET. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1. Background  
Common External Tariff (CET) Initiative – The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) was the first regional integration arrangement in Asia. It still remains the centre for 
current and future economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. At the 13th ASEAN Summit in 
Singapore on 20 November 2007, the ASEAN Leaders signed the Declaration on the ASEAN 
Economic Community Blueprint to accelerate the establishment of the ASEAN single market 
and production base by 2015 and to transform ASEAN into an integrated region with free 
movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labor and freer flow of capital. One of those 
initiatives involves the move from the current Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) 
included in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) to a Common External Tariff (CET) of an 
ASEAN Customs Union. The Coordinating Committee for the Implementation of the CEPT for 
AFTA (CCCA) is tasked by the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) to advance work on 
the possibility of establishing a CET in ASEAN. 
Motivation for Present Study: The AFTA has already achieved significant progress in the 
removal of tariffs among the ten ASEAN members. Through WTO tariff reductions and various 
free trade agreements signed by ASEAN and its member states, tariffs with the non-ASEAN 
members have been gradually reduced. The next step involves the analysis of options and 
consequences of moving towards an ASEAN CET. Process in this area is likely to involve a 
number of challenges since existing MFN tariffs of ASEAN member states vary widely. The 
present study is the first attempt to analyze a range of CET options for the region and to 
measure their welfare effect on each ASEAN member state.  
Reconciling National Interests – Unlike the European Union and other customs union 
arrangements in Africa and Latin America, the ASEAN has not applied a CET to imported goods 
from non-ASEAN countries. The AFTA is essentially a free trade agreement under which each 
ASEAN member exercises its own tariff regime. A common external tariff would require the 
ASEAN to move from AFTA to a custom union, which needs to reconcile diverse national 
interests including the large discrepancies in applied MFN tariffs. For example, Singapore does 
not levy import duties and Brunei applied them to only a relatively few products, while other 
ASEAN members levy import tariffs in a variety of rate structures and in various degrees. If a 
uniform common external tariff were required of all member countries, then Singapore and 
Brunei would have to begin applying tariffs or other member states would need to completely 
eliminate their tariffs. While convergence of tariffs would be difficult in the short term because of 
large development gaps between Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand (ASEAN-6) and the CLMV countries, in the medium to long-run it is likely that such 
convergence would be both desirable and feasible. 
1.2.  Objective and Outputs 
Objective – The objective of this study is to provide a preliminary analysis on a range of CET 
options that could be adopted in ASEAN and to provide details on the implications of the 
proposed CET for each ASEAN member state. The results of the study are intended to assist 
the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN member states in considering the options under the 
deliberations by the Coordinating Committee for the Implementation of the CEPT for AFTA 
(CCCA), which will eventually be presented to the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) 
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for its deliberation on the application of the harmonized ASEAN common external tariffs as a 
long term objective of economic integration in ASEAN. 
Outputs – The main output of the study is the identification of a range of options of the CET 
scenario that could be adopted in ASEAN. The study provide an analysis on the implications of 
the possible CET scenarios for each member state with regard to the following factors: (a) the 
adjustments required; (b) the implications on the structural adjustments; (c) the ultimate welfare 
effects; (d) review on the issue of loss of revenue as a result of lowered customs tariffs; and (d) 
other issues that may be affected by the required adjustments. The study also provides 
alternatives for the use of customs revenue, for example, in terms of potentially providing 
resources towards supporting the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
envisioned under the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. Finally, the study suggests key 
aspects of further trade technical support that would be required in establishing a customs union 
in ASEAN, especially in the form of follow-up work to the present study.  
1.3 Coverage  
The present study builds on the results of an in-depth review of previous CET experiences and 
consultations with ASEAN stakeholders to construct a modeling framework that has been able 
to provide quantitative estimates of the welfare effects from a CET.  
 Literature Review: A comprehensive review has been undertaken on (a) the historical 
developments of the ASEAN trade initiatives including CEPT under AFTA and FTA 
negotiations, and (b) comparative analysis of CET experiences in other regions, including 
the EU, MERCUSUR, SACU, and others. 
 Consultation with Stakeholders: Stakeholders were consulted during the field studies in nine 
ASEAN member states (except for Myanmar) by two senior consultants on revenue and 
competition effects, as well as export potentials in the ten ASEAN member states.  
 Modeling CET Welfare Effects: A partial equilibrium model is used to measure CET-related 
welfare effects on consumption and revenue in the ASEAN member states. 
 Analysis of CET Options and Their Implications: The three experts worked together to 
identify a range of options of the CET scenarios that could be considered by ASEAN and 
analyze the implications of each option for the ASEAN member states.  
The present report summarizes the results of the aforementioned activities and is divided into 
the following chapters. 
 Chapter 1 provides the background to the study in terms of the evolution of ASEAN towards 
an economic community, summarizes the objective and outputs of the study, and highlights 
its coverage and limitations of the preliminary study.  
 Chapter 2 summarizes the historical developments of ASEAN economic integration from the 
AFTA/CEPT to FTAs and to CET. It also provides the comparative analysis of the CET 
options and practices of other customs unions. 
 Chapter 7 describes and evaluates the current tariff structure in ASEAN and puts forward a 
set of options for designing a CET for the ASEAN member states. 
 Chapter 4 presents the modeling methodology to be used to measure the welfare effects of 
a range of alternative common tariff regimes and how the costs and benefits would be 
distributed across ASEAN member states. 
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 Chapter 5 analyzes the sequencing of the FTAs and CET and the implications that it has on 
member states’ welfare effects. 
 Chapter 6 describes a number of key architectural issues that need to be addressed as part 
of the CET design and implementation. 
 Chapter 7 provides the recommendations on the options of the CET design and 
implementation in ASEAN and also on further studies on the subject. 
 The Annexes to the report present the technical details of the model used to measure 
welfare, and statistical information on sequencing modalities and the welfare effects of 
alternative CET options. 
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2. MOVING TOWARDS A COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF IN ASEAN: AN OVERVIEW 
2.1 Regional Trade Agreements 
A common external tariff (CET) is one of the most important features of a customs union in 
which a single external tariff is applied by all member states to imports coming from non-
member countries. After the imports clear the customs in one of the member states, they can 
move freely within the single customs territory. Along with the CET, some customs unions have 
also instituted other common commercial policies among the member states. However, the 
WTO only requires the common external tariff be created for a customs union under the WTO 
rules.  
Stages of Regional Trade Agreements – Traditional regional blocs have been based on 
formal trading arrangements that aim to harmonize rules and regulations governing trade flows 
between member states and the rest of the world. The stages of these formal arrangements 
consist of the creation of, first, a free trade area with a zero tariff on intra-regional trade and the 
retention of individual member tariffs on third countries; second, a customs union with free trade 
between members and a common external tariff; third, a common market with unrestricted 
mobility of labor and capital, as well as goods and services; and finally, an economic union that 
harmonizes macroeconomic and sector policies. Each of these can be described in the following 
manner: 
 Free Trade Area (FTA) – The lowest level of economic integration is a free trade area in which 
the tariffs among the members’ products are lowered but the member countries retain their own 
tariff regimes on products from non-member countries. The ASEAN-AFTA is one of the examples 
of this type. Another important example is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
which includes Canada, Mexico and the United States. ASEAN and other countries are currently 
negotiating many FTAs which also fall into this category. 
 Customs Union (CU) – The second level of economic integration is a customs union in which the 
member states apply free trade within their customs territory and adopt a CET and possibly other 
commercial policies towards non-member countries. Compared with FTAs the benefits of the 
customs union come primarily from the further integration of the member states, common external 
tariffs and collective actions towards third parties and the removal of non-tariff barriers through 
common commercial policies. The European Union is the most successful example of the 
customs union in the world. There are other customs unions in South America (MERCOSUR) and 
in Africa (SADU, ECOWAS), etc. Even there are proposals in North America to move from 
NAFTA to a customs union between Canada and the United States. 
 Common Market (CM) – The third level of economic integration is a common market which is a 
further integration under the customs union. Under the common market, member states not only 
have a common external tariff, but also they will have free movement of goods, services, capital 
and labor. The European Union has already achieved the goal of the common market among the 
member states. According to the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, ASEAN is in fact 
moving towards a common market of free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labor, 
and capital by 2015. In order to achieve the goal, the first step is to create a customs union with a 
common external tariff in ASEAN.   
 Economic Union (EU) – The highest level of regional economic integration is an economic union 
in which a common market is created, common economic institutions established, and common 
commercial policies formulated and coordinated among the member states. At present, the 
European Union is the only regional bloc moving towards the economic union in the integration 
process. The example of the European Union integration has inspired many other regional 
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groupings to move towards higher level of economic integration. ASEAN member states are also 
moving toward that direction. 
2.2 Potential Benefits of a Common External Tariff 
There are six possible benefits for ASEAN member states from a CET: 
(1) Substantial economic gain – Like the European Union (EU), ASEAN could derive large 
economy-wide gains from a common external tariff. In the case of the EU, it is estimated that 
when the European Single Market was first created, the effect was to expand economic 
activity by more than 6 percent of the EU economy.1
(2) Formalization of policy reforms and best practices – The creation of an ASEAN CET 
requires that the most efficient rules will prevail to become the ASEAN regional rules. Under 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN decisions are supposed to govern 
businesses in ASEAN and supersede national policies that could otherwise contradict them. 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam are still in the transition to become more 
efficient market economies. Through the creation of the ASEAN CET, these countries could 
learn the best practices of other ASEAN member states and lock-in more efficient policies 
and practices through the integration process. 
 The next chapter illustrates some of the 
effects that a CET would have on the welfare of the ASEAN member states.  
(3) More Attractive Regional Market for Foreign Investors – Although the AFTA has created 
positive gains for the ASEAN member states, the independent national policy environment 
has become less attractive to multinational corporations doing business in ASEAN as their 
transaction costs in the segmented markets are higher than they would otherwise be in an 
integrated regional market. The CET or ACU could create an ASEAN Single Market that 
would have more positive effects in attracting FDI inflow to ASEAN, particularly given the 
strong competition for FDI from China and India in the region. 
(4) Abolishment of Rules of Origin and Reduced Transaction Costs – The establishment of 
an ASEAN CET would mean that the ASEAM member states, along with the elimination of 
internal tariffs, would also eliminate the need for rules of origin required for the goods 
imported from other ASEAN member states. The AFTA rule of origin would expire after the 
creation of a CET. Imports from non-ASEAN member states could enter any ports of the 
ASEAN member states to the ASEAN customs territory. As long as importers pay the 
ASEAN import duties under the CET, imported goods would also be allowed to move freely 
within the region. The advantage eliminating rules of origin in ASEAN is that it would allow 
the trade and investment to move more freely in the region as otherwise sometime rules of 
origin can be used as non-tariff barrier (NTBs) to trade.     
(5) Functional Enhancements of the ASEAN Secretariat –  Enhanced functions related to 
the monitoring and implementation of the CET would strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat. 
This process would, in turn, allow ASEAN to be in a better position to harmonize, coordinate 
and implement the ASEAN rules, regulations and policies, as well as to monitor the 
economic integration process and to resolve any disputes that may arise during the CET 
implementation process.  
(6) Enhanced Negotiating Capacity with WTO and Other Trade Organizations – With the 
joint actions in the WTO and other regional trade organizations, the collective ASEAN 
positions would be much more powerful than individual ASEAN members. However, ASEAN 
                                                          
1  Cecchini. P. The Costs of Non-Europe. Brussels: European Commission, 1988 
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members may have different commercial interests in multilateral and regional trade 
negotiations. In the long run, ASEAN member states would benefit from the collective 
bargaining in trade negotiations if their common trade interests could be coordinated and 
represented by the ASEAN trade negotiation team.  
2.3 Historical Developments of ASEAN Trade Arrangements 
The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) was established in August 1967 in 
Bangkok by the following five original member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Initially ASEAN intended to establish a forum for discussing political 
and security concerns in the region. Brunei Darussalam joined the ASEAN in 1984 after its 
independence, and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) joined the ASEAN in the 
1990s as part of their reform programs and regional integration process. Vietnam became a 
member in July 1995, Laos and Myanmar in July 1997, and Cambodia in April 1999.  
Early Development – In the early years, ASEAN primarily focused on political goals, striving for 
peace and security in Southeast Asia. Only in the late 1970s, did ASEAN member states begin 
to give more thoughts on closer economic integration among the ASEAN countries. The first 
Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) was signed by five original ASEAN member states in 
1977. However, the impact of the PTA was limited because the tariff concessions granted by 
ASEAN member states only covered a small portion of the intra-ASEAN trade. Due to the large 
development gaps between the member states, ASEAN countries were not ready to open up to 
the regional economic integration at that time. In the late 1980s the ASEAN-6 became more 
serious with their trade liberalization and economic integration process, partly to counterweight 
the growing trends of other trading blocs such as the European Union and NAFTA. In January 
1992, ASEAN leaders decided to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). In 1995, they 
also concluded the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). In 1998, the ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA) was also created.  
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) – The AFTA, which replaced the former PTA, went much 
further and aimed at reducing tariffs at much broader range of products and also tried to 
eliminate non-tariff barriers and other cross-border restrictions. In the tariff area, the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) was introduced to implement the AFTA Agreement. Under 
the CEPT, ASEAN member states were required to lower down most of their tariffs to 0-5 
percent gradually – for ASEAN-6 by 2002 and for ASEAN-CLMV by 2008. It was envisioned that 
intra-ASEAN import tariffs could be completely eliminated for ASEAN-6 by 2010 and for 
ASEAN-CLMV by 2015 with some exceptions of sensitive products and general and temporary 
exclusion products. 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) – The CEPT applies only to goods originated 
with the ASEAN member states. The general rule is that the ASEAN content must constitute at 
least 40 percent of the value of the goods to be qualified. The local ASEAN content can be 
cumulative – i.e. the value of material, labor and processing inputs from various ASEAN 
members that can be combined to meet the 40 percent requirement under the ASEAN rules of 
origin (RoO). The exporters must obtain a Form D certification from its national government 
confirming that the goods have met the 40 percent ASEAN RoO requirement. The Form D must 
be presented to the customs authorities of the importing ASEAN countries to qualify for the 
CEPT rate. Sometimes difficulties have arisen with regards to the proof required to support such 
a claim and the question of how ASEAN national customs authorities can verify Form D 
submissions. In fact, the customs authority from each ASEAN member state interprets and 
implements the Form D requirements independently without much coordination and consistency.  
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Remaining CEPT Issues – Although the ASEAN can officially claim that the AFTA has been 
virtually created, there are some problems in the implementation of the CEPT. First of all, there 
are a large number of sensitive products excluded from the CEPT scheme by each of ASEAN 
member states. For example, rice and sugar are considered by many ASEAN members as 
highly sensitive products and excluded from the CEPT reduction. Second, there is a quite low 
utility of the CEPT scheme for the intra-ASEAN trade. Local enterprises do not bother to go 
through the necessary formalities to be qualified for the CEPT scheme or simply do not know 
that their business transactions are qualified for the preferential tariff rates. Some government 
authorities still apply relatively high tariffs and do not bother to inform the local businesses about 
the CEPT as they want to meet their tariff revenue targets.  
The ASEAN leaders understand that the ultimate goal of AFTA is to move the tariff rates to zero 
and to achieve the free movement of the goods within ASEAN. In this regard, ASEAN member 
states will have to make more efforts before the free movement of goods is reached in ASEAN. 
The ASEAN leaders are calling for the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
with a free movement of goods, services, investment, capital and skilled labor in ASEAN by year 
2015. In fact, the AEC is a much higher level of economic integration – somewhere between a 
customs union and a common market. 
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint – The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 
indicates that free flow of good is one of the principal means by which the ASEAN member 
states can achieve the single market and production base. The following actions are being 
taken to eliminate tariffs within ASEAN under the CEPT:2
 Eliminate import duties on all products, except for those phased in from the Sensitive and Highly 
Sensitive Lists by 2010 for ASEAN-6 and by 2015, with some flexibilities for some sensitive products 
by 2018, for CLMV in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol to Amend the CEPT Agreement 
for the Elimination of Import Duties; 
  
 Eliminate import duties on products in the Priority Integration Sectors 2012 for CLMV, following their 
elimination by the ASEAN-6 in 2007, in accordance with the provisions of the ASEAN Framework 
Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors; 
 Complete the phasing in of the remaining products in the Sensitive List (SL) into the CEPT Scheme 
and reduce tariffs on these products to 0-5 percent by 1 January 2010 for ASEAN-6, 1 January 2013 
for Vietnam, 1 January 2015 for Lao PDR and Myanmar, and by 1 January 2017 for Cambodia, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Special Arrangements for Sensitive and Highly 
Sensitive Products; and 
 Phase in products, which are in the General Exceptions List, in conformity with the CEPT Agreement.   
One of the initiatives proposed by the Senior ASEAN Officials Meeting (SEOM) as a means of 
promoting the free movement of goods has been to study ways in which ASEAN member states 
could move towards a common external tariff regime. To that end, the SEOM requested the 
Coordinating Committee for the Implementation of the CEPT for AFTA (CCCA) carry out an 
investigation of the possibility of establishing a CET regime in ASEAN.  
2.4 Free Trade Agreements and Implications for CET 
In addition to the various efforts being made to promote free movement of goods within the 
region, ASEAN and the individual ASEAN member states are also active in pursuing regional 
and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries or regional trading blocs. Box 
2.1 shows that ASEAN member countries, both as a group and individually, have concluded a 
                                                          
2 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, P. 6-7. 
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Box 2.1: Free Trade Agreements and Negotiations Involving ASEAN and the Member States 
Country/ASEAN FTAs Currently in Force FTAs under Negotiations 
ASEAN as a 
Group 
• ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• China 
• Korea 
• Japan 
• European Union 
• India 
• Australia and New Zealand 
• ASEAN + 3 (China, Korea and Japan) 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
• ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• Japan 
• US TIFA 
• New Zealand-Singapore-Chile (Strategic 
Economic Partnership) 
 
Cambodia • ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• US TIFA 
 
Indonesia • ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• Japan 
• US TIFA 
• Australia 
• Pakistan 
• EFTA countries 
Lao PDR • ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (Bangkok 
Agreement) – India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
China and Myanmar 
 
Malaysia • ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• Japan 
• Pakistan 
• US TIFA 
 
 
• Australia 
• New Zealand 
• United States 
• Chile 
• India 
• Trade preferences with Organization 
of Islamic Conference Countries 
Myanmar • ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• Bangladesh, Bhutan India Myanmar, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka (BIMSTEC) 
• Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (Bangkok 
Agreement) – India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
China and Lao PDR 
 
Philippines • ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• Japan 
• US TIFA 
• US 
Singapore • ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• Australia 
• Japan 
• EFTA countries 
• New Zealand 
• USA 
• Jordan 
• India 
• Brunei, New Zealand and Chile Economic 
Partnership 
• Korea 
• China 
• Panama 
• Canada 
• Mexico 
• Sri Lanka 
• Peru 
• Egypt 
• Pakistan 
• Morocco 
• Ukraine 
Thailand • ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• Australia 
• China 
• New Zealand 
• Japan 
• BIMSTEC 
• US TIFA 
• India 
• Bahrain 
• USA 
• EFTA 
• Chile 
• Peru 
• Pakistan 
Vietnam • ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
• US TIFA 
• Japan 
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large number of free trade agreements, and that they are also engaging in numerous FTA 
negotiations with other countries or trading blocs. Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have been 
most active in FTA negotiations, though all other member states have contributed to the so-
called spaghetti-bowl of free trade agreements involving ASEAN and its member states. 
Apparently the increased FTAs in ASEAN have some important implications for the ASEAN 
economic integration and, in particular, for the proposed common external tariff in ASEAN. 
There are several characteristics that emerge from the FTA experience in ASEAN: 
 Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effects – FTAs in ASEAN have both trade creation 
and trade diversion effects. In particular, since some bilateral FTAs contain more favorable 
treatments to their trade partners than the ASEAN members under AFTA, the trade 
diversion effects may be greater than the trade creation effects. The proliferation of the 
bilateral FTAs in ASEAN can hardly contribute to the economic integration among the 
ASEAN members. This may also have created tension between the more advanced ASEAN 
members and the less developed CLMV countries. Apparently the advanced ASEAN 
members are more active in pursuing the bilateral FTAs with other countries.    
 Negotiating Capacity of Member States – Involvement in the FTA negotiations in ASEAN 
has added a strain on some ASEAN member states, particularly on those less developed 
ones. Apparently those ASEAN members do not have the skills and capacity to conduct the 
FTA negotiations and they feel pressured by their trading partners or to follow the trend to 
negotiate the FTAs and they do not have a good understanding of the impact of the 
proposed FTAs on their industries, government and the people. They also lack the capacity 
to implement the FTA commitments even they finally conclude the FTA negotiations.  
 Range of Commitments – ASEAN member states have made numerous FTA 
commitments with their trading partners and the implementation of these FTA commitments 
is scheduled to take place immediately or with certain transitional arrangements, particularly 
for the CLMV countries. The FTA commitments are legally binding to the ASEAN member 
states. In the tariff area, the ASEAN members are typically committed to reducing their tariff 
rates to zero on most of the products except for those sensitive products. Sometimes those 
FTA tariff reductions are much deeper than those in the AFTA. It is interesting to note that 
the ASEAN countries are conducting their FTA negotiations with their respective trading 
partners separately without the coordination and comparison. In reality, the ASEAN 
members are competing among themselves on the FTA deals with other countries. As a 
result, many ASEAN members have indicated that it would be good to conduct a mapping 
study on the FTA commitments involving ASEAN and the member states so that they will be 
in a better position to negotiate the FTA deals and to consider the CET in ASEAN.     
 Sequencing of Commitments – Under various FTA agreements, ASEAN member states 
have agreed to lower down their tariff rates to zero with most of the FTA partners by year 
2010, 2012, 2015, 2018 and 2020. The best time to implement the CET could be after the 
key FTAs are fully implemented, probably after 2015. In particular, if those FTA in force and 
FTA under negotiations are being implemented in the next few years, it is likely that the bulk 
of the ASEAN trade will be conducted with those FTA partners. Since there is a tendency to 
move the tariff rates to zero for the ASEAN members with those FTA partners, the ASEAN 
members may eventually move to a common external tariff at zero on most of the products, 
at least with those FTA partners.      
 FTA-CET Complementarities – ASEAN members may have to consider what happens to 
those FTAs after the CET is being negotiated and implemented. Naturally, a customs union 
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should replace the AFTA to move up to a higher level of economic integration in ASEAN. 
However, since CET only covers tariff-related issues, the FTAs may have to be in place to 
cover the services, investment and other issues until the ASEAN member states are 
completely ready for a deeper integration – not only with the CET, but also with the common 
commercial policies and regional institutions. Once the ASEAN customs union is firmly 
formed, it is imagined that bilateral FTAs with individual ASEAN member states will no 
longer exist and the ASEAN will negotiate the FTAs on behalf of all the ASEAN member 
states.  
2.5 Common External Tariffs in Other Regional Trade Arrangements 
There are several customs unions operating with common external tariff throughout the world. 
The European Union is undoubtedly the most well-known and has moved beyond a customs 
union to become a common market on a path to becoming an economic union. The following 
section provides summarizes several customs unions with particular focus on their common 
external tariff so that ASEAN member states may be able to learn from their experiences and 
lessons in order to benefit the design and implementation of the CET in ASEAN.  
2.5.1. The European Union 
Common Customs Tariff (CCT) – Six founding members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) of the European Customs Union agreed to the common 
customs tariff (CCT) on 1 July 1968 – one and a half years earlier than planned in the 1957 
Treaty of Rome. The CCT was set at the unweighted average of the six member states’ tariff 
rates on 1 January 1957, which implied that average rates of France and Italy would generally 
fall while those for Germany and the Benelux countries generally rose.3
Flexible Arrangements – Although the internal customs duties were eliminated and the 
common customs tariff established for the EU, specific rules and regulations were still in force in 
member states on checks for safety and conformity assessment purpose on products imported 
from third countries. Each member state was allowed to impose restrictions or prohibitions on 
 Since that time EU 
member states have not been allowed to unilaterally carry out customs policy. Only the 
European Council could waive the normal application of CCT by means of regulations adopting 
various tariff measures.  
Transitional Arrangements – The following transitional arrangement were adopted – (a) each 
member state should move by three stages at least by 30 percent, 30 percent and 40 percent 
closer to the common external tariff rates; (b) the European Commission (EC) had the right to 
authorize any member states with special difficulties to postpone the adjustments of duty rates 
towards the common customs tariff for a limited period of time; and (c) the CCT should be 
applied in its entirety by the end of the transitional period. During the transitional period, 
member states were to refrain from introducing any new customs duties and from increasing the 
tariff rates among the members. The internal customs duties should be progressively abolished. 
It was agreed that customs duties within the European Union (EU) were eliminated in three 
stages with the first reduction amounted to at least 25 percent of the basic duty and the second 
reduction at least 50 percent of the basic duty and the third covering the remaining percentage. 
The internal customs tariffs were completely eliminated on 1 July 1968 when the EU common 
customs tariffs officially began operational. 
                                                          
3 The CCT is published annually in the Official Journal of the European Union L Series. For example, the 2008 CCT 
was published in the 31 October 2007 issue of the Official Journal of European Union L286, volume 50. A CD ROM 
and an on-line version of the CCT can be purchased through the EU documentation publishing house. 
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imports or exports justified on grounds of public morality, protection of health and life of humans, 
animals and plants, etc. This was consistent with the GATT requirement. EU member states are 
gradually harmonizing the practices in those areas. 
Common Elements Tariff Regime – The common elements of the customs tariff regime 
comprised: (a) tariff nomenclature providing a systematic way to classify the imported goods; (b) 
a common customs code; (c) import duty rates or duty exemption attached to the items of the 
tariff nomenclature. The tariff nomenclature can also be used for the purpose of foreign trade 
statistics, import and export restriction, rules of origin determination, VAT and excise duties, 
government procurement and freight tariffs and others. The Harmonized System (HS) 
Convention adopted under the auspices of the World Customs Organization (WCO) provided 
the international basis for these nomenclatures (96 chapters, 1,244 four-digit headings, and 
5,225 six-digit subheadings). The EC adopted the HS and expanded its subheadings to 
establish the Combined Nomenclature (CN) that is a combination of tariff and statistical 
subheadings. The result was a system of 10,400 eight-digit subheadings. At times, 15,000 ten-
digit subheadings, supplemented by four-character additional codes in certain cases, are also 
used in the EEC in order to capture the statistical information on tariff preferences, tariff 
suspensions, agricultural, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, import-export restrictions, and 
export refunds.  
Monitoring and Supervision – The EC has created a supra-national system with institutions 
mostly headquartered in Brussels. Each member state has representation in these EU 
institutions. Full membership gives the government of a member state a seat in the European 
Council. Similarly each state has assigned seats in the European Parliament according to their 
population. The European Commission, serving as a permanent executive body of the EU, has 
an exclusive right on common trade policy formulation, coordination and implementation. It 
monitors the implementation of the CCT and other instruments of the common commercial 
policies and makes decisions on the use of safeguards and antidumping under the EU trade 
remedy laws. It is also responsible for the WTO and FTA negotiations on behalf of the 27 
member states. When the WTO and FTA agreements are being negotiated, the EU will consult 
all the member states for their positions and inputs. Once the trade agreements are reached, 
the obligations and commitments will apply to all the member states.  
Financing Arrangements – From the beginning, member states have transferred part of their 
common customs revenue to the EC budget. Member states also contribute to the EC budget 
according to their Gross National Income (GNI) shares. A proportion of the VAT collected by 
member countries serves as an additional source of the Community financing to cover the 
increased cost of the EC operation and other adjustment costs. Since 2001, the European 
Communities have the following resources for its financing: (a) 1.27 percent of the GNI of the 
member states (maximum ceiling, about 70 percent of the revenues); (b) 75 percent of customs 
and agricultural duties (minus 25 percent retained by the member states as collection costs, 
about 15 percent of the total EC revenues); and 0.5 percent of the VAT collections from the 
member states (about 15 percent if the total EC revenues). In 2008 total EC budget expenditure 
stood at €129.1 billion, of which €7.3 billion (5.7 percent of the total) were allocated for the 
administrative costs of EC institutions while the remaining budget was used for regional growth, 
competitiveness, research, training, agricultural support, environment and development 
assistance.4
                                                          
4  Europedia. The Common Customs Tariff of the EU. 
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Compensation to Member States – During the implementation of the CCT, some extra-
regional countries requested compensation because the net effect of alignment of tariffs could 
their diminish market access to the EU. This process also became a part of trade negotiations in 
the Dillon Round (1960-62) and also provided impetus for trade negotiations in the Kennedy 
Round (1964-67). The reductions in MFN tariff rates agreed in those trade negotiation rounds 
were estimated to have left the average rates of Germany and the Benelux broadly level, while 
imposing a double cut on France and Italy. In the subsequent enlargement of the EU, the issue 
of compensation was also brought up but further cuts were made to the EC’s tariffs in the Tokyo 
Round (1973-79) and the Uruguay Round (1986-93), thereby reducing the margin of the 
discrimination against third countries. As a result, no compensation made to extra-regional 
countries during the EU’s formation and enlargement.  
2.5.2. MERCOSUR 
Membership – The Southern Common Market (Mercosur) is a regional trade agreement signed 
by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay on 26 March 1991. There are two main instruments 
of Mercosur which include a four-year trade liberalization program and a commitment to 
implement a common external tariff by January 1, 1995. Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador and 
Peru currently hold the associate member status with Mercosur. Venezuela signed a Mercosur 
membership agreement on 17 June 2006. However, the Parliaments of Brazil and Paraguay 
have not yet approved the Venezuela’s membership. Mexico is an observer to Mercosur.  
Purpose – The purpose of Mercosur is to promote trade and investment and free movement of 
goods, services and the people and common currency within the Southern American region. 
The motivation for creating Mercosur was to counterbalance the other regional trading blocs, 
particularly the EU and NAFTA. It was also thought that Mercosur could be a stepping stone or 
a collective bargaining chip for the South American countries to engage in the Free Trade 
Agreement for Americas (FTAA) negotiations. However, the development of Mercosur was 
weakened partly by the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001. More importantly, it seems 
that the internal conflicts over trade policies and trade relations among the Mercosur member 
states still prevent them from moving to a customs union or common market. At this moment, 
the free movement of people remains controversial and the development of common currency 
for Mercosur has also met with obstacles. Nonetheless, Mercosur has also made progress 
towards a regional trade bloc. In the last 17 years, Mercosur has gradually moved from a 
substantially restricted trade structure to a practically free trade area with additional efforts in 
creating a customs union and moving toward a common market. 
Tariff Structure – In 1995 Mercosur members established a common external tariff (CET) 
which covered around 85 percent of the imports with the exceptions of some sensitive products 
(including capital goods, telecommunications, computer equipments and electronic products) 
which continued to be subject to the national tariff rates until the end of the transition period. 
The Mercosur CET includes 11 tariff bands, ranging from 0 to 20 percent and represents a real 
cut in overall tariffs with the non-members. It was agreed that the member states would 
converge to the CET by 2001. To implement the arrangement, Mercosur created the Common 
Market Council (CMC) to act as the legal representative of the group. The CMC, comprising the 
foreign ministers and ministers of economic affairs of the four members, is the highest policy 
making body in Mercosur.  
Sensitive Products – Some sensitive products will gradually converge to the CET. For 
example, for the computer equipments and communications goods, the CET rate would be 16 
percent, starting in 2006. Capital goods would have a maximum common tariff of 14 percent 
effective from the year of 2001 (2006 for Paraguay and Uruguay). Each Mercosur member state 
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was allowed to have a list of exceptions (300 tariff items for each country except for Paraguay 
with 399) which would be phased out in five years. These exceptions would converge towards 
the agreed CET according to a predetermined calendar capital goods in 2001 (Paraguay was 
given a special waiver until 2006), telecommunication and computer products in 2006 and the 
items included in the national exception lists would converge by 2001 (Paraguay in 2006). The 
convergence process was automatic, linear and progressive. All exceptions would be eliminated 
as of 2006.  
Enforcement – Although the common external tariff was formally launched in Mercosur in 1995, 
enforcement of the CET was quite weak and fragmented. In particular, the myriad of the large 
exceptions made it necessary to continue the enforcement of the rules of origin for all traded 
products within Mercosur. In fact, over a third of tariff items do not fall into the CET in Mercosur. 
The discretionary authorities that allow the national governments to depart de facto from the 
CET make things worse. Until today, there is no common customs code for Mercosur member 
states. Each of Mercosur members still collects its own tariff revenues and there is no customs 
revenue sharing among the Mercosur members. In fact, the imports from third countries cannot 
move freely in Mercosur. If they move from one Mercusor member state to another, they may 
end up paying double common external tariffs. Therefore, in a strict sense, Mercosur is not 
really a customs union but simply a regional trade bloc of four customs territories with the same 
external tariffs on most of the products.     
Moving the Process Forward – Aware of the need to fine tune the Mercosur CET, the 
Common Market Council highlighted three tasks in its 2004-2006 Work Program: (1) remove the 
double levying of CET on imports from third countries; (2) identify priority sectors for creating a 
common import regimes; (3) analyzing the dispersion and consistencies of the CET. 
Subsequently, the Mercosur member states agreed to circulate the imported goods freely if the 
CET was at zero in all member states or if Mercosur granted the third parties 100 percent 
concessions. They also agreed to establish a common import regime for some sectoral products 
such as capital goods, information technology and telecommunication goods. Mercosur member 
states still need to create a common customs code to apply within their respective borders. 
They also must agree to share the customs revenues if the imported goods are allowed to move 
freely within the Mercosur region. Finally, they will need to consider what common commercial 
policies should apply to Mercosur member states. 
2.5.3. Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
Origin and Membership – Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is the oldest customs 
union in the world. SACU dates back to 1889 Customs Union Convention between the British 
Colony of Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State Boer Republic. An official agreement 
was signed on 29 June 1910 to extend to the Union of South Africa and the British High 
Commission Territories of Bechuanaland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland. 
After the independence of these territories, the Customs Union Agreement was renewed on 
December 11, 1969 and signed by South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The 
updated customs union officially entered into force on March 1, 1970. After Namibia became 
independent from South Africa in 1990, it joined SACU as the fifth member.5
                                                          
5  For more details, see SACU website www.sacu.int  
  SACU members 
have different levels of economic scale, structure and development. South Africa and Botswana 
are middle-income countries, Namibia and Swaziland are lower income countries and Lesotho 
is a least developed country.  
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Key Elements – The 1910 SACU Agreement, which was in effect until 1969, created the 
following for the SACU: (a) a common external tariff (CET) on all goods imported from the rest 
of the world; a common pool of customs duties as per the total volume of external trade; and 
common excise duties based on the total production and consumption of excisable goods; (b) 
free movement of SACU manufactured products within SACU, without any duties or quantitative 
Box 2.2: The 2002 SACU Revenue-Sharing Formula  
 
The revenue sharing formula of the 2002 SACU Agreement, for a given financial year, is: 
Ri = C (Ai/A) + (0.85) E (GDPi/GDP) + 20*(0.15) E (1-((Yi/Y)-1)/10) 
where: 
Ri = revenue share of SACU country i; 
i = Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa or Swaziland; 
C = all customs duties actually collected on goods imported into SACU, less the cost of financing the     
 Secretariat, the Tariff Board, and the Tribunal, less the customs duties rebated or refunded; 
Ai = c.i.f. value (at the border) of imports of SACU country i from all other SACU members, less re- 
 exports; 
A = total c.i.f. value (at the border) of intra-SACU imports, less re-exports; 
E = all excise duties actually collected on goods produced in the SACU area, less the cost of financing  
 the Secretariat, the Tariff Board, and the Tribunal, less the excise duties rebated or refunded; 
GDPi = Gross domestic product of SACU country i; 
GDP =  total gross Domestic product of SACU members; 
Yi =  Gross domestic product per capita of SACU country i; 
Y = average gross domestic product per capita of all SACU members. 
After some algebraic manipulations, Ri becomes: Ri = C (Ai/A) + (0.85) E (GDPi/GDP) + (0.3) E (11- Yi/Y) 
 
The customs component: C (Ai/A). The pooled customs revenue will be distributed according to intra-SACU imports. 
On the basis of 1998/99 trade, South Africa would have contributed about 80% to the customs component, and its 
share of this component would have been 20.5% (in 1998/99 South Africa's intra-SACU imports were R7,520 million, 
while total intra-SACU imports amounted to R36,706 million). On the same basis, the BLNS would have contributed 
around 20% to the customs component, and their shares of the customs pool would have been: Botswana (26.6%), 
Lesotho (13.4%), Namibia (24.9%), and Swaziland (14.6%). These shares are expected to remain stable over time, 
though the size of the customs pool (C) will depend upon the value of imports and changes to the SACU tariff regime. 
 
The excise component: (0.85) E (GDPi/GDP). The size of the excise component has been set initially at 85% of the 
excise pool, and will be distributed on the basis of the GDP of each of the SACU countries. In 1998, South Africa's 
GDP represented 92.8% of SACU's total GDP, and its share of this component would have been 78.9% (92.8 times 
0.85). The remainder of the 85% of the excise component would have been distributed as follows: Botswana (3.0%), 
Lesotho (0.5%), Namibia (1.8%), and Swaziland (0.8%). 
 
The development component: (0.3) E (11- Yi/Y). The size of the development component has been set initially at 
15% of the excise pool, and will be distributed inversely to each country's GDP per capita: the smaller the GDP per 
capita, the greater the share of the development pool. In 1998, GDP per capita in the SACU area was: Botswana 
(R17,968), Lesotho (R2,395), Namibia (R9,615), South Africa (R17,578), and Swaziland (R7,024); this leads to an 
average GDP per capita of R10,916. On this basis, the 15% share of the development component would have been 
distributed as follows: Botswana (2.80%), Lesotho (3.23%), Namibia (3.04%), South Africa (2.82%), and Swaziland 
(3.11%). 
 
The composition of SACU payment by component: On the basis of the previous figures, the BLNS countries would 
largely derive their total SACU revenues from the customs component: Namibia (83.7%), Botswana (82.1%), 
Swaziland (78.9%), and Lesotho (78.2%); while South Africa would receive 20.1% from this component. South Africa 
would get the majority of its SACU revenue from the excise component (77.2%), followed by Botswana (9.3%), 
Namibia (6.1%), Swaziland (4.3%), and Lesotho (2.9%). The development component is relatively more important for 
Lesotho and Swaziland (18.9% and 16.8%, respectively, of their total SACU revenues), followed by Namibia (10.2%), 
Botswana (8.6%), and South Africa (2.7%). 
 
Source: WTO Trade Policy Review: SACU 2003; WT.TPR/S/114. 
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restrictions; and (c) a revenue-sharing formula for the distribution of customs and excise 
revenues collected in SACU. 
Transition – Under apartheid, South Africa was the sole administrator of the common SACU 
revenue pool, deciding the SACU import duties and setting the SACU excise policy. This 
resulted in some structural issues of management and decision making process as well as the 
complaints about the unfair and inequitable revenue sharing among the members. Through the 
negotiations, the independent states signed a new SACU Agreement on 11 December 1969 
with the two major changes as follows: (a) the inclusion of excise tax in the revenue pool; and (b) 
a multiplier in the revenue sharing formula that would boost the revenue of Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland by 42 percent. 
Compensation Arrangements – Although there was an improvement under the 1969 SACU 
Agreement, South Africa still retained the sole decision-making power over the customs and 
excise policies. Since South Africa was the only country with manufacturing capacities among 
SADU members, the high common external tariffs in SACU benefited mostly the South African 
manufacturers. Batswana, Lesotho and Swaziland requested for compensation through the 
revision to the revenue sharing formula. In 1976, South Africa agreed to include a stabilization 
factor in the revenue sharing formula – i.e. ensuring that BLS received at least 17 percent, and 
at most 23 percent of the value of their imports for their revenues.  
Further Elements – After Namibia became independent in 1990 and South Africa ended its 
apartheid policy in 1994, SACU members began a new round of negotiations which led to the 
2002 SACU Agreement. The new agreement addresses the following three outstanding issues: 
First, it created a joint decision making processes. An independent administrative secretariat 
was created to oversee SACU with its headquarters in Windhoek, Namibia. Several 
independent institutions were also established – these include a Council of Ministers, a 
Customs Union Commission, Some technical Liaison Committees, a SACU Tribunal and a 
SACU Tariff Board. These institutions are intended to enhance equal participation of the 
member states. The 2002 Agreement also provides for policy coordination in agriculture, 
industry, competition, and unfair trade practices and protection of infant industries. Second, it 
agreed to a new revenue sharing formula which includes a customs excise and development 
component. Finally, it emphasized the need for developing strategies that enhance the political, 
economic, social and cultural integration of the region without jeopardizing the economies of the 
small member states. 
Customs Revenue Sharing – With regard to the customs revenue sharing formula, the SACU 
members agreed the shared revenue should be calculated from three basic components: (1) a 
share of the customs pool; (2) a share of the excise pool; and (3) a share of a development pool. 
They further agreed that these three different components would be distributed as follows (see 
Box 2.1): 
• The customs component should be allocated according to each country’s share of total 
intra-SACU trade, including re-exports; 
• The excise component (85 percent of the total excise pool) should be allocated on the 
basis of GDP of each member state; 
• The development component (15 percent of the total excise pool) should be distributed 
to all SACU members according to the inverse of each member’s GDP/capita.6
                                                          
6  The 2002 SACU Agreement 
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2002 SACU Agreement – Under the 2002 SACU Agreement signed in July 2004, SACU 
member states can maintain preferential trade arrangements existing at the time of entry into 
force of the 2002 SACU Agreement. It establish a common negotiating mechanism to negotiate 
future trade agreements and no member states shall negotiate or enter into any preferential 
agreements with third parties or amend the existing agreements with taking into account the 
concerns of the other member states. According to Article 2 of the SACU Agreement, the 
objectives of the SACU are: (a) to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods between the 
territories of the member states; (b) to create effective, transparent and democratic institutions 
which will ensure equitable trade benefits to member states; (c) to promote conditions of fair 
competition in the common customs area; (d) to substantially increase investment opportunities 
in the common customs area; (e) to enhance the economic development, diversification, 
industrialization and competitiveness of member states; (f) to promote the integration of member 
states into the global economy through enhanced trade and investment; (g) to facilitate the 
equitable sharing of revenue arising from customs, excise and additional duties levied by 
member states; and (h) to facilitate the development of common policies and strategies. 
Operational Mechanism – South Africa plays an important role in the operation of the SACU. It 
serves as the custodian to the pool of the SACU revenue, which means all customs and excise 
revenues collected in SACU are paid into South Africa’s national Revenue Fund. The collected 
revenue is shared among the SACU members according to the revenue sharing formula 
described above. In fact, only the shares of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia are 
calculated according to the formula with South Africa receiving the residual which may be 
smaller than South Africa’s share calculated by the formula. The SACU revenue constitutes a 
substantial share of the state revenue of the four smaller SACU members. 
Tariff Structure – All intra-SACU trade in goods is free of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Imports 
from third countries would face a common external tariff and a common excise tax. Recently 
SACU members, led by South Africa, have reformed and simplified their common tariff structure. 
Tariff rates were reduced from a simple average of more than 20 percent to 5.8 percent. The 
tariff rates fell within eight bands ranging from zero to 30 percent with some exceptions of higher 
rates on clothing and automobile items.  
FTA Commitments within CU Framework – Before 2002 individual SACU members were 
allowed to enter separately into trade agreements with other countries. However, under the 
2002 SACU Agreement, FTA negotiations with SACU would only be possible with SACU as a 
whole and not with individual SACU members. SACU members are also currently engaging in 
several FTA negotiations with the United States and Mercosur. SACU and Mercosur completed 
the FTA negotiations and signed the trade deal on 1 July 2008. The SACU-Mercosur FTA 
reduced the customs duties of both sides on more than 1,000 products. The SACU-US FTA 
negotiations are still continuing but facing some difficulties, due primarily to the US demands for 
stronger investment and IPR provisions in the FTA. SACU is also negotiating an EPA with the 
EU in the context of the Cotonou negotiations. The five SACU members are also members of 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which aimed at progressively 
establishing a free trade area among the 11 members.  
2.5.4. Other Customs Unions in Africa 
There are several other customs unions in Africa. These include the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) with 15 members; the Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) with 19 members; and the East African Community (EAC) with 5 
members. They are either at the beginning of the integration process or they have met some 
difficulties on their integration initiatives. 
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – ECOWAS is a regional trading 
bloc of 15 West African countries. The Treaty of the Economic Community of West African 
States was signed in Lagos on 25 May 1975. The current ECOWAS members include Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Cerde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The objective of ECOWAS is to promote 
economic cooperation and integration among the West African countries, leading to the 
establishment of an Economic Union of West Africa. ECOWAS was intended to achieve the 
collective self-sufficiency for the member states by means of economic and monetary union. It 
intended to promote economic integration in all the fields of economic activities, particularly in 
agriculture, industry, transport, energy, telecommunications, natural resources, commerce, 
monetary and cultural matters. The headquarters of ECOWAS is located in Abuja, Nigeria. 
ECOWAS is one of the important pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC). 
 Acceleration under 1992 Treaty – Economic integration in ECOWAS was quite slow in the 
1970s and 1980s. In 1993 the ECOWAS Treaty was revised by the 15 member states to 
accelerate the integration process. Among other specific provisions, the ECOWAS Treaty 
covers the following: (a) the harmonization and coordination of national policies and the 
promotion of integration programs, projects and activities; (b) the liberalization of trade by 
the abolition of customs duties among the member states on imports and exports and the 
abolition of non-tariff barriers among the member states; (c) the adoption of a common 
external tariff and a common trade policy vis-à-vis third countries; (d) the removal, between 
member states, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, 
and to the rights of residence and establishment; (e) the establishment of an economic 
union through the adoption of common policies in the economic, financial, social and cultural 
sectors and the creation of a monetary union; (f) the harmonization of standards and 
measures; and (g) the harmonization of national investment codes leading to the adoption of 
a single community investment code.7
 Common External Tariff – The ECOWAS leadership realized it was necessary to introduce 
a common external tariff and to establish a single customs territory among the 15 member 
states. It was also necessary to harmonize other economic and financial policies. As a result, 
the ECOWAS Heads of State at their 2001 summit required the member states to harmonize 
their import tariffs with the common external tariff adopted mainly by eight francophone 
member states under the Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), (UEMOA) in 
1998. It was intended to apply the UEMOA CET in the entire ECOWAS region by the end of 
2007. 
 
 Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) – The UEMOA CET contains four 
tariff bands with essential social goods at 0 percent, basic raw materials, capital goods and 
specific inputs at 5 percent, intermediary products at 10 percent, and the final consumption 
goods at peak tariff rate of 20 percent. The unweighted UEMOA average tariff rate is 12.1 
percent. 
 Guidelines – ECOWAS Executive Secretariat prepared guidelines for the national 
governments to follow. However, from 2001 to 2006, there was not much happening in the 
harmonization process. As a result, the ECOWAS Heads of State adopted a fast tracking 
decision to accelerate the CET harmonization in line with the UEMOA rate at the 2006 
Summit in Niamey. They also provided a two-year transitional period from 1 January 2006 to 
                                                          
7  WTO, ECOWAS Revised Treaty – Notification from the Parties of the Agreement, WT/COMTD/N/21, 26 September 
2005 
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31 December 2007. It was hoped that the ECOWAS CET could enter into force on 1 
January 2008. It seems that some ECOWAS member states have passed the deadline. 
However, it is reported that Nigeria and other members have recently wrapped up their work 
on the CET harmonization. It was indicated that Nigeria would like to have the fifth band of 
the CET rate at 50 percent in order to have the adequate protection of the industries of 
ECOWAS but this was not accepted by other ECOWAS members. With more harmonization 
of the individual member states with the CET, it has shown some hope that the ECOWAS 
Customs Union will finally take off in 2009.        
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) – COMESA has 19 members 
situated in the Eastern and Southern Africa. It is called the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) which include Burundi, Comoros, D.R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. After the independence in 
1960s, these African countries began to consider a proposal to create a mechanism for the 
promotion of the regional economic integration. Under the auspices of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa, a ministerial meeting of the newly independent states of 
Eastern and Southern Africa was held in Lusaka, Zambia in 1965 to begin the process of the 
treaty negotiations. However, it was until 1978 at a meeting of the Ministers of Trade, Finance 
and Planning in Lusaka, the creation of a sub-regional economic community was agreed under 
the “Lusaka Declaration of Intent and Commitment to the Establishment of a Preferential Trade 
Area for Eastern and Southern Africa” (PTA). It took more than three years for the preparatory 
work and negotiations, and the Heads of States and Government finally signed the PTA Treaty 
on 21 December 1981. The COMESA PTA Treaty entered into force on 30th September 1982. 
 Strategy – In the 1980s most COMESA member states followed the import substitution 
policy and emphasized the role of the states in their economies. The growth of the private 
sector and the economic integration among the COMESA members were largely ignored. It 
was only until the 1990s when the COMESA integration was promoted again as many 
COMESA member states fell into poverty under the previous government policy. The 
reemergence of the COMESA regional integration took a gradual strategy. First, it was 
agreed to form a free trade area by October 31, 2000. The second step was to form a 
customs union with a common external tariff by 2004. Finally it was agreed to create a 
monetary union by 2025. 
 Intra-COMESA Trade Liberalization – COMESA member states adopted a program for the 
reduction and eventual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-COMESA trade. It 
was agreed that the reduction program towards evaluation of tariffs would go through the 
five-stage process, i.e. 60 percent reduction by 31 October 1993; 70 percent reduction by 31 
October 1994; 80 percent reduction by 31 October 1996; 90 percent reduction by 31 
October 1998; and 100 percent reduction (elimination of tariffs) by 31 October 2000. In fact, 
only a few countries reached this goal. Part of the problems was related to the revenue loss 
of the member countries when they implemented the tariff reductions. This made some 
countries reluctant to reduce the intra-COMESA tariffs.  
 Common External Tariff – COMESA member states reached an agreement to implement a 
common external tariff by 2004 and further agreed to the four bands of the CET tariff 
structure, i.e. 0 percent for capital goods and raw materials, 10 percent for intermediate 
goods and 25 percent for final goods. COMESA has also adopted the common tariff 
nomenclature, common customs valuation and a single customs declaration document. But 
there are no revenue collection and sharing agreements yet. There are no common 
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commercial policies and no institutional and administrative structure for the customs union. 
With regard to the CET, there are a number of specific obstacles. These include the 
compliance issue of the CET schedules, the revenue loss as the result of the CET 
implementation, and the monitoring and administration of the CET in COMESA. By 2005, it 
seemed that the COMESA had extended the deadline to the end of 2008 to implement the 
CET since many member states found difficult to converge to the CET and implement the 
new tariff schedule. It is not clear that the member states will be able to meet the new 
deadline. 
East African Community (EAC) – EAC is a regional trade group of 5 East African countries 
which include Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda with the institutional 
headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. The objective of the EAC is to widen and deepen the 
cooperation among the member states and other regional economic communities on political, 
economic and social matters for their mutual benefits. Some Eastern African countries had 
close relations before. For example, Kenya and Uganda created a customs union in 1917. But 
the real regional economic integration only began in the 1990s when the leaders of Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania decided to establish a permanent Commission in East Africa in 1993. 
Through the negotiations, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community was 
signed in Arusha on 30 November 1999 and it entered into force on 7 July 2000. Burundi and 
Rwanda became full members of EAC in 2007. 
 Customs Union – The EAC intended to create the East African Community Customs 
Union which was launched on 31 December 2004. The main objectives of the EAC Customs 
Union are to: (a) liberalize intra-regional trade in goods; (b) promote efficiency in production; 
(c) enhance domestic, cross-border foreign investment; and (d) promote economic 
development, diversification and industrialization. The EAC also enacted the East African 
Community Custom Management Act 2004 intended to apply uniformly in East Africa. Under 
the Act, EAC agreed to a transitional decentralized administrative structure under which the 
day-to-day operations of the customs union, including the collection of customs revenue 
continue to be the responsibility of individual member states. The Directorate of Customs 
under the EAC Secretariat will focus on policy issues, coordinate and monitor customs and 
trade related activities for EAC.  
 Common External Tariff – Member states agreed to a common external tariff (CET) regime 
which contains three bands ranging from 0, 10 and 25 percent with sensitive products at 60 
percent. The EAC CET entered into force on 1 January 2005. But the enforcement has been 
quite weak. There are more than 20 products classified as sensitive products, mostly 
agricultural and dairy products charging tariff at more than 25 percent and sometime as high 
as 100 percent. For example, Tanzania charges a CET of 50 percent for the imported wheat 
from third countries while Kenya charges 60 percent and Uganda 35 percent. This situation 
caused friction in the intra-regional wheat trade and may also disqualify the EAC as a 
standard customs union since the member states do not apply a CET.8
 Intra-EAC Trade – Member countries agreed the goods from and to Uganda and Tanzania 
should be duty free immediately and the goods from Uganda and Tanzania to Kenya should 
also be duty free. However, the good from Kenya to Uganda and Tanzania should be 
subject to customs duties at 10 percent and 25 percent during the transition period and 
reduced to zero by five equal installments. This arrangement was due to the consideration 
of Kenya’s economy was more advanced than those in Uganda and Tanzania.  
 
                                                          
8  The Citizen, Dar es Salaam: East Africa: Common External Tariff Poses Problem, 20 December 2007. 
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 Harmonization of Commercial Policies – The EAC also intended to harmonize other 
commercial policies among the EAC member states. These include the policies in the areas 
of non-tariff barriers, trade facilitation, standards harmonization, trade remedies, competition, 
and export promotion. The EAC has also created a series of regional institutions to 
implement and monitor the economic integration in East Africa. These institutions include 
the Summit, the Council of Ministers, the EAC Coordination Committee, Sectoral 
Committees, East African Court of Justice, East African Legislative Assembly, the East 
African Development Bank and the EAC Secretariat.  
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3. OPTIONS FOR A COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF 
3.1. Existing Tariff Structures 
Tariff Trends - Trade policies in the ASEAN region have become progressively more liberal in 
the last 15 to 25 years, although that trend has been somewhat mixed since the Asian Crisis.9 
Major trade and investment liberalization began in Singapore with export-led industrialization; it 
was followed in the 1980s by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam, and in the 1990s by 
the Philippines, Cambodia and Lao PDR. In Indonesia, there has been an increasing trend 
towards protectionism, particularly of the manufacturing sector which now has effective rates of 
protection (ERPs) that are much higher than those for agricultural products.10 Malaysia has also 
had higher ERPs for manufacturing industries relative to other sectors, yet has favored its 
domestic oriented manufacturing industries over export-oriented ones.11 In the Philippines, 
attempts were made in the early part of this decade to lower and simplify MFN tariffs but political 
considerations and the potential loss of government revenue prevented the implementation of 
those reforms.12 Despite its support of low and simplified tariff regimes in the WTO Doha 
Round, Thailand’s trade regime remains complex in an effort to protect key sectors of the 
economy and maintain the country’s competitiveness relative to India and China.13
ASEAN Tariffs – At present the trade-weighted average tariff rate of all ASEAN member 
countries is 6.1 percent, which rises to 6.8 percent if the two countries with few if any tariffs, 
Brunei and Singapore, are eliminated (Box 3.1). At the lower range are Singapore and Brunei, 
with zero or minimal tariffs, followed by Malaysia (1.2% trade weighted average), Indonesia 
(3.2%) and the Philippines (3.7%); in the mid-range are Myanmar (4.8%), Thailand (6.6%) and 
Lao PDR (7.8%); and in the upper range are Cambodia (8.3%) and Vietnam (9.9%). For the 
unweighted averages, it is Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand that are in the upper range, while 
Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Myanmar are in the mid-range, with 
Singapore and Brunei the only countries in the lower range. By way of comparison, overall 
unweighted average of the ASEAN countries (7.2%) is somewhat below that of all developing 
countries (9.8%) but substantially higher than that of industrialized countries (2.4%).
 
14
                                                          
9 For a earlier comprehensive review of tariff structures in the ASEAN countries, which shows that the region’s MFN 
tariffs declined by over 50 percent between 1986 and the second half of the 1990s, see C. Azarcon, “Comparative 
ASEAN Policies of ASEAN Member Countries”. Journal of Philippine Development, No. 43, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, First 
Semester 1907. 
10 See H. Soesastro, “The political economy of trade policy in Indonesia”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, April 2005.  
11 P. Athukorala, “Trade policy in Malaysia: Liberalization Process, Structure of Protection, and Reform Agenda”. 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin, April 2005. 
12 A. Menardo, “Tariff Reforms in the Philippines”. Trade, Industry and Utilities Staff, National Economic and 
Development Authority. Prepared for the APEC High-level Conference on Structural Reform, Tokyo, Japan, 8-9 
September 2004. 
13 P. Talerngsri, “Trade Policy in Thailand: Pursuing a Dual Track Approach”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, April 2005. 
14 World Bank, World Bank Trends in Applied Tariffs Rates in Developing and Industrialized Countries, 1981-2007. 
Site: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21051044~pagePK:64214
825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html  
 Across 
regions, the 7.2 percent unweighted average tariff rate of the ASEAN countries compares with 
15.6 percent in the Middle East and North African countries, 14 percent in the South Asian 
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countries, 12.8 percent in 
Sub-Sahara Africa, 9.2 
percent in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and 5.2 
percent in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia.15
 Tariff Distribution –It is the 
range of tariffs that affects the 
pattern of trade more than 
their simple average. The 
ASEAN member countries 
have fairly wide dispersion of 
tariff rates that vary from 0 to 
226 percent with 137 tariff 
rates within that range. This 
dispersion is particularly 
characteristic of the tariff 
structures of Thailand, 
Vietnam, Indonesia and, to a 
lesser extent, Malaysia. The tariff structure of most countries follows a "cascading" approach in 
which tariffs are generally higher on final goods than on production inputs (intermediate and 
capital goods). In such cases the rate of protection is progressively raised and escalated. The 
dispersion of these tariffs then to interfere with the optimal allocation of resources since the 
relative returns to activities are not determined by comparative advantage but rather by the 
differences in protection rates arising from the differential in tariffs. Generally, the activities that 
seek and receive protection are those industries that cannot compete well with foreign imports 
or use their resources to compete in external markets. The higher the dispersion of tariffs, the 
higher is the deviation of activities from their most efficient use, while if all industries were 
instead protected to the same extent, then resource flows would be neutral among sectors.  
Effects of Tariff Escalation – While it is not the purpose of this study to evaluate the 
effectiveness of national trade policies, the design of a common external tariff in ASEAN will 
depend not only on the average tariff itself but also on the structure of the ASEAN-level tariffs 
across imported products in the region. The existing high tariff escalation tends to discourage 
the growth of input producing industries. This may also be counterproductive to the best use of 
resources for those countries like Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia and Myanmar that tend to 
have a comparative advantage in the production of natural resource intensive products.  
 
 Evaluation – When activities related to the production of natural resource intensive 
products are discriminated against by low tariffs, entrepreneurs will receive greater profits 
from downstream activities in the production chain, which may not have comparative 
advantage. In addition, input producing industries often are more labor intensive and the low 
protection accorded to them also leads to fewer persons being employed in these activities. 
This limits the opportunities for labor to acquire more human capital, which is the mainspring 
of skill development. Finally, the protection accorded from the high tariffs, their high 
dispersion and escalation influences the pattern of investment, which may in turn 
exacerbate the current international financial crisis effects on trade and investment flows 
                                                          
15 R. Islam and G. Zianini, World Trade Indicators 2008: Benchmarking Policy and Performance. Washington, DC, 
World Bank, 2008. 
 
Box 2.1: Characteristics of ASEAN Member States’ Tariff Structure 
Characteristic of Tariff Structure 
All ASEAN 
Members 
Excluding 
Brunei & 
Singapore 
 Number of unique 8-digit tariff lines 76,762 76,477 
 Number of unique 6-digit tariff lines 5,466 5,375 
 Number of tariff lines with imports a/:  3,709 3,706 
 Number of official rate 137 137 
 Unweighted mean average 7.2% 9.1% 
 Trade-weighted mean average b/ 6.1% 6.8% 
 Maximum tariff rate 226% 226% 
 Minimum tariff rate 0% 0% 
 Median of all tariff rates c/ 5.0 5.0 
 Median of non-zero tariff rates c/ 7.0 7.0 
 Mode of all tariff rates d/ 0.0 0.0 
 Mode of non-zero tariff rates d/ 7.0 5.0 
 Dispersion e/ 11.3 12.0 
a/ Based on 2006 import (CIF) data and current customs duties. 
b/ Current structure has 10 bands above ‘general maximum’ of 40% 
and 10 bands at and below ‘general maximum. 
c/ Median refers to the middle value in the list of tariff rates. 
d/ Mode refers to the tariff rate that appears most often. 
e/ Measured by the standard deviation. 
Source: calculations by the authors. 
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within the region. The major challenge currently facing the ASEAN economies in gaining 
economic maturity is to move towards a more uniform incentive structure with a view to 
redressing the structural protection and supporting the movement towards an efficient 
allocation of resources.  
3.2 The Optimal Tariff 
Definition – The economic motivation for applying a tariff is base on the argument that it should 
improve a country’s overall well-being to the extent that any welfare improvement should 
exceed the deadweight losses incurred by the tariff.16
Practical Use for ASEAN – If any of the ASEAN countries were large enough that it imports a 
significant share of the world’s supply of a particular product, a tariff on that product could lower 
the price it must pay to world suppliers, which would improve its terms-of-trade. Consistent with 
this argument, the government of that country could impose tariffs at different levels on different 
products to exploit the monopsony power it possesses and the ‘optimal’ tariff on each product 
 A large country that has the ability to 
impact world market prices of a product can derive welfare gains by taxing its imports. The 
resulting reduction in demand for the imported good would lower the price of the product on 
world markets and increases national income of that country. Under these circumstances, the 
optimal tariff can be shown to be equal to the reciprocal of the foreign supply elasticity of the 
country.  
                                                          
16 The argument dates back to the writings of Robert Torrens in 1821 and those of John Stuart Mill in 1844. The view 
was widely accepted until Jan de V. Graaff’s book on welfare economics appeared a century later (Theoretical 
Welfare Economics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1957), which showed that free trade could be 
more advantageous for a large country when there are no distorting elements from taxes, imperfect markets, 
nonconvex production sets, and public goods. For a historical perspective, see K. Murray and K. Shimomura, “An 
Antiquarian Note on Optimal Tariffs”. History of Political Economy, Volume 32, Number 3, Fall 2000. 
Table 3.1: Profile of Tariffs in ASEAN Member Countries 
  
Tariff Revenue 
Share of Total 
Tax Revenue a/ 
Average Tariff 
Maximum 
Tariff Rate 
Number 
of Tariff 
Rates Rates Weighted b/ Unweighted 
Brunei na 1.0 2.4 30 6 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30 
Cambodia 25.2% (2006) 8.3 12.0 35 4 0, 7, 15, 35 
Indonesia 4.4% (2004) 3.2 5.9 150 16 
0, 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 
90, 150 
Lao PDR na 7.2 8.4 40 6 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40 
Myanmar 8.9% (2000) 4.8 5.0 40 16 0, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7.5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40 
Malaysia 5.6% (2003) 1.2 6.5 60 19 
0, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 30, 35, 
40, 50, 60 
Phiippines 0.7% (2006) 3.7 5.7 65 15 0, 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 65 
Singapore 0% 0.0 0.0 0 0 none 
Thailand 12.3% (2003) 6.6 10.2 226 43 
0,1,3, 4.5, 5, 9, 10, 12.5, 13.5, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 
27, 30, 35, 36, 40, 41, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 60, 
72, 73, 80, 84, 90, 94, 119, 125, 142, 146, 216, 218, 
226 
Vietnam 18.4% (2000) 9.9 15.7 150 16 
0, 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 100, 
150 
ASEAN 
Total 
  6.2 7.2 226 137 0 to 226 
a/ Weighted by share of imports of the corresponding good in total value of all imports. 
Sources: Author calculations from ASEAN trade and tariff database, and IMF, GFS database. 
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would be the based on the so-called inverse elasticity rule.17
Effects of Interest Groups – For countries like those in the ASEAN region that are unable to 
influence the world markets for their imports, the optimal tariff can easily be shown to be zero 
when the objective is to maximize the overall welfare of an economy in which consumer surplus 
normally dominants welfare.
 While this argument is theoretically 
valid, there are unlikely to be any products where any ASEAN member state possesses 
sufficient monopsony power to influence the terms of trade of that internationally traded product. 
In that case, the actual tariffs in the ASEAN member states are typically larger than the values 
optimal tariffs could reasonably be expected to take, and for all practical purposes, tariff policy in 
ASEAN can be established without reference to this basically theoretical issue. 
18 In practice, however, consumers normally have little, if any, 
influence over how the authorities determine tariffs. Instead, the authorities tend to focus on 
government revenue and producer import-substitution interests since tariffs are often an 
important source of tax revenue and industry lobbyists are able to consolidate their interests 
through business associations. In such cases, it has been shown that non-zero tariffs are 
optimal when the political support function gives greater weight to producer profits and 
government revenue than it does to consumer welfare.19
Cascading Tariff Structures – There are two types of structures that broadly reflect the 
preferences of member states. The first is a cascading tariff structure in which higher tariffs are 
applied to final goods than to production inputs, that is, intermediate and capital goods, as well 
as raw materials. The advantage of this type of structure is that it promotes local industries that 
would otherwise be unable to complete with internationally produced goods in the domestic 
markets. To achieve domestic competitiveness by local enterprises, tariffs on vertically linked 
products reflected in input-output relationships need to have tariffs structured according to their 
position in the production process. Otherwise producers will face a negative effective protection 
 
3.3 Alternative CET Structures 
Tariff Structure Preferences of ASEAN Countries – Notwithstanding difficulties of classifying 
goods in the Harmonized System (HS) according to degree of process, we were able to glean 
the type of tariff structure preferred by ASEAN member states through member consultations 
and the existing national tariff structures of member states. For countries other than Brunei and 
Singapore, the preferred tariff structure is one that reflects the following basic characteristics: (a) 
cascading tariff structures, wherein tariffs on inputs are lower than those on final products; (b) 
few tariff rates within a narrow band and having a small standard deviation; and (c) the eventual 
adoption of a single uniform tariff for all goods. 
                                                          
17 In practice, the rule is difficult to implement because it requires consideration of substitution effects between goods, 
as well as consideration of intermediate goods and non-taxable goods. This information is seldom available and 
application of the rule is impractical. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see M. Corden, “Normative Theory of 
International Trade” in R. W. Jones and P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, 
volume 1, number 1, 1984. 
18 In particular, the optimal tariff rate is that which makes the extra losses and extra gains from changing tariff equal to 
one another such that M(dP/dt) – t*P(dM/dt) = 0, where M is the level of imports, P is the initial foreign price level, t is 
the fraction of time, and t* is the optimal tariff rate. Since t* = [(dP/dt)M]/[(dM/dt)P, then the formula for the optimal 
tariff is t* = 1/sm, where sm is the foreign supply elasticity. Note that for countries like those in the ASEAN region that 
are unable to influence the world markets for their imported products, the foreign supply elasticity is infinite and t* = 0, 
that is, the optimal tariff is 0. 
19Grossman, Gene and Helpman, Elhanan, 1995, "The Politics of Free Trade Agreements," American Economic 
Review 85(4), September, 667-690; and Krishna, Pravin, 1998, "Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political 
Economy Approach," Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(1), February, 227-251. 
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rate that will ultimately erode their international competitiveness, weaken their industry and that 
of the supporting industries needed to produce their products.  
 Limitations – The problem in applying this type of tariff structure is that it is difficult to 
design and government authorities often find themselves making recurrent tariff adjustments 
in response to lobbying interests of different industries that are confusing to enterprises and 
fail to reflect a long-term vision or nation or regional policy priorities. This situation can 
create an unpredictable and inconsistent investment environment for enterprises. Tariff 
structures with a few rates therefore allow for protection and suffer from virtually all the 
problems of the diverse structures that are currently in effect in the ASEAN member 
countries, which include lobbying for high protection by industry groups and encouraging 
misclassification and corruption at customs. Only a simplified tariff structure with few rates 
that has a small standard deviation and is designed to move towards a uniform tariff will 
provide many of the same benefits as a single tariff rate. 
Uniform Tariff Structures – The second type of tariff structure is a uniform tariff that is applied 
to all goods equally. There are several advantages to this structure. First, the HS classification 
system does not lend itself to identifying input-output relationships for industries, so it avoids the 
need for policymakers to have a good knowledge of all the important industries in their 
economies, as well as their global market. Second, protecting one industry often hurts others 
within vertically linked industrial structures since protection of upstream industries undermines 
the competitiveness of downstream industries through higher cost for their imported goods. 
Finally, protection of internationally uncompetitive industries through import-substitution policies 
is against the interest of consumers since it increases the cost of the domestically produced 
goods relative to the cost in the global markets.  
 Advantages – Uniform tariffs therefore convey a number of administrative advantages to 
the ASEAN countries: there is no incentive to misclassify goods, which enables customs 
authorities to concentrate on assuring that the value of the imported goods is not 
understated, and will reduce corruption related to customs clearing; the transparency and 
administrative simplicity of uniformity in customs clearance procedures will lower the 
administrative costs of trading; and it dramatically reduces the incentive to lobby for 
protection. 
3.4 Revenue Sharing and Compensations 
Trade Tax Dependencies – In practical terms, several ASEAN members use tariffs as an 
important source of government revenue because of the state of their public finances. In our 
interviews conducted with government tax authorities of these member states, it was generally 
recognized that trade taxes are not optimal instruments to achieve their revenue objective 
because they significantly distort production and consumption choices. They acknowledge that 
preferred instruments to raise revenue are taxes such as income or value added taxes since 
these types of taxes are applied neutrally to domestically produced and imported goods, and 
they therefore impose less distortion or inefficiency costs than tariffs. However, their use of 
tariffs to raise revenue is motivated by the present lack of present availability of other trade-
neutral tax instruments, with the result that the domestic tax base is fixed either because the tax 
base cannot be enlarged rapidly enough or the marginal costs of increased domestic tax 
collection are high.  
Revenue Sharing – All customs unions must establish procedures for sharing common 
customs revenues and those revenue sharing procedures have followed different rules in 
different customs unions. In the European Union it is based on a common fund to finance joint 
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policies. The creation of a common fund was considered an essential step in the creation of the 
European Union’s set of common policies, particularly for the operation of the European 
Commission and its management of the Common Trade Policy that included the Common 
External Tariff.20 In the South African Custom Union (SACU) revenue sharing is based on 
measures of country size involving imports, consumption and population, as well as member 
countries’ per capita income levels, which is used to measure a country’s deviation from the 
average level of economic development of the regional grouping.21
Formula for Revenue Sharing – Most CUs adopt the destination principle for revenue 
determination in which tariff revenue accrues to the country where the import is finally 
consumed. The alternative is a final consumption criterion in which the customs union tariff 
revenue is shared among members according to the final destination of the revenue-generating 
import.
  
22
Alternative Formula – An interesting alternative to the standard formula is the one used by the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). In that case, all customs duties collected are 
distributed on the basis of (a) each country's percentage share of total intra-SACU imports, 
excluding re-exports; (b) all excise duties collected on goods produced in the Common Customs 
area are allocated on the basis of each country's share of total SACU GDP; and (c) the 
development component, which represents a form of development assistance, initially funded 
from 15 percent of the total excise component and distributed on the basis of each country's 
GDP per capita so that countries with lower income per capita will receive more assistance.
 The final consumption criterion means that the country of consumption of an extra-
regional CET receives the tariff revenue regardless of the location of its import. If a good enters 
the CU via one country and then it, or a transformation of it, is exported to another CU member 
the revenue collected in the original country of importation must be transferred to CU member in 
which the final consumer resides. However, the approach is cumbersome and requires share 
information member countries to share information about trade, harmonize their input output 
tables and manage a common fund to perform compensations among countries. 
23
 Evaluation – The SACU formula relies heavily on the amount of intra-regional trade among 
member countries as a means of determining revenue shares from extra-regional imports. 
Difficulties with obtaining reliable trade statistics have given rise to conflicts between 
members, though it has provided a means of redistributing revenue from its largest and 
richest member, South Africa, to the lesser developed countries in the region. Basing 
customs revenue sharing on trade which itself is not subject to any customs duties has 
created serious administrative difficulties. Moreover, as with the ASEAN countries, there is 
no authoritative, consistent and mutually agreed source of intra-regional trade data with 
  
                                                          
20 Pelkmans, Jacques, 1997: “European Integration Methods and Economic Analysis,” Netherlands Open University, 
Longman, England. 
21 Kirk Robert and Stern Matthew, 2003: “The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement,” Africa Region 
Working Paper Series, No. 57. 
22 M. Vaillant and A. Lalanne, “Tariff revenue sharing rules in a customs union: a new methodology applied to the 
MERCOSUR case” (undated).  
23 According to the 2002 SACU Agreement covering the common revenue pool and sharing formula, all customs, 
excise, and additional duties collected in the common customs area are paid into the common revenue pool within 
three months of the end of each quarter of a financial year. South Africa managed the common revenue pool for two 
years from the entry into force of the Agreement; thereafter, a member state or SACU institution is to be appointed by 
the Council to manage it, and specify the accounts into which the common revenue pool is to be paid and from which 
all SACU payments are to be made. All transactions into and out of the common revenue pool are reported to the 
Secretariat, and are subject to regular audits. For details, see World Trade Organization, “Trade Policy Review South 
African Customs Union. Report by the Secretariat”. WT/TPR/S/114, 24 March 2003. 
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which to base information needed for revenue sharing decisions. Moreover, the information 
required for the SACU revenue-sharing formula imposes a substantial additional customs 
administration and compliance burden on intra-regional trade and each member country has 
an incentive to over-report its level of intra-regional imports.24
Application to ASEAN – The revenue sharing experience of existing customs unions will be 
useful guides for ASEAN, but it is clear that a practical system suitable for the characteristics of 
the region’s countries will need to be designed in a somewhat independent manner to those of 
other regions. Alternative revenue sharing methods are currently being proposed for the South 
African Development Community (SADC) that would be usefully studies by the ASEAN 
Secretariat and its members.
 
25
                                                          
24 For details on the SACU revenue sharing system and the difficulties associated with it, see F. Flatters and M. Stern, 
“Implementing the SACU Revenue-Sharing Formula: Customs Revenues”. Prepared under the USAID RCSA, 
Gaborone, and USAID South Africa, under the Trade Policy Development Project (TPDP) and Support for Economic 
Growth and Analysis (SEGA II) project (undated). 
25 For alternative proposals under the system, see Development Network Africa, “Evaluation of an Appropriate Model 
for a SADC Customs Union – Policy Brief”. Report Commissioned by the SADC Secretariat. 3 September 2007. 
 Most customs unions adopt the destination principle whereby 
tariff revenue accrues to the country where the import is finally consumed makes the 
administrative process attractive and the political incentive appealing since it means that 
member states retain control over the revenue they collect. Whether or not the need for a 
revenue sharing arrangement disappears depends on whether member states are willing or 
able to compensate other members for possible losses in revenue deriving from tariff 
restructuring under the CET. That process would require that that revenue be collected at the 
point where it first enters into the ASEAN region, and that it then distributed between members 
countries based on additional agreements on how the revenue would be shared, and whether or 
not some form of compensation mechanism is needed.  
3.5 Sequencing and Implementation Arrangements 
ASEAN Member Preferences –The level of effort, or time horizon, varies considerably for the 
implementation of different policies. In general, immediate short-term initiatives are unrelated to 
the operational system of the government, and they usually involve stroke-of-pen reforms of 
tariff structures. The more challenging measures often involve a strong institutional base for 
their successful implementation. The prioritization and phasing of the recommended tariff 
initiatives are based on discussions with government authorities of ASEAN member states 
based on the impact that specific initiatives would have on the following areas: (1) a government 
revenue neutral effect, (2) the promotion of private sector, market-driven development of the 
country, and (3) and compensation for tariff revenue losses suffered by high tariff countries by 
those with low tariffs during the transition period towards a CET. 
Tariff Strategy – Based on the preference structures of ASEAN member states, the 
recommended tariff strategy is based on complementarities and adjustments in the overall 
design of trade policy reforms among ASEAN member states. The approach is motivated by the 
empirical findings that individual policy initiatives are less effective in promoting economic 
growth that are a combination of tariff policies that are mutually reinforcing to one another in the 
AEAN region. The strategy consists of the following sequence of arrangements for the CET: 
Stage I: Apply uniform tariffs to those HS 8-digit tariff lines that are most similar to one 
another across the ASEAN member states. Annex B shows that tariff lines that are most 
similar across member states under the current tariff structure of each country. No 
compensatory action would be required at this stage. 
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Stage II: Reduce the number of tariff bands to three or four rates with a small standard 
deviation. Revenue compensation would be provided to those countries with existing high 
tariff rates that would suffer substantial tariff revenue declines in moving towards the 
common tariff band under the CET. 
Stage III: Move tariff regime to a neutral incentive system by implementing a uniform tariff 
across all HS 8-digit tariff lines.  
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4.  MODELING WELFARE EFFECTS OF AN ASEAN COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF 
4.1. Methodology for Estimating Welfare Effects 
Model Summary – The substantial divergence of Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs among 
ASEAN Member States implies that a CET will have varying effects on the welfare of those 
countries. To measure those possible welfare effects, we applied a detailed partial equilibrium 
model for commodity-level imports and tariffs of the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS).26
                                                          
9 The specification for the model follows Tumbarello, P. (2005), “Regional Trade Integration and WTO Accession: 
Which Is the Right Sequencing? An Application to the CIS”, IMF Working Paper WP/05/94, Policy Development and 
Review Department, International Monetary Fund. The theoretical framework underlying the model is based on the 
work of Lord, M. (1991), Imperfect Competition and International Commodity Trade: Theory, Dynamics, and Policy 
Modelling. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Finally, the implementation of the model using Excel spreadsheet software uses 
the approach of Francois, J., and K. Hall (1997), “Partial Equilibrium Modeling,” in Applied Methods for Trade Policy 
Analysis: A Handbook, edited by J. Francois and K. Reinert. London: Cambridge University Press. 
  
Assumptions – The model assumes that the each commodity-level import represents a small 
share of each country’s economy, which implies that the effect of tariff changes on other 
markets can be ignored. It also assumes that intra-regionally traded products are perfect 
substitutes for one another but that products traded intra-regionally are imperfect substitutes for 
extra-regionally traded products, and that world markets are perfectly competitive. The 
motivation underlying these assumptions is that ASEAN member countries are currently 
applying a zero tariff rate on most intra-regional trade and that commodity coverage is likely to 
continue and broaden when the CET is implemented. Hence, perfect substitution of intra-
ASEAN trade is a useful representation, while imperfect substitution in extra-ASEAN trade is a 
better characterization of the current situation because tariff changes resulting from the 
introduction of a CET would cause the relative price changes between foreign and domestic 
goods to make consumers and producers adjust their purchases between goods produced 
within the region and those produced outside the region.  
Model Specification – Details of the model are presented in the Technical Appendix. 
4.2 Estimates of the CET Welfare Effects under Alternative Regimes 
Application to ASEAN – Application of the model to the ASEAN member country imports 
relative to total world trade in those products implies that the import supply of each of those 
products is infinitely price elastic so the effect on other markets of a change in tariffs can be 
ignored since both the country and the region as a whole is unlikely to be able to influence their 
world market price. Import demand is calibrated for each country and product using 2006 trade 
values with non-ASEAN member countries, tariffs at the 6-digit HS product level. World markets 
are assumed to be perfectly competitive and integrated in the sense that there are no reaction 
functions to changes in tariffs preferences by trading partners, and traded products are 
assumed to be perfectly homogeneous at the 6-digit product level. The aggregate results for 
total imports of each ASEAN member state apply to both uniform and multiple tariff rates 
structures. They differ at the disaggregated level and it is straightforward to calculate the effects 
of multiple rates since the model is based on disaggregated welfare estimates at the 6-digit HS 
product level. 
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Treatment of Singapore – Two exceptions have been made in the application of the CET to 
member states. First, Singapore has expressed its intent to maintain zero tariff rates on all its 
imports regardless of the CET adopted by other ASEAN members, and the welfare impact 
assessment therefore maintains Singapore’s rates at zero throughout. This position could be 
approved by ASEAN member countries under the ASEAN Minus X formula in which a member 
state can opt out from certain economic schemes that it is not yet ready to participate, although 
it has taken part in determining and approving such economic schemes in the first place. The 
formula is permitted under the newly signed ASEAN Charter.27
Treatment of Brunei –Brunei has indicated that it would like to maintain low tariffs and the 
present welfare effects are therefore only calculated for that country at rates that are near its 
 
                                                          
27 The ASEAN Charter was signed on 20 November 2007 by the Leaders of the ASEAN Member States at the 13th 
ASEAN Summit in Singapore. 
Table 4.1: Change in Government Revenue from MFN Tariffs Applied to Non-ASEAN Imports under Alternative Common External 
Tariffs (Million US dollars) 
CET  Brunei   Cambodia   Indonesia   Laos   Myanmar   Malaysia   Philippines   Singapore   Thailand   Vietnam  
 Total 
ASEAN  
0.0 -44.3 -221.6 -1,890.9 -27.8 -59.8 -3,711.3 -1,229.1 0.0 -5,081.4 -2,378.1 -14,644 
 0.5 -37.8 -209.0 -1,711.5 -24.9 -50.1 -3,231.8 -1,022.7 0.0 -4,648.3 -2,233.7 -13,170 
1.0 -31.4 -196.7 -1,534.6 -22.1 -40.6 -2,763.5 -824.3 0.0 -4,222.8 -2,091.8 -11,728 
1.5 -25.0 -184.7 -1,360.4 -19.4 -31.2 -2,306.0 -633.4 0.0 -3,804.6 -1,952.5 -10,317 
2.0 -18.8 -172.9 -1,188.7 -16.8 -22.1 -1,858.9 -449.6 0.0 -3,393.5 -1,815.7 -8,937 
2.5 -12.6 -161.4 -1,019.4 -14.2 -13.1 -1,421.6 -272.5 0.0 -2,989.3 -1,681.3 -7,585 
3.0 -6.6 -150.0 -852.6 -11.6 -4.4 -993.9 -101.8 0.0 -2,591.7 -1,549.3 -6,262 
3.5 -0.6 -138.9 -688.1 -9.1 4.2 -575.3 62.9 0.0 -2,200.7 -1,419.7 -4,965 
4.0 5.3 -128.0 -525.9 -6.7 12.6 -165.5 221.9 0.0 -1,816.0 -1,292.2 -3,695 
4.5 11.1 -117.3 -366.0 -4.3 20.9 235.8 375.5 0.0 -1,437.3 -1,167.0 -2,449 
5.0 16.9 -106.9 -208.3 -1.9 28.9 629.0 524.0 0.0 -1,064.7 -1,044.0 -1,227 
5.5 22.5 -96.6 -52.8 0.3 36.8 1,014.3 667.7 0.0 -697.9 -923.0 -29 
6.0 28.1 -86.5 100.6 2.6 44.6 1,392.1 806.8 0.0 -336.7 -804.2 1,147 
6.1 39.0 -66.9 401.1 7.0 59.6 2,126.1 1,072.1 0.0 369.3 -572.3 3,435 
6.2 39.0 -66.9 401.1 7.0 59.6 2,126.1 1,072.1 0.0 369.3 -572.3 3,435 
6.3 39.0 -66.9 401.1 7.0 59.6 2,126.1 1,072.1 0.0 369.3 -572.3 3,435 
6.4 39.0 -66.9 401.1 7.0 59.6 2,126.1 1,072.1 0.0 369.3 -572.3 3,435 
6.5 33.6 -76.6 251.9 4.8 52.2 1,762.6 941.5 0.0 19.0 -687.3 2,302 
7.0 39.0 -66.9 401.1 7.0 59.6 2,126.1 1,072.1 0.0 369.3 -572.3 3,435 
7.5 39.0 -57.4 548.3 9.1 66.9 2,482.7 1,198.7 0.0 714.4 -459.3 4,543 
8.0 39.0 -48.1 693.6 11.2 74.0 2,832.9 1,321.7 0.0 1,054.5 -348.2 5,631 
8.5 39.0 -38.9 836.9 13.2 81.1 3,176.6 1,441.1 0.0 1,389.5 -238.8 6,700 
9.0 39.0 -29.9 978.4 15.2 87.9 3,514.3 1,557.1 0.0 1,719.7 -131.3 7,750 
9.5 39.0 -21.0 1,117.9 17.1 94.7 3,846.0 1,669.9 0.0 2,045.2 -25.5 8,783 
10.0 39.0 -12.4 1,255.7 19.1 101.3 4,172.1 1,779.7 0.0 2,366.1 78.6 9,799 
10.5 39.0 -3.8 1,391.6 20.9 107.7 4,492.5 1,886.5 0.0 2,682.5 181.0 10,798 
11.0 39.0 4.5 1,525.8 22.8 114.1 4,807.6 1,990.6 0.0 2,994.4 281.8 11,781 
11.5 39.0 12.8 1,658.3 24.6 120.3 5,117.5 2,092.0 0.0 3,302.1 381.0 12,748 
12.0 39.0 20.8 1,789.1 26.4 126.5 5,422.3 2,190.9 0.0 3,605.6 478.7 13,616 
12.5 39.0 28.8 1,918.2 28.1 132.5 5,722.2 2,287.5 0.0 3,905.0 574.8 14,636 
13.0 39.0 36.6 2,045.7 29.8 138.3 6,017.4 2,381.7 0.0 4,200.4 669.5 15,558 
13.5 39.0 44.2 2,171.6 31.5 144.1 6,307.9 2,473.7 0.0 4,491.8 762.6 16,467 
14.0 39.0 51.7 2,295.9 33.2 149.8 6,594.0 2,563.7 0.0 4,779.5 854.4 17,361 
14.5 39.0 59.1 2,418.6 34.8 155.4 6,875.7 2,651.6 0.0 5,063.3 944.7 18,242 
15.0 39.0 66.4 2,539.9 36.4 160.8 7,153.2 2,737.6 0.0 5,343.5 1,033.7 19,111 
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current trade-weighted average tariff of 3.8 percent. In particular, alternative CET rates have 
been applied to Brunei up to a limit of 7 percent, after which the 7 percent tariff upper bound is 
maintained despite CET increases by other member states.  
Revenue Impact – The direct welfare effects associated with government revenue and 
consumer welfare changes for alternative CETs are reported for the aggregated of trade with 
non-ASEAN member countries in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. Table 4.1 shows the 
government revenue effects from CET rates ranging from 0 to 15 percent for each of the 
ASEAN member countries and the region as a whole. The net regional impact is negative for 
any CET rate below 5.5 percent since the existing trade-weighted average rate is 6.1 percent 
and any reduction in the average tariff below that rate will reduce tariff revenue. In contrast, any 
CET rate above 6 percent generates additional revenue at the regional level. The country-level 
impact varies considerably, however, because existing rates vary across countries. Singapore, 
Brunei, Philippines, Myanmar, Malaysia and Indonesia have below average rates, and changes 
in their tariff revenues therefore become positive at lower CET rates, for example, 4 percent for 
Brunei, 3.5 percent for the Philippines, and 4.5 percent for Malaysia.  
Consumer Welfare Effects – The consumer welfare effect is summarized in Table 4.2. It 
shows that the change in consumer welfare remains positive but gradually declining with 
increasing CET rates up to 6.3 percent. Positive consumer welfare changes continue into higher 
CET rates for those countries currently having high trade-weighted average rates. These 
countries include Cambodia and Vietnam, where the change in consumer welfare remains 
positive, though declining, through a CET rate of 11.5 percent; and Thailand, which also 
remains positive through a relatively high CET rate of 7 percent. In other countries the 
consumer welfare becomes negative at low CET rates because their existing average tariff rates 
are relatively low.  
Negatively Affected Countries – Unless regional tariff rates were set at rates whose average 
exceeded 11 percent, some 
ASEAN member states will 
experience government revenue 
losses the CET. At a CET rate of 
6.1 percent, the direct tariff 
revenue losses are estimated at 
nearly $640 million in Cambodia 
and Vietnam since both of these 
countries would need to lower their 
existing tariffs to the lower ASEAN 
rates. These losses would be 
particularly burdensome to 
Cambodia, which relies on tariff 
revenue for about one-fourth of its 
total tax revenue, while Vietnam 
relies on tariff revenue for about 10 
percent of its total tax revenue. 
Whether or not the ASEAN CET 
were to include a revenue 
compensation formula for countries 
experiencing revenue losses from 
the CET is a decision that would need to be addressed by the member states if a common tariff 
scheme were to be adopted. 
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Range of CET Options – The ASEAN-level welfare effects from CET rates ranging from 0 to 15 
percent are shown in Figure 4.1. At low CET rates the change in consumer welfare is large, 
while government revenue changes from their existing current levels fall sharply. The opposite 
occurs at high CET rates, where government revenues increase sharply from their present 
levels and consumer welfare falls sharply. At a CET rate of 5.5 percent government revenue at 
the ASEAN regional level is nearly unchanged from the trade-weighted average of the existing 
tariff rates of the member states. For consumer surplus, it is a CET rate of 6.5 percent that 
yields no change from its regional level. At a CET rate of 6.1 percent, the net change in 
consumer welfare is equivalent to the change in government revenue. Table 4.3 shows the 
welfare effects of a CET rate of 6.1 percent. The first rows compare the existing weighted and 
unweighted MFN tariff rates in the ASEAN member states and the ASEAN regional average, 
relative to the 6.1 percent CET rate. Above average tariff rates exist in Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Thailand, while below average rates exist in Brunei, Indonesia, 
Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. The 6.1 percent CET rate would produce an 
Table 4.2: Change in Consumer Welfare from MFN Tariffs Applied to Non-ASEAN Imports under Alternative Common External Tariffs (Million US dollars) 
CET  Brunei   Cambodia   Indonesia   Laos   Myanmar   Malaysia   Philippines   Singapore   Thailand   Vietnam  
 Total 
ASEAN  
0.0 48.8 267.4 2,212.3 32.5 71.6 4,354.9 1,535.4 0.0 6,008.9 3,113.1 17,645 
 0.5  42.3 254.8 2,032.2 29.7 61.8 3,872.5 1,327.0 0.0 5,573.9 2,968.0 16,162 
 1.0  35.8 242.3 1,853.4 26.8 52.2 3,395.9 1,122.6 0.0 5,142.8 2,824.1 14,696 
 1.5  29.3 230.0 1,676.0 24.0 42.6 2,924.7 922.1 0.0 4,715.3 2,681.6 13,246 
 2.0  22.9 217.8 1,499.8 21.3 33.1 2,458.9 725.4 0.0 4,291.6 2,540.3 11,811 
 2.5  16.6 205.7 1,324.9 18.6 23.7 1,998.4 532.3 0.0 3,871.4 2,400.4 10,392 
 3.0  10.2 193.7 1,151.2 15.9 14.4 1,543.0 342.8 0.0 3,454.7 2,261.6 8,987 
 3.5  4.0 181.8 978.8 13.2 5.2 1,092.6 156.6 0.0 3,041.5 2,124.1 7,598 
 4.0  -2.3 170.1 807.5 10.5 -3.9 647.0 -26.4 0.0 2,631.6 1,987.7 6,222 
 4.5  -8.4 158.4 637.5 7.9 -12.9 206.1 -206.2 0.0 2,225.1 1,852.6 4,860 
 5.0  -14.6 146.9 468.7 5.3 -21.9 -230.2 -383.0 0.0 1,821.8 1,718.6 3,512 
 5.5  -20.7 135.5 301.0 2.7 -30.7 -662.0 -556.9 0.0 1,421.7 1,585.8 2,176 
 6.0  -26.7 124.2 134.5 0.2 -39.4 -1,089.5 -727.9 0.0 1,024.8 1,454.0 854 
 6.1  -27.9 121.9 101.3 -0.3 -41.2 -1,174.4 -761.8 0.0 945.8 1,427.8 591 
 6.2  -29.2 119.7 68.2 -0.8 -42.9 -1,259.2 -795.6 0.0 866.9 1,401.7 329 
 6.3  -30.4 117.5 35.1 -1.3 -44.6 -1,343.9 -829.2 0.0 788.1 1,375.5 67 
 6.4  -31.6 115.2 2.1 -1.8 -46.4 -1,428.3 -862.8 0.0 709.5 1,349.5 -195 
 6.5  -32.8 113.0 -30.9 -2.3 -48.1 -1,512.6 -896.2 0.0 630.9 1,323.4 -456 
 7.0  -38.7 101.9 -195.2 -4.8 -56.7 -1,931.6 -1,061.9 0.0 240.1 1,193.9 -1,753 
 7.5  -38.7 90.9 -358.4 -7.3 -65.2 -2,346.6 -1,225.0 0.0 -147.8 1,065.4 -3,032 
 8.0  -38.7 80.0 -520.4 -9.7 -73.6 -2,757.5 -1,385.6 0.0 -532.7 938.0 -4,300 
 8.5  -38.7 69.2 -681.4 -12.1 -81.9 -3,164.6 -1,543.8 0.0 -914.8 811.7 -5,556 
 9.0  -38.7 58.5 -841.3 -14.5 -90.1 -3,567.9 -1,699.8 0.0 -1,294.0 686.4 -6,802 
 9.5  -38.7 47.9 -1,000.2 -16.9 -98.3 -3,967.5 -1,853.4 0.0 -1,670.4 562.0 -8,036 
 10.0  -38.7 37.4 -1,158.1 -19.3 -106.4 -4,363.5 -2,004.9 0.0 -2,044.2 438.7 -9,259 
 10.5  -38.7 27.0 -1,314.9 -21.6 -114.4 -4,755.9 -2,154.3 0.0 -2,415.2 316.4 -10,472 
 11.0  -38.7 16.7 -1,470.7 -23.9 -122.4 -5,144.8 -2,301.7 0.0 -2,783.6 195.0 -11,674 
 11.5  -38.7 6.4 -1,625.5 -26.2 -130.2 -5,530.3 -2,447.0 0.0 -3,149.4 74.5 -12,866 
 12.0  -38.7 -3.7 -1,779.3 -28.5 -138.0 -5,912.6 -2,590.5 0.0 -3,512.6 -45.0 -14,049 
 12.5  -38.7 -13.8 -1,932.2 -30.7 -145.8 -6,291.5 -2,732.1 0.0 -3,873.3 -163.5 -15,222 
 13.0  -38.7 -23.7 -2,084.0 -32.9 -153.4 -6,667.3 -2,871.8 0.0 -4,231.5 -281.2 -16,385 
 13.5  -38.7 -33.6 -2,235.0 -35.1 -161.0 -7,039.9 -3,009.8 0.0 -4,587.3 -398.0 -17,538 
 14.0  -38.7 -43.4 -2,385.0 -37.3 -168.5 -7,409.4 -3,146.1 0.0 -4,940.7 -513.9 -18,683 
 14.5  -38.7 -53.1 -2,534.0 -39.5 -176.0 -7,776.0 -3,280.8 0.0 -5,291.7 -628.9 -19,819 
 15.0  -38.7 -62.8 -2,682.2 -41.6 -183.4 -8,139.6 -3,413.8 0.0 -5,640.3 -743.0 -20,945 
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overall contraction of ASEAN imports of 2.5 percent as a result of trade contractions in Brunei, 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. These imports changes refer to trade 
with countries other than ASEAN member states and have been calculated at the 6-digit product 
level for each of the countries, and the results reported in Table 4.3 represent the combined 
total of the individual trade variations in each of the products. 
Tax Revenue Gains – Notwithstanding the decline in extra-regional trade in some countries, 
tariff revenues would increase in Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia and the Philippines as a 
result of the average tariff increase following the introduction of the 6.1 percent CET rate. Total 
ASEAN tariff revenue would increase by over 10 percent on imports from non-ASEAN countries, 
which would represent an overall 7 percent increase in trade taxes from all sources of imports. 
Those governments likely to benefit the most would be in Brunei, Myanmar, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. In contrast, there would be significant revenue shortfalls in Cambodia and Vietnam.  
Table 4.3: Welfare Impact of 6.1 Percent CET on ASEAN Member States
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Myanmar Malaysia PhilippinesSingapore Thailand Vietnam ASEAN
Tariff Rates
Pre-CET
Trade-Weighte 3.8% 10.1% 5.1% 10.5% 3.7% 4.3% 3.2% 0.0% 6.4% 10.3% 6.1%
Unweighted 2.4% 11.9% 5.9% 8.4% 5.0% 6.5% 5.7% 0.0% 10.2% 15.7% 7.2%
With CET
Trade-Weighte 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 0.0% 6.1% 6.1% 5.5%
Unweighted 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 0.0% 6.1% 6.1% 5.5%
Change in Imports a/
Million US$
Extra-Regional -64 212 -581 5 -3,467 -121 -6,224 0 -1,350 3,208 -13,980
Intra-ASEAN -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -           
Total -64 212 -581 5 -3,467 -121 -6,224 0 -1,350 3,208 -13,980
Percent
Extra-Regional -4.4% 9.2% -1.0% 2.1% -3.7% -6.8% -13.3% 0.0% -1.2% 7.4% -2.5%
Intra-ASEAN -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -           
Total -3.2% 4.0% -0.6% 0.5% -2.4% -3.7% -10.8% 0.0% -1.0% 5.3% -1.8%
Change in Tariff Revenue
Million US$
Extra-Regional 29.7 -83.5 146.0 -4.3 46.9 1,503.6 847.5 0.0 -229.8 -769.0 1,486.9
Intra-ASEAN -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -           
Total 29.7 -83.5 146.0 -4.3 46.9 1,503.6 847.5 0.0 -229.8 -769.0 1,486.9
Percent 67.1% -37.7% 7.7% 11.8% 78.3% 40.5% 69.0% na -4.5% -32.3% 10.2%
Change in Consumer Welfare
Million US$
Extra-Regional 1,153 1,260 168,700 288 2,129 462,287 46,924 759,162 354,502 59,634 1,856,039
Intra-ASEAN -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -           
Total 1,153 1,260 168,700 288 2,129 462,287 46,924 759,162 354,502 59,634 1,856,039
Percent
Total, of which: -0.25% 0.97% 0.01% -0.02% -0.20% -0.03% -0.17% 0.00% 0.03% 0.24% 0.00%
Gainers b/ 0.25% 1.19% 0.07% 0.52% 0.15% 0.06% 0.16% 0.00% 0.09% 0.37% 0.05%
Losers c/ -0.50% -0.22% -0.06% -0.54% -0.35% -0.08% -0.33% 0.00% -0.07% -0.14% -0.05%
Total Change in Welfare
Million US$
Extra-Regional 1,183 1,176 168,846 284 2,176 463,791 47,772 759,162 354,272 58,865 1,857,526
Intra-ASEAN -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -         -           
Total 1,183 1,176 168,846 284 2,176 463,791 47,772 759,162 354,272 58,865 1,857,526
Percent
Total 0.01% 0.29% 0.01% 0.09% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.11% 0.01%
a/ Base year 2007.
a/ Refers to HS-6 digit products that register a gain in consumer welfare relative to the base level as a result of the CET.
b/ Refers to HS-6 digit products that register a loss in consumer welfare relative to the base level as a result of the CET.  
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN  
- 34 - 
 
Consumer Welfare Effects – The consumer welfare effects are large in absolute dollar terms 
but small in percentage terms since consumer welfare is generally much larger in absolute 
terms than government revenue effects in a country.28
                                                          
28 In a supply-demand framework, the consumer welfare is represented by the triangular area covered by the import 
demand curve above the horizontal import supply curve of a country, while the tariff revenue is the rectangular area 
between the world price and the import price below the country’s supply and demand curves for any imported product. 
See, for example, E. Helpman and P.Kruegman, “Market Structure and Foreign Trade: Increasing Returns, Imperfect 
Competition, and the International Economy”. MIT Press, 1987. 
 Tariff rate increases and the associated 
declines in the goods imported into Brunei, Myanmar, Malaysia and the Philippines would drive 
down consumer welfare in those countries. In contrast, there would be net positive consumer 
gains in Cambodia and Vietnam because of the larger volume of imports and the lower prices 
that consumers would need to pay for imported goods. While government revenue 
compensatory schemes are sometimes provided to countries that experience tariff revenue 
shortfalls during the implementation of a CET, the fact that they benefit from consumer welfare 
gains also needs to be considered when designing revenue sharing mechanisms in a CET. 
Therefore, what matters in determining whether or not compensatory payments should be made 
to countries is not limited to government revenue losses from the implementation of the CET, 
but rather whether the overall welfare situation for any one member country is inferior to that 
which existed in its pre-CET situation. 
Country Level Effects – Table 4.3 also reports on the net consumer welfare gains and losses 
by each country to suggest that the welfare effects from the CET are likely to impact on different 
products and sectors in the economy differently. To this end, Annex C presents the 2-digit HS 
product welfare effects of a 6.1 percent CET rate in the ASEAN region. 
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5. SEQUENCING FTAs AND A COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF 
 
5.1 Estimates of the ASEAN FTAs before CET 
Motivation for Sequencing – The proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) between 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries raises the question about whether it is preferable to move 
from FTAs to a CTE-based customs union or whether the gains are greater if the customs union 
is first established and FTAs are later negotiated.29
Static versus Dynamic Effects – In this chapter we compare the welfare effects of the ASEAN 
FTAs relative to pre-CET and post-CET tariff rates. While the static effects are unlikely to be 
large since, in the end, the final trade-weighted average is the same, the dynamic effects could 
be significant and give rise to questions about revenue compensations prior to joining new 
FTAs. The welfare effects of the two sequencing paths can vary considerably. Implementation 
of a customs union and an FTA can also move forward simultaneously since the implementation 
of a customs union may be phased and FTA negotiations initiated during that time. In those 
cases, the existence of customs union commitments by the ASEAN member states can be 
considered as preceding the FTA, even though the customs union commitments are not fully 
implemented. 
 Table 5.1 shows the percentage distribution 
of imports originating from current ASEAN FTAs  with China, Korea and Japan, as well as the 
ASEAN AFTA itself; FTA under negotiations with the European Union, India, Australia and New 
Zealand, and ASEAN+3 (China, Korea and Japan). Overall, the total value of imports originating 
in current and forthcoming FTAs other than AFTA represents over 40 percent of total imports. 
AFTA originating imports account for 25 percent, and imports from the rest of the world are 32 
percent. The countries that import the most from those FTAs are Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand 
and Indonesia, while they account for a small proportion of Lao PDR’s imports. Imports from 
other destination account for a high proportion of total imports in the Philippines because of that 
county’s large trade volume with the United States.  
                                                          
29 A free trade arrangement establishes zero tariff rates between participating countries and different has tariff rates 
with non-members of the individual FTA member countries, while a customs union has zero tariff rates among 
members and a common external tariff. 
Table 5.1: Percent Distribution of ASEAN Country Imports from Actual and Forthcoming ASEAN-FTAs, ASEAN Countries and Rest-of-World, 2006 
Exporter: Australia China P.R. India Japan Korea European 
Union 
New Zealand Total FTAs ASEAN Rest-of-World World 
Importer: 
           
Brunei 1.1 5.5 2.3 5.6 1.2 14.6 3.7 34.1 57.9 8.0 100.0 
Cambodia 0.4 17.5 0.9 4.3 4.9 4.1 0.0 32.2 34.3 33.4 100.0 
Indonesia 4.9 10.9 2.3 9.0 4.7 9.9 0.5 42.2 31.1 26.7 100.0 
Lao PDR 1.2 11.2 0.4 1.4 1.6 2.4 0.0 18.1 77.7 4.1 100.0 
Malaysia 1.9 12.2 1.0 13.3 5.4 11.4 0.3 45.4 24.6 30.0 100.0 
Myanmar 0.7 34.5 3.9 3.0 3.5 2.9 0.1 48.6 47.2 4.2 100.0 
Philippines 1.2 7.1 0.8 13.6 6.2 8.6 0.5 38.1 19.8 42.1 100.0 
Singapore 1.6 11.4 2.0 8.3 4.4 11.3 0.1 39.2 26.1 34.7 100.0 
Thailand 2.6 10.6 1.3 19.9 4.0 8.6 0.2 47.2 18.3 34.4 100.0 
Vietnam 2.4 16.5 2.0 10.5 8.7 6.9 0.4 47.4 27.9 24.7 100.0 
ASEAN Total 2.2 11.5 1.6 12.1 5.0 10.1 0.3 42.7 24.8 32.6 100.0 
 Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade database. 
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Options for CET Rate – In this chapter we examine a CET rate that provides useful results in 
gauging the welfare effects of alternative sequencing paths to FTAs. In the previous chapter the 
CET rate was established at the trade-weighted average of the prevailing pre-CET MFN rates 
applied by the ASEAN member states. That rate was then applied to the analysis of the welfare 
implications of a CET for the ASEAN member states in the previous chapter. The results are 
less interesting at the regional level than those at the member states level since the CET rate is 
the same as the pre-CET rate. If all member countries had uniform tariff lines prior to the CET, 
then the national welfare impact would be the same as the regional welfare impact. In practice, 
however, the results presented in the previous chapter showed that divergences in the national 
welfare effects of the trade-weighted average occur because movements from multiple tariff 
rates within member states produce different welfare effects across ASEAN member countries. 
Those welfare differences are relatively small, so an assessment of CET versus FTA 
sequencing paths may yield little, if any, conclusive results about preferred sequencing paths for 
ASEAN member countries. 
Application of Mid-Point CET Rate – The alternative CET rate is one that lies between the 
pre-CET rate and the trade-weighted regional average of the MFN rates applied to extra-
regional trade and the zero-tariff rates under the current and proposed FTAs. The resulting 
adjustments in moving from the pre-CET rate to both an FTA and CET is therefore likely to be 
similar to one another and can therefore provide a better comparison of the welfare effects 
under the two sequencing paths. Table 5.2 presents the results for sequencing the 6.1 percent 
CET presented in the previous chapter relative to FTAs with the extra-regional countries in 
Table 5.1 above. There is a more favorable net welfare impact on sequencing FTAs before the 
CET since the total revenue and consumer welfare effects from first negotiating the FTAs and 
then adopting a CET outweigh the total effects from first adopting a CET and then negotiating 
FTAs. The reason is that the redistribution effects across the 6-digit HS tariff lines are relatively 
small compared with the alternative of moving from an average MFN rate applied to extra-
regional trade to zero-tariffs for major trading partners of the ASEAN member countries. For 
tariff revenue, the redistribution effects from the pre-CET to CET rate are negative but those 
Table 5.2: Welfare Impact on ASEAN Member States: Moving from Pre-CET to CET Rate 
   
Pre-CET 
to CET CET to FTA 
Total 
Effect 
Pre-CET to 
FTA 
FTA to 
CET 
Total 
Effect 
Tariff Rates 
      
 
Initial (trade-weighted) 6.1% 4.2% - 6.1% 2.7% - 
 
Final (trade-weighted) 4.2% 1.8% - 2.7% 1.8% - 
Change in  Imports a/ 
      
 
Million US$ 4,676 17,484 22,160 15,471 6,689 22,160 
 
Percent 
      
  
Extra-Regional 1.2% 3.1% 5.8% 1.8% 1.2% 5.8% 
  
Total 0.9% 2.3% 4.2% 1.3% 0.9% 4.2% 
Change in Tariff Revenue 
      
 
Million US$ -3,199 -6,242 -9,441 -7,056 -2,385 -9,441 
 
Percent -27.9% -54.5% -64.5% -48.2% -31.4% -64.5% 
Change in Consumer Welfare 
      
 
Million US$ 5,676 6,659 12,334 9,828 2,506 12,334 
 
Percent 0.03% 0.04% 0.06% 0.05% 0.01% 0.06% 
Total Change in Welfare 
      
 
Million US$ 2,477 416 2,893 2,772 121 2,893 
a/ Base year 2007. 
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redistribution effects become positive when applied to the low average pre-CET with the FTAs 
for the ASEAN countries. For consumer welfare, the changes that occur when moving from pre-
CET national tariff rates to zero-tariff rates with FTA member countries significantly outweigh 
gains that occur when moving from the region CET rate to zero-tariff rates with FTA member 
countries. These results, however, depend largely on redistribution effects from a CET rate that 
is, on average, the same as the pre-CET rate and the more interesting results are those that 
reflect large movements between the pre-CET and CET rates. 
Comparative Welfare Effects – Table 5.2 summarizes the effects of a CET equal to 4.2 
percent, which represents the midpoint between the pre-CET trade-weighted average without 
FTAs and the extra-regional trade-weighted rate with FTAs for those trading partners listed in 
Table 5.1.30
 Stage 1: Member states adopt a uniform CET rate of 4.2 percent. Table 5.3 shows that 
overall imports rise by about 1 percent, reflecting considerable variations among the 
member states. Cambodia’s and Vietnam’s trade expand by 13 percent and 11 percent 
respectively as tariff rates in these countries are more than halved; Thailand’s imports also 
expand in response to the cut in their average tariff rate from a trade-weighted average of 
6.4 percent; in contrast, imports of the Philippines contract by around 7 percent since its 
average tariff rate rises by one percentage point. Revenue and consumer welfare 
adjustments reflect these same patterns, with the magnitude of Vietnam’s and Thailand’s 
revenue contraction dominating the regional average.  
 In all simulations, we assume that Singapore retains a zero tariff rate but that 
Brunei adopts the CET rate since it represents a relatively low rate that is in line with its trade 
policy regime.  
Option A: From Pre-CET to FTAs to CET – The first option for the sequencing approach is 
one that first adopts a CET and, once implemented, introduces FTAs. 
Table 5.3: Welfare Impact of 4.2 Percent CET Rate on ASEAN Member States
BN KH ID LA MM MY PH SG TH VN ASEAN
Tariff Rates
Pre-CET 3.8% 10.1% 5.1% 10.5% 3.7% 4.3% 3.2% 0.0% 6.4% 10.3% 6.1%
With CET 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2%
Change in Imports a/ -1.8% 13.3% 1.7% 4.9% 0.1% -3.0% -7.6% 0.0% 1.9% 11.1% 1.2%
Change in Tariff Revenue 17.2% -55.8% -24.4% -20.6% 26.6% -0.1% 23.1% na -32.7% -52.2% -21.8%
Change in Consumer Welfare -0.04% 1.33% 0.04% 0.33% -0.04% 0.01% -0.02% 0.00% 0.07% 0.33% 0.03%  
 Stage 2: FTAs with ASEAN trading partners are introduced. Since those countries account 
of 43 percent of the region’s imports, ASEAN’s trade-weighted average MFN tariff rate for 
non-regional member countries falls to 1.8 percent (Table 5.4). At the regional level, imports 
expand by a further 3 percent, reflecting strong gains by the Philippines, Cambodia, and 
Malaysia. The liberalization of trade with large trading partners causes a halving of trade tax 
revenue but an even larger increase in consumer welfare, measured in absolute terms.  
Table 5.4: Welfare Impact of FTA Plus 4.2% CET Rate and FTAs on ASEAN Member States
BN KH ID LA MM MY PH SG TH VN ASEAN
Tariff Rates
Pre-CET 3.8% 10.1% 5.1% 10.5% 3.7% 4.3% 3.2% 0.0% 6.4% 10.3% 6.1%
With CET 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 0.0% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8%
Change in Imports a/ 3.4% 5.4% 3.5% 3.8% 5.0% 5.2% 8.3% 0.0% 4.1% 4.8% 3.1%
Change in Tariff Revenue -55.2% -54.7% -55.2% -54.5% -54.6% -54.4% -52.9% na -55.0% -54.9% -54.5%
Change in Consumer Welfare 0.26% 0.45% 0.05% 0.44% 0.21% 0.05% 0.19% 0.00% 0.06% 0.11% 0.04%  
                                                          
30 From a methodological viewpoint, the process involves running the model for the base solution (with CET but no 
FTAs, or with FTAs but no CET in the first instance), then running the model again for the second stage (CET with 
FTAs, or FTAs with the CET) in the second instance, using the results from the first stage for comparative purposes. 
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 Total Effect: The combined effects of the CET and the FTAs produce major adjustments in 
trade, consumer welfare and government revenue. ASEAN trade would expand by 6 
percent, and while tax revenue would suffer a large reduction (equivalent to overall two-
thirds of current levels) there would be a more-than-proportional increase in overall 
consumer welfare. 
Option B: From Pre-CET to CET to FTAs – The alternative sequencing approach would be to 
adopt the FTAs first and, once implemented, to introduce the CET. 
 Stage I: In the first stage, the member states adopt a zero tariff rate with uniform Australia 
and New Zealand, China, India, Japan, Korea and the European Union. Under these 
conditions, Table 5.5 shows that ASEAN’s trade-weighted average MFN tariff rate would fall 
from 6.2 percent to 2.7 percent. Overall imports would rise by nearly 2 percent, reflecting a 
strong surge in imports by Cambodia, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Lao PDR and 
Thailand. Among the other member states, only the Philippine’s trade would experience a 
contraction. Revenue and consumer welfare adjustments reflect these same patterns, with 
the magnitude of Vietnam’s and Thailand’s revenue contraction dominating the regional 
average. 
Table 5.5: Welfare Impact of ASEAN FTAs on Member States
BN KH ID LA MM MY PH SG TH VN ASEAN
Tariff Rates
Pre-CET 3.8% 10.1% 5.1% 10.5% 3.7% 4.3% 3.2% 0.0% 6.4% 10.3% 6.1%
With CET 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 0.0% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7%
Change in Imports a/ 0.3% 16.7% 3.9% 7.2% 3.2% 0.2% -2.5% 0.0% 4.4% 14.0% 1.8%
Change in Tariff Revenue -23.0% -70.8% -50.4% -47.4% -16.1% -33.7% -16.6% na -55.7% -68.5% -48.2%
Change in Consumer Welfare 0.12% 1.61% 0.07% 0.61% 0.09% 0.04% 0.10% 0.00% 0.10% 0.39% 0.05%  
 Stage 2: In the second stage, a uniform CET rate of 4.2 percent would be introduced, 
further lowering the average MFN tariff on extra-regional trade to 1.8 percent (Table 5.6). 
Since the additional reduction in tariff rates are below existing rates of most member 
countries, excepting Singapore, the further cut in average tariffs would affect member 
countries in a fairly similar manner. Imports would expand between one and three percent, 
while tax revenue would contract by over 30 percent. Consumer welfare gains, nonetheless, 
would expand by a more-than-proportional amount in absolute value terms, especially for 
countries like Cambodia, Brunei, Laos, and the Philippines. 
Table 5.6: Welfare Impact FTAs and 4.2% CET Rate on ASEAN Member States
BN KH ID LA MM MY PH SG TH VN ASEAN
Tariff Rates
Pre-CET 3.8% 10.1% 5.1% 10.5% 3.7% 4.3% 3.2% 0.0% 6.4% 10.3% 6.1%
With CET 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 0.0% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8%
Change in Imports a/ 1.3% 2.1% 1.3% 1.4% 1.9% 2.0% 3.2% 0.0% 1.6% 1.8% 1.2%
Change in Tariff Revenue -31.8% -31.5% -31.8% -31.4% -31.4% -31.4% -30.5% na -31.7% -31.6% -31.4%
Change in Consumer Welfare 0.10% 0.17% 0.02% 0.17% 0.08% 0.02% 0.07% 0.0% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01%  
 Total Effect: The combined effect of the FTAs and CET would be the same as in the 
previous sequencing option. ASEAN trade would expand by 6 percent, and while tax 
revenue would suffer a large reduction that would be equivalent to overall two-thirds of 
current levels. Offsetting these declines would be a more-than-proportional increase in 
overall consumer welfare. 
5.2 Dynamic FTAs and CET Sequencing Effects  
The previous welfare analysis of alternative FTA-CET sequencing modalities is based on a 
static partial equilibrium modeling framework. There are a number of dynamic sequencings 
issues that must also be considered by ASEAN member states. 
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 Arguments in Favor of Sequencing FTAs before a CET 
(1) Argument No. 1 – First, even though a customs union may not limit the scope for FTAs, 
it can delay their implementation and progress towards liberalizing trade at a regional or 
multilateral level. The reason is that adoption of a CET under a customs union involves 
large political and economic commitments on the part of member countries, while FTAs 
there is often less to enter into regional trade agreements. There can therefore by costs 
associated with sequencing a CET before adopting FTAs that are not measured in a 
static modeling framework. 
(2) Argument No. 2 – A second argument against implementing a customs union before 
FTAs is that, once the customs union is formed, protected industries may apply pressure 
on the ASEAN state governments against further liberalization of their protected sectors. 
However, the formation of a customs union is likely to promote greater competition and 
induce industries to become more efficient in order to compete with others within the 
region. Moreover, the formation of a customs union prior to FTAs could facilitate the 
transition of import-substituting industries to more competitive behavior by lowering the 
above-average national tariffs to the CET. Lower tariff rates may produce the necessary 
domestic adjustments that would facilitate the opening of the economy to other countries 
that form part of the FTA. From a political economy viewpoint, formation of a customs 
union first may increase ASEAN’s bargaining power in FTA negotiations by having a 
common regional position toward MFN rates that include sensitive products in 
agriculture. Without a common external policy, FTA negotiations could be dominated by 
the larger countries and some of the larger countries could have higher levels of 
protection across-the-board or in sensitive products that are likely to dominate the FTA 
discussions at the expense of the smaller member countries. A cooperative approach to 
FTA negotiations can have significant welfare implications in the absence of a customs 
union and the prevalence of protective large member states. 
 Arguments in Favor of Sequencing a CET before FTAs 
(1) Argument No. 1 – A powerful argument in favor of adopting a customs union before 
FTAs is that regionalism can act as a stumbling block toward the process of further 
integration. Political economy considerations suggest that inefficient firms will lobby 
against future removal of the preferential rates that protect their interests and will exert 
political pressure to avoid moving towards a more efficient uniform tariff structure.31
(2) Argument No. 2 – A second argument in favor of first implementing a customs union is 
that it can increase the bargaining power of member states in negotiating FTAs. The 
political leverage offered by a customs union can be especially beneficial for members in 
negotiations with industrial countries and other regional groupings in sectors that are 
often sensitive and highly protected like those of agriculture and textiles.  
 A 
simplified tariff structure is more efficient for countries, especially small member states in 
regional groupings that must compete with larger members to attract trade and 
investment.  
 
 
                                                          
31 This argument has been advanced in a well-regarded and often referenced work by A. Kruger, ““Free Trade 
Agreements Versus Customs Unions,” NBER Working Paper No. 5084, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1995. 
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6. DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A CET 
6.1 Key Issues for the CET Design and Implementation 
If ASEAN member states adopt a common external tariff (CET) they will need to design and 
implement the CET from the current tariff regimes under the AFTA and FTAs with which each 
member state maintains its own external tariffs with non-ASEAN countries towards a common 
external tariff regime. In addition to the CET, the ASEAN member states will also need to 
consider the harmonization of other commercial polices in ASEAN, including import quotas, 
import restriction and other non-tariff barriers to trade to all goods entering the ASEAN member 
states. The following section discusses some fundamental and structural issues for the CET 
design and the next one covers the transitional and technical issues that are likely to arise in the 
CET implementation process.  
Single ASEAN Customs Territory- Before the ASEAN CET is introduced, the ten ASEAN 
member states will have to create a single ASEAN customs territory which is the combined 
customs territories where the ten ASEAN member states are exercising their sovereign rights 
according to international and domestic laws. Since all the ASEAN members (except for Lao 
PDR, which is in the accession process) are WTO members, they are required by the WTO 
Secretariat to register their single customs territory as the ASEAN Customs Union in the WTO.  
Under the single ASEAN customs territory, a single schedule of import duties and uniform 
customs procedures should be applied at all entry points of the ten ASEAN member states to 
imports from any non-ASEAN countries. Once the imported goods from non-ASEAN countries 
had paid the import duties and entered the single ASEAN customs territory, they would be 
allowed to move freely among the ASEAN member states without paying additional import 
duties. The national customs authorities will become an integral part of the ASEAN customs 
administration and cooperation, although they may still play a role in import inspection, 
standards conformity, and statistical collection according to the national laws of the member 
states. The customs revenues collected from the imports could be poured into an ASEAN 
common revenue pool and shared by the member states or kept by ASEAN for the regional 
institutional operation and/or for the structural support to the member states, particularly to the 
CLMV countries.  
Zero Tariffs on Intra-ASEAN Trade – Before the ASEAN CET is adopted, there is a 
prerequisite that the intra-ASEAN trade should be duty-free in order to allow ASEAN products 
and imported goods to move freely within ASEAN single custom territory. Currently ASEAN-6 
have completely eliminated their intra-ASEAN tariffs on 65.09 percent of ASEAN products and 
kept another 34.68 percent of products at below 5 percent under the CEPT. They have agreed 
to completely eliminate the import duties by 2010 on all products from ASEAN except for a few 
sensitive and highly sensitive products. Under the CEPT scheme, the CLMV countries have 
lowered the intra-ASEAN tariffs to 0-5 percent on 76.86 percent of their products from ASEAN 
countries and the average CEPT rate of the CLMV countries was 4.65 percent in 2006. Under 
the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, the CLMV countries have promised to eliminate 
import duties on all ASEAN products, except for some sensitive and highly sensitive products, 
by 2015. This timeframe has provided an indication that the ASEAN CET can be adopted after 
2015 when the intra-ASEAN import tariffs are completely eliminated.  
Common External Tariff in ASEAN – The common external tariff (CET) is the most important 
requirement for a customs union. If ASEAN member states intend to move to a customs union, 
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a common external tariff will have to be designed and negotiated among the member states. 
The process involves the merge and reconciliation of the tariff schedules of the ten ASEAN 
member states. In order to convert the current tariff regimes to the common external tariffs, 
there are two criteria that can be taken into consideration. First, the WTO requires that the 
duties of a customs union shall not be higher or more restrictive than the duties of the member 
states prior to the formation of such a customs union. Second, in the practical terms, most of the 
customs unions moved to the average of the duties of the member states at the pre-union level.  
Presently there are significant differences of the MFN applied rates of ASEAN member states 
as indicated in the modeling exercise of the previous chapters. If the average tariffs of ASEAN 
member states are adopted as the ASEAN CET, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam will have to 
reduce the tariffs substantially while some other ASEAN countries, particularly Brunei and 
Singapore, will have to raise their tariffs. The next issue of the CET design is related to the 
structure of the CET which includes the tariff rates and bands. Currently ASEAN member states 
have different tariff rates ranging from 0 to 226 percent. Cambodia only has four bands (0%, 7%, 
15% and 35%) while Thailand has 41 bands (from 0% to 226%). The convergence of the 
different ASEAN tariff rates and bands into a simplified, if not uniform, ASEAN common external 
tariff would be desirable. 
Customs Revenue Sharing Agreement – The single ASEAN customs territory and common 
external tariff will require the ASEAN member states to share the common customs revenue 
from the collection of the import duties. Apparently many ASEAN member states do not have 
the luxury of the EU practice to leave the customs revenue to the ASEAN for its administrative 
operation and other purposes. For example, the tariff revenue of Cambodia and Vietnam 
accounts for 25.2 percent and 18.4 percent of the total tax revenue of the two countries 
respectively. Even Thai tariff revenue constitutes 12.3 percent of the total tax revenue of the 
country. As a result, it may be more desirable to design an adequate and fair formula to share 
the customs revenue among the ASEAN member states. Many customs unions have adopted 
the “destination principle” which means the tariff revenue should go to the member country 
where the import is finally consumed. In that case, there is no need for the revenue sharing 
agreement and the member states retain the control over the customs revenue. The alternative 
approach is to surrender the collected ASEAN customs revenue to a joint regional revenue pool 
and distribute to the member states according to the pre-determined customs revenue sharing 
formula. 
The customs revenue sharing formula should take into consideration several factors. First, part 
of the customs revenue should be retained by the national customs authorities in order to cover 
the costs of the duty collecting operation. The EU has left 25 percent of the customs duties to 
the member states for that purpose. The ASEAN could leave a smaller portion of the collected 
revenue to cover the collection costs of the national customs authorities. Second, another part 
of the customs revenue could be kept at the regional level to finance the operation of the 
ASEAN regional institutions and/or to provide financial support to less developed member states 
(i.e. CLMV countries). Third, the remaining portion of the customs revenue should be shared by 
the member states based on the negotiated formula, taking into account the special needs of 
the CLMV countries to compensate for their revenue loss after the adoption of the CET. Fourth, 
richer ASEAN member states may consider giving up the customs revenue to benefit the poorer 
CLMV countries and to support the regional ASEAN institutions. Finally, ASEAN may also 
consider setting up a development fund to support the CLMV in the CET implementation. 
ASEAN Institutional Arrangements – At present, ASEAN has relatively weak regional 
institutional arrangement. The ASEAN Secretariat is the only regional ASEAN organization with 
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limited capacity. Most of the ASEAN work has been delegated to the member governments 
through the ASEAN summit and various ASEAN committees. Compared with other customs 
unions, ASEAN may wish to strength and develop the ASEAN regional institutions in order to 
achieve the goals of the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. The 
ASEAN institutional building could be a three-step process. First, the ASEAN Secretariat should 
be strengthened with the analytical and coordinating capacities. Second, some regional ASEAN 
institutions could be created according to the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Economic 
Community Blueprint. These institutions could include the ASEAN Economic Community 
Council, the ASEAN Security Community Council, and the ASEAN Social and Cultural 
Community Council. Third, in the late years, ASEAN may also consider the establishment of the 
ASEAN Parliament, ASEAN Court of Justice, and ASEAN Development Fund, the ASEAN 
Central Bank and other regional institutions in order to promote and facilitate the further 
integration of the ASEAN member states. 
The Financing of the ASEAN - With the expansion of the ASEAN regional institutions and the 
need for financial support to the CLMV countries and selected sectors and regions, ASEAN will 
have to consider the financing issue of the ASEAN operation. The following could be the 
potential sources for the ASEAN financing: (1) part of the customs revenues; (2) part of the VAT 
and excise tax; (3) certain percentage of GDP or GNI; (4) voluntary contributions of the rich 
ASEAN members; and (5) financial support of bilateral and multilateral donors. At this moment, 
the total EU budget in 2008 is about €129 billion. The financing of the EU budget comes 
primarily from the contributions of the member states (85% in total, of which 70% derived from 
the percentage of GNI and 15% from the national VAT collections) and the remaining portion 
(15%) is the customs revenue collected directly from the EU customs. The size of the ASEAN 
budget should be much smaller than that of the EU, at least at the beginning of the CET 
implementation. However, the financing of the ASEAN regional institutions and the support to 
the CLMV countries and other sectors and regions will require adequate financial resources for 
the purpose. The ASEAN members should take it into consideration from the beginning of the 
CET design and the ASEAN institutional capacity building.  
6.2 Transition and Adjustment Issues for CET Implementation 
Transitional arrangements – A transitional arrangement should be considered to help move 
from the current tariff regimes of individual ASEAN members to the ASEAN CET. In particular, 
CLMV countries may need more time to make the transition. For example, if the ASEAN CET 
can be designed and negotiated by 2012, ASEAN-6 could be given three years until 2015 to 
adjust their tariff rates and bands to those of the CET while the CLMV countries could be given 
another 3 years until 2018 for the adjustment. In that case, the CET could be officially launched 
between 2015 and 2018. During the transitional period, each of the ASEAN members should 
move their national tariff schedules incrementally every year towards the ASEAN CET regime. 
The ASEAN Secretariat or another newly created ASEAN regional institution should be tasked 
to monitor the progress of the integration process and prepare the annual report on the CET 
transition and implementation. 
Sensitive Products under the CET – Under the CEPT scheme, there are a number of 
sensitive products for which some ASEAN member states maintain high levels of tariff 
protections. These reflect the sensitivities to import competition in some ASEAN member states. 
Some agricultural products (particularly rice and sugar) are sensitive due primarily to their direct 
connection with the basic human needs, especially for the poor households. As a result, these 
products have special and specific high tariffs in ASEAN member states. Some ASEAN 
members maintain the flexibility of quantitative restrictions of imports of those products. Under 
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the proposed ASEAN CET, how the sensitive products are treated will be an important political 
and negotiating issue. There are several options for consideration. First, each ASEAN member 
could be given the flexibility to list 3-5 sensitive products for the CET at which higher tariffs 
could be negotiated among the ASEAN members. In the end, these sensitive products will be 
part of the CET schedule. Gradually these sensitive products could be moved to the normal 
products list under the CET with reduced tariff rates. Second, each ASEAN member could be 
allowed to list 3-5 sensitive products as exceptions from the CET schedule. The consolidated 
list of the ASEAN sensitive products could be subject to specific tariffs outside of the CET 
regime. However, the first option is more preferable as the sensitive products with high tariffs 
under the CET could become the normal products with gradually reduced tariffs while the 
sensitive products identified as exceptions have the tendency to stay there forever.    
VAT and Excise Taxes under the CET – In addition to the customs duties, most of the ASEAN 
members also collect value-added tax (VAT) and excise taxes by the national tax authorities. In 
principle, if these indirect taxes apply to both domestically produced goods and imported 
products, they will not have a trade-distorting effect. However, this is not always the case in 
ASEAN. ASEAN member states need to gradually harmonize their VAT and excise tax regimes. 
In particular, after the CET is introduced, a harmonized VAT and excise tax system in ASEAN 
will provide an equal playing field for companies doing businesses in ASEAN since they are 
treated with the same tariff and VAT in ASEAN. Moreover, if VAT and excise taxes are also part 
of the ASEAN revenue, it would be more important to link the VAT and excise taxes with the 
operation of the ASEAN regional institutions. 
Relationship between the CET and FTAs – As mentioned above, ASEAN as a group and 
individual ASEAN member states have concluded a number of free trade agreements or are 
currently negotiating FTAs with other countries. After the CET is implemented, there are several 
important considerations for ASEAN, given the numerous FTAs involving ASEAN and its 
member states. First of all, ASEAN CET under the ASEAN Customs Union should replace the 
AFTA. Second, since the CET covers only the tariff issue of goods, the FTAs may have to stay 
since they cover not only goods, but also services, investment, trade facilitation and other 
issues. If the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) covers all the issues as indicated by the AEC 
Blueprint, the AEC could act as the focal point of the ASEAN member states to deal with the 
ASEAN trading partners on the FTA issues. Third, the bilateral FTAs with individual ASEAN 
member states should be wrapped up or consolidated to become an ASEAN FTAs with those 
trading partners. Fourth, immediately after the CET is introduced, no ASEAN member states 
should be allowed to negotiate bilateral FTAs with other countries. The negotiations of the FTAs 
should be the collective actions conducted by ASEAN as a group. 
Future Trade Negotiations with ASEAN – Currently most of the ASEAM member states are 
engaging in the WTO DDA negotiations except for the Lao PDR which is still in the WTO 
accession process. Although the DDA negotiations are stalled, the ASEAN members are 
engaged in the consultations with other major trading partners. Unlike the EU, each ASEAN 
member state is presenting the country at the WTO and other trade negotiations. By the same 
token, the individual ASEAN members are also negotiating bilateral FTAs by themselves. 
Sometimes, they are competing for their trade interests in the multilateral and bilateral 
negotiating processes. After the ASEAN CET is introduced and the ASEAN Customs Union is 
formed, ASEAN member states should negotiate their WTO, regional and bilateral trade 
agreements collectively as a group. One of the most important issues to negotiate a trade deal 
as a group is to coordinate the negotiating positions of the trading bloc. Since ASEAN has ten 
member states and each member may have different trade interests due to their geographical 
locations, market sizes and import/export structures, the ASEAN negotiating team will have to 
Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN  
- 44 - 
 
coordinate the ASEAN regional negotiating positions in order to compromise and advance their 
national interests and maximize the benefits for the entire ASEAN region.       
Free Trade Zones and Export Processing Zones – Singapore is a free port in ASEAN and it 
does not levy customs duties on its imports. Once the CET is introduced, Singapore has 
indicated that it would like to retain the zero tariff rates on its imports. Brunei has also applied 
zero tariffs on many of its imports. With some ASEAN member states, there are also export 
processing zones or special economic zones where imports of raw materials and industrial parts 
are duty free. After the processing, the products made in the zones are primarily destined for 
exports. If the products made in the zones enter the domestic markets, they will have to pay the 
customs duties as the same as the imported products. This situation has brought an important 
interesting issue in light of the CET design and implementation. How can the ASEAN Customs 
Union accommodate Singapore and Brunei and how do these export processing zones fit into 
the ASEAN Customs Union?    
With regard to Singapore and Brunei, one of the options is to treat Singapore and Brunei as the 
free trade zones within the ASEAN Customs Union. If the products come from non-ASEAN 
countries to Singapore and Brunei, they do not have to pay the customs duties. However, if they 
move from Singapore/Brunei to other ASEAN member states, they will have to pay the ASEAN 
CET duties. As part of the ASEAN Economic Community, Singapore and Brunei will be fully 
implementing the commitments in the areas of services, investment, and trade facilitation, etc. 
They will also make contributions to the ASEAN regional institutional building. In the long run, 
when the ASEAN CET moves close to zero through the multilateral and regional trade 
negotiations, Singapore and Brunei will naturally integrate into the ASEAN CET regime. As far 
as the export processing zones are concerned, the implementation of the CET in ASEAN will 
not have a problem as long as they maintain the same practices in the past. Smuggling and 
corruption may become a problem if the law enforcement is weak and the customs officials are 
corrupt along the borders of these zones.     
Monitoring and Compliance – In order to make the CET implementation effective and time-
sensitive, the ASEAN should institute a good monitoring system for the compliance of the CET 
commitments of the member states. The monitoring system should include a framework for 
gauging progress on the harmonization of the national tariff regimes towards a regional ASEAN 
CET. It is important for each ASEAN member state to prepare a CET Harmonization Action Plan 
to show the annual progress of the harmonization. In that case, ASEAN will also be in a good 
position to monitor the progress of the CET implementation and the compliance of the 
commitments of each member state in the integration process. It will also allow the national CET 
experts and officials to share experiences and information in order to build the local capacity in 
the area and also inform the public awareness of the CET implementation. 
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
 
Country-Focused Studies – During consultation held with ASEAN stakeholders, several 
representatives, including those of Cambodia and Vietnam, requested that case studies be 
conducted of their countries on the proposed CET that would allow them to better assess the 
impact and consequences to change from the current tariff regimes to the CET system. The 
country case studies could be conducted individually for each country or for sub-groups like the 
CLMV to provide comparative analytical information for policymakers. It is therefore 
recommended that additional studies be supported to address the CET impact on individual 
country members as a benchmark to determining the desirability of alternative implementation 
strategies, as opposed to the welfare analysis of a CET to the ASEAN as a whole that this study 
has addressed.32
 Analytical Extensions: The following are key analytical areas that would support the 
interests of ASEAN member stakeholders in moving towards an ASEAN CET: 
 
Capacity Building – The CLMV countries have also requested for some training and capacity 
building programs in order to train government officials, trade negotiators and other people to 
understand the CET and other integration initiatives. The CLMV countries also requested 
capacity building in the drafting and preparation of legislative and regulatory procedures for the 
transition from the current tariff regimes to the CET system.  
o Sector-Level Trade Flows under an ASEAN CET – The sector-level impact of a CET on trade 
flows between the ASEAN member states and other regional and country trading partners would 
provide meaningful information for policymakers in assessing national interests in alternative CET 
options. Gravity models provide a useful means of assessing the impact of CET-related trade 
policies on trade flow of ASEAN member countries.33
o Macroeconomic Consequences of an ASEAN CET – The international transmission of 
changes occurring in CET-induced trade in the context of the open macro-economies are 
particularly important for the ASEAN member states. The analytical framework provides 
information about the dynamic transmissions of CET-related policies on key macroeconomic 
variables such as investment, consumption, and government expenditure patterns. From an 
analytical point of view, they are offer dynamic linkages that are not available within the partial 
equilibrium framework used in this study and they are more tractable for policymakers than 
general equilibrium models.
 Like the present study they rely on a partial 
equilibrium framework to analyze detailed HS 6-digit trade flows between ASEAN member states 
and extra-regional trading partners and regions. Also like the present study, the can provide 
detailed information about the welfare implications of alternative CET rates and tariff structures at 
the national and regional levels.  
34
                                                          
32 For the small country case, see A.  Panagariya, “Preferential Trading and Welfare: The Small-Union Case 
Revisited”. New York: Columbia University April 2005.  
33 For a recent application to customs unions in the Western Hemisphere, see B.M. Hilbun, “Analysis of Trade in the 
Western Hemisphere Utilizing a Gravity Model Framework”. Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, 
Louisiana State University, 2003. See also, S. Armstrong, “Measuring Trade and Trade Potential: A Survey, Crawford 
School of Economics And Government, Asia Pacific Economic Papers No. 368, 2007. 
34 For an application to the South Asian SAARC, see K.K. Guru-Gharana, “Macro-Economic Modeling of South Asian 
Economies with Intra-SAARC Trade Link”. Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS), June 2000. 
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o ASEAN CET in the Global Economic Context – The country-level effects of a CET on output 
mix and demands for factors of production can be extended to the global economy. At the 
ASEAN regional level, changes in relative prices of outputs and inputs resulting in the region’s 
change in trade policy are transmitted to the industries and input markets of other trading partners 
and regions. For trade policy analysis to be meaningful, the interactions that prevail among 
different sectors as a result of CET-related change in the ASEAN group of countries should be 
taken into account. A general equilibrium methodology is the most appropriate analytical 
framework for the analysis of inter and intra-sectoral changes in outputs and, by extension, the 
demand for different factors of production to be captured. The CET-related effect on ASEAN 
within the global economic framework is appropriately examined within the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) model and database.35
o Tariff Revenue Sharing Rules – It would be useful to quantify the national and regional level 
effects of alternative mechanisms for sharing the common tariff revenue in an ASEAN customs 
union. The focus should be on the two main mechanisms currently use by customs unions. As 
mentioned earlier, the first involves rules for sharing revenue based on measures of country size, 
such as imports, consumption and population; the other involves a common fund to finance joint 
policies, as used in the European Union.
 
36
o Political Economy Effects on CET  Determination – A growing body of empirical work has 
been growing on the effects of political pressures on the formation of CETs in customs unions.
 Because of significant developmental and tariff-
structure differences among ASEAN member countries, the CET impact will initially have 
significant distributional effects among countries. Measuring those differences and offering 
mechanisms to possibly neutralize those effects could lead to greater support my member 
countries to a customs union and thereby help to fast-track the CET mechanism.  
37
Roadmap – An essential part of the (CCCA) work on the possibility of establishing an ASEAN 
CET will involve the preparation of a roadmap on sequencing and implementation arrangements 
that would be required for the implantation of a customs union and the associated common 
external tariff. That work should involve a detailed study of the process needed for the adoption 
of a common external tariff, the transition arrangements required for its eventual 
implementation, and institutional and structural arrangements and possible options for ASEAN 
members to consider. By accepting a model of integration that requires successive steps, the 
time scale of benchmark targets and the overall commitment to the roadmap, ASEAN member 
states would be able to move forward in achieving the integration goals for the establishment of 
a customs union and ASEAN CET. 
 
These pressures mainly occur from cross-border lobbying and their effects have been analyzed 
within the context of tariff formation in political economic models for the determination of CETs. 
The results are useful in measuring potential influences among member states in their 
susceptibilities to lobbying, as well broader political influences the member states in the CU-wide 
decision-making. They can provide policy-makers with useful information about sources of 
pressure on CET rate determination that can point to ways in which they can work with lobby 
groups in cooperative or non-cooperative manner. 
                                                          
35 For an application of the GTAP model to CET analysis, see S. Karingi et al, “The Economic and Welfare Impacts of 
the EU-Africa Economic Partnership Agreements”. ATCP Briefing No. 6. Economic Commission for Africa, May 2005. 
For a discussion of the assumptions of these models in the context of customs unions and Nash equilibrium, see L. 
Abrego, R. Riezman and J. Whalley, “How Reasonable are Assumptions Used in Theoretical Models?: 
Computational Evidence on the Likelihood of Trade Pattern Changes”. April 28, 2005.  
36 For an application to Mercosur, see M. Vaillant and A. Lalanne, “Tariff revenue sharing rules in a customs union: a 
new methodology applied to the MERCOSUR case”. Departamento de Economía, Universidad de la República, 
Uruguay and Universidad de la Republica, Montevideo, Uruguay. 
37 For a recent application, see “S. Bandyopadhyay, S. Lahiri and S. Roy, Political Asymmetry and Common External 
Tariffs in a Customs Union”. Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2007.  
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ANNEX A: THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Much of the literature on the welfare effects of customs unions and preferential trade 
arrangements (PTAs) in general derive from Viner’s seminal work, The Customs Union Issue.38
(1) Partial equilibrium analysis uses single-sector or single-product estimates of supply and 
demand to examine the effects of trade liberalization on particular sectors or products. 
Since these types of models examine narrow product categories, they are able to 
capture the likely direct effects of policy changes on individual products. Moreover, 
partial equilibrium analysis is dynamic in nature and can therefore be used to assess the 
impact of trade liberalization on such factors as the growth rate of economic activity. The 
main limitation of this approach, however, is that it does not capture interactions 
between various economic sectors, and therefore does not account for secondary or 
indirect effects that could result as capital and labor move from the less productive to the 
more productive sectors of the economy. 
 
The initial work in this area was based on homogeneous goods models characterized by perfect 
competition. More recently the literature has largely switched to imperfect competition models, 
which has also relied on the so-called natural trading partners hypothesis in which trade 
creation effects dominate the trade diversion effects if the potential union members are natural 
trading partners in the sense that they already trade intensively with each other and are 
geographically proximate to one another. 
Attempts to quantify the effects of a CET on member states rely on one of the following 
approaches, each of which provides a level of information that is not generally available in the 
other approaches: 
(2) Macroeconomic analysis provides valuable information about the transmission of tariff 
policies on the economy, and the feedback effects that occur in the external sector from 
income and price changes. The dynamic nature of these models allow us to track the 
effect that relative prices changes will have on investment, consumption and other major 
components of the economy, as well as the fiscal revenue implications of those 
adjustments. Like partial equilibrium analysis, macroeconomic analysis of tariff policies 
focuses on the demand-side of the economy, and the results therefore allow us to 
examine the difference between estimates of the direct effects of tariff reforms and those 
arising from both direct and indirect changes in the macro-economy. Also like the partial 
equilibrium approach, this type of analysis does not look at supply-side adjustments from 
relative prices changes in the economy. 
(3) Industry-level analysis offers useful measures of how trade policies alter effective rates 
of protection (ERP), and how these ERPs changes could shift the existing tariff-induced 
bias away from import substitution to export expansion and investment in the production 
of non-tradables. Because the magnitude of protection tends to vary considerably across 
industries, this type of detailed industry analysis can be used to show how changes in 
tariffs on US traded goods could influences production and the distribution of benefits 
and costs among the Colombian industries and consumers. While this type of analysis 
addresses industry-specific demand and supply conditions by examining factor input 
prices, it fails to provide an  economy-wide perspective on the effects of trade policies. 
                                                          
38 Viner, Jacob, 1950, The Customs Union Issue, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
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(4) General equilibrium analysis provides the type of economy-wide perspective that is not 
available in the other three approaches. As such, it offers a useful means of analyzing 
the effects of trade policies on upstream, downstream and substitute products. The key 
advantage of the approach is the ability to capture feedback effects of relative price 
changes and resource flows on overall gross domestic product (GPD) and social 
welfare. The major limitations are, first, the comparative static nature of the analysis, 
which precludes us from examining year-to-year changes arising from trade liberalization 
and, second, the sensitivity of the results to the parameters of the model and the fact 
that the parameters are not generated from within the model and therefore not internally 
consistent.  
The model used to calculate the welfare effects of a CET is a partial equilibrium model for 
commodity-level imports and tariffs of the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS).39
                                                          
39 The specification for the model follows Tumbarello, P. (2005), “Regional Trade Integration and WTO Accession: 
Which Is the Right Sequencing? An Application to the CIS”, IMF Working Paper WP/05/94, Policy Development and 
Review Department, International Monetary Fund. The theoretical framework underlying the model is based on the 
work of Lord, M. (1991), Imperfect Competition and Internaitonal Commodity Trade: Theory, Dynamics, and Policy 
Modelling. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Finally, the implementation of the model using Excel spreadsheet software uses 
the approach of Francois, J., and K. Hall (1997), “Partial Equilibrium Modeling,” in Applied Methods for Trade Policy 
Analysis: A Handbook, edited by J. Francois and K. Reinert. London: Cambridge University Press. 
 It assumes that 
the each commodity-level import represents a small share of each country’s economy, which 
implies that the effect of tariff changes on other markets can be ignored. It also assumes that 
intra-regionally traded products are perfect substitutes for one another but that products traded 
intra-regionally are imperfect substitutes for extra-regionally traded products, and that world 
markets are perfectly competitive. Usage of intra-regional and extra-regional goods depends on 
the constant elasticity of substitution, which is the so-called Armington specification. So any 
change in the price of price of extra-regional imports because of tariff changes under the CET 
would change the amounts used of intra and extra-ASEAN originating goods according to the 
elasticity of substitution between them. 
From the start, it is important to determine whether the imported and domestic competing goods 
are perfect or imperfect substitutes and then needs to determine whether the country is “small” 
with reference to the rest of the world (in which case the import supply curve is horizontal or 
perfectly elastic) or “large” with reference to the rest of the world (in which case the import 
supply curve is upward sloping or less than perfectly elastic). If imports and domestic competing 
goods are best modeled as imperfect substitutes (following Armington, 1969), the transmission 
of shocks from the market for the imported good to the market for domestic goods relies on the 
cross-price elasticity of demand or, alternatively, the elasticity of substitution. This measure 
affects the extent to which changes in the price of an imported good affect demand for the 
domestic competing good. 
A.1  National Welfare of a Member Country 
For the CET the welfare effects are decomposed into trade that occurs between ASEAN 
member states and that which occurs with non-ASEAN countries. The welfare effect following 
the introduction of the CET can therefore be represented by the change in the welfare effect 
following the introduction of a common MFT tariff with non-member countries, denoted 
ΔWi,ASEAN, and that under the CEPT-AFTA preferential arrangement among ASEAN countries: 
ΔWi = ΔWi,ROW + ΔWi,ASEAN (A.1) 
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where ΔWi denotes the total change in welfare of ASEAN country i, ΔWi,ROW represents the 
change in welfare between ASEAN country i and the non-ASEAN countries (rest-of-world), and 
ΔWi,ASEAN is the welfare change between country i and other ASEAN member states. 
We further decompose the welfare effects into those associated with changes in consumer 
surplus, denoted ΔTCi, and the change in the government’s tariff revenue, ΔTRi: 
 ΔWi = ΔTCi + ΔTRi (A.2) 
Substituting (A.1) into (A.2) yields: 
 ΔWi = ΔTCi,ROW + ΔTCi,ASEAN + ΔTRi,ROW + ΔTRi,ASEAN (A.3) 
such that the total change in country i’s welfare is the change in consumer surplus with the non-
ASEAN countries, ΔTCi,ROW, and the change in government revenue with those non-ASEAN 
countries, ΔTRi,ROW, resulting from the new MFN tariff common to all ASEAN countries, as well 
as the change in consumer surplus with the ASEAN countries, ΔTCi,ASEAN, and the change in 
government revenue with ASEAN countries, ΔTRi,ASEAN, resulting from the CEPT-AFTA 
preferential arrangement of the ASEAN countries. 
The utility maximization for the importer in country i for a given import price Pi and level of 
income Y is  
 max [πiMiα + (1-Ni)]1/α (A.4) 
 subject to Pi Mi + Ni = Yi (A.5) 
where α < 1 and 0<π<1. For the initial country-base tariff tiI, the solution for (3.5) yields the 
overall demand for imports from country i: 
 
where θ is the price elasticity of demand for imports, and Ai  represents the so-called demand 
parameter such that Ai = Yko and ko = [(1-π)/ π]1/(1- α) with expected sign Ai > 0. That demand 
parameter Ai is unknown and is calibrated by (a) applying the latest 6-digit tariff lines of the 
ASEAN member states provided by the member countries to the ASEAN Secretariat, as well as 
various CET options; (b) normalizing prices to 1; and (c) using nearly 4,700 price elasticities of 
import demand calculated by the World Bank for 6-digit imports.40
                                                          
40 Kee, H. L., A. Nicita, and M. Olarreaga, 2004, “Estimating Import Demand Elasticities,” Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. 
 
The import price is derived from the import supply schedule: 
 Mis = k1(Pi/P)η (A.7) 
where Pi is the import price and P is the world price of the import, which can be expressed as 
the import price of country i. Pi = ki-1/ η PM-1/ η. Unless the importer is a monopsonist, the import 
price will be given and the relative price elasticity of import supply will approach infinity (η ≈ 0), 
from which it can be seen that the following relationship holds for import prices: 
 Pi = k1’ P (A.8) 
The change in ASEAN imports from the rest-of-world, denoted ROW, resulting from the 
introduction of a CET is given by: 
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For intra-ASEAN trade, the change in imports is zero since the preferential tariff rate applied to 
intra-ASEAN trade is the same under the under the CEPT-AFTA as that prior to the introduction 
of the CET: 
 
The change in each ASEAN member’s government tariff revenue derived from rest-of-world 
imports, TRiROW, is given as follows: 
     
 
 
For government tariff revenue from intra-ASEAN imports, TRiASEAN, the change is: 
= 0 (A.12)  
since CEPT tariffs, tiCEPT are the same as the initial tariffs, tiI. 
The change in consumer surplus with the non-ASEAN countries, ΔTCi,ROW, resulting from the 
introduction of the CET is as follows: 
 
 
 
and change in consumer surplus with the ASEAN countries, ΔTCi,ASEAN, is given by: 
 
The total change in welfare is therefore the change in government revenue, ΔTRi, plus the 
change in consumer surplus with the non-ASEAN countries, ΔTCi,ROW: 
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ANNEX B: PRODUCT-LINES HAVING SIMILAR TARIFFS APPLIED BY ASEAN MEMBER STATES 
 
Several government authorities of the ASEAN member states have suggested a transition program towards a common external tariff 
that would initially harmonize tariffs having the greatest similarity among countries. Subsequent harmonization would sequentially 
include the next most similar tariffs among countries, until eventually all tariffs were included in the coverage. To this end the following 
table ranks tariffs at the 6-digit HS level according to their standard deviation from the mean. The list is indicative since only the first 
115 tariff lines of a total of 5,466 are presented in this annex. 
No. 
HS 
Code 
 Existing Tariff  Mean 
Tariff  
Standard 
Deviation  Description KH   ID   LA   MM  MY   PH   TH   VN  
1 851770   -    -    -    -    -    -   0.5    -    0.06    0.18  Parts of telephone sets, telephones for cellular n 
2 851769   -    -    -    -    -    -   0.7    -    0.08    0.24  Apparatus for the transmission or reception of voi 
3 845690   -    -    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.13    0.35  Machine tools for working any material by removal 
4 854310   -    -    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.13    0.35  Electrical particle accelerators for electrons, pr 
5 880100   -    -    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.13    0.35  Balloons and dirigibles; gliders, hang gliders and 
6 848610   -   1.4    -    -    -    -   0.9    -    0.29    0.55  Machines and apparatus for the manufacture of boul 
7 848620   -   1.7    -    -    -    -   0.8    -    0.30    0.61  Machines and apparatus for the manufacture of semi 
8 851762   -   1.9    -    -    -    -   0.2    -    0.26    0.66  Machines for the reception, conversion and transmi 
9 848640   -   1.9    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.36    0.71  Machines and apparatus specified in Note 9 C to ch 
10 848690   -   1.9    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.37    0.72  Parts and accessories for machines and apparatus o 
11 848630   -   2.5    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.44    0.90  Machines and apparatus for the manufacture of flat 
12 852359   -   1.7    -    -    -    -   2.2    -    0.48    0.91  Semiconductor media, unrecorded, for the recording 
13 852351   -   2.0    -    -    -    -   2.8    -    0.59    1.12  Solid-state, non-volatile data storage devices for 
14 851761   -   3.3    -    -    -    -   3.0    -    0.79    1.47  Base stations of apparatus for the transmission or 
15 390591  7.0   5.0   5.0   1.5   5.0   3.0   5.0   5.0    4.56    1.64  Copolymers of vinyl, in primary forms (excl. vinyl 
16 120921   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Alfalfa seed for sowing 
17 120922   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Clover "Trifolium spp" seed, for sowing 
18 120923   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Fescue seed for sowing 
19 120924   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  "Poa pratensis L." seed for sowing 
20 120925   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Ryegrass "Lolium multiflorum lam., Lolium perenne 
21 293621   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Vitamins A and their derivatives, used primarily a 
22 293622   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Vitamin B1 and its derivatives, used primarily as 
23 293623   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Vitamin B2 and its derivatives, used primarily as 
24 293624   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  D-Pantothenic or DL-pantothenic acid "Vitamin B3 o 
25 293626   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Vitamin B12 and its derivatives, used primarily as 
26 293628   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Vitamin E and its derivatives, used primarily as v 
27 293629   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Vitamins and their derivatives, used primarily as 
28 293690   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Provitamins and mixtures of vitamins, of provitami 
29 293712   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Insulin and its salts, used primarily as hormones 
30 293721   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Cortisone, hydrocortisone, prednisone "dehydrocort 
31 294120   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Streptomycins and their derivatives; salts thereof 
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32 294190   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0   1.0    -    1.00    1.69  Antibiotics (excl. penicillins and their derivativ 
33 120926   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0    -    -    0.88    1.73    
34 120991   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0    -    -    0.88    1.73  Vegetable seeds, for sowing 
35 293610   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   1.0    -    -    0.88    1.73    
36 293711   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   2.0   1.0    -    1.13    1.73  Somatropin, its derivatives and structural analogu 
37 391000   -   2.5   5.0   1.5    -   1.0   2.5    -    1.56    1.74  Silicones in primary forms 
38 010210   -    -   5.0    -    -   1.0    -    -    0.75    1.75  Pure-bred breeding bovines 
39 010310   -    -   5.0    -    -   1.0    -    -    0.75    1.75  Pure-bred breeding swine 
40 100510   -    -   5.0    -    -   1.0    -    -    0.75    1.75  Maize seed 
41 292521   -   5.0    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.75    1.75  Chlordimeform "ISO" 
42 292529   -   5.0    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.75    1.75  Imines and their derivatives; salts thereof (excl. 
43 293050   -   5.0    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.75    1.75  Captafol "ISO" and methamidophos "ISO" 
44 293920   -   5.0    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.75    1.75  Alkaloids of cinchona and their derivatives; salts 
45 310270   -    -   5.0    -    -   1.0    -    -    0.75    1.75    
46 310320   -    -   5.0    -    -   1.0    -    -    0.75    1.75    
47 310410   -    -   5.0    -    -   1.0    -    -    0.75    1.75    
48 500300   -   5.0    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.75    1.75  Silk waste, incl. cocoons unsuitable for reeling, 
49 730411   -   5.0    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.75    1.75  Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, 
50 730419   -   5.0    -    -    -    -   1.0    -    0.75    1.75  Line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, 
51 540269  7.0   5.0   5.0   2.0   7.5   7.0   5.0   5.0    5.44    1.76  Multiple "folded" or cabled synthetic filament yar 
52 250620   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Quartzite, merely cut, by sawing or otherwise, in 
53 285300   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Inorganic compounds, incl. distilled or conductivi 
54 290331   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Ethylene dibromide "ISO" "1,2-dibromoethane" 
55 290339   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Fluorinated, brominated or iodinated derivatives o 
56 290352   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Aldrin "ISO", chlordane "ISO" and heptachlor "ISO" 
57 290811   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Pentachlorophenol "ISO" 
58 290819   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Derivatives containing only halogen substituents a 
59 290891   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Dinoseb "ISO" and its salts 
60 290899   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated d 
61 291040   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Dieldrin "ISO" "INN" 
62 291536   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Dinoseb acetate "ISO" 
63 291636   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Binapacryl "ISO" 
64 291818   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Chlorobenzilate "ISO" 
65 291891   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  2,4,5-T "ISO" "2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid", 
66 291899   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Carboxylic acids with additional oxygen function a 
67 291910   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Tris"2,3-dibromopropyl" phosphate 
68 291990   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Phosphoric esters and their salts, incl. lactophos 
69 440721   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Mahogany "Swietenia spp.", sawn or chipped lengthw 
70 440722   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Virola, imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwi 
71 440727   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Sapelli, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or pee 
72 440728   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Iroko, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peele 
73 440793   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Maple "Acer spp.", sawn or chipped lengthwise, sli 
74 440794   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Cherry "Prunus spp.", sawn or chipped lengthwise, 
75 440795   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Ash "Fraxinus spp.", sawn or chipped lengthwise, s 
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76 440921   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Bamboo, incl. strips and friezes for parquet floor 
77 440929   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Wood, incl. strips and friezes for parquet floorin 
78 681292   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Paper, millboard and felt of asbestos or of mixtur 
79 740100   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Copper mattes; cement copper "precipitated copper" 
80 844399   -    -    -    -    -    -   5.0    -    0.63    1.77  Parts and accessories of printers, copying machine 
81 903032   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Multimeters with recording device 
82 903033   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checkin 
83 903084   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77  Instruments and apparatus for measuring or checkin 
84 980300   -   5.0    -    -    -    -    -    -    0.63    1.77    
85 390320  7.0   5.0   5.0   1.5   6.0   3.0   5.0   6.0    4.81    1.77  Styrene-acrylonitrile copolymers "SAN", in primary 
86 300210   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   2.5   0.7    -    1.15    1.78  Antisera and other blood fractions and modified im 
87 120910   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   3.0   1.0    -    1.25    1.83  Sugar beet seed, for sowing 
88 280430  7.0   5.0   5.0   1.0   5.0   3.0   5.0   3.0    4.25    1.83  Nitrogen 
89 280440  7.0   5.0   5.0   1.0   5.0   3.0   5.0   3.0    4.25    1.83  Oxygen 
90 293722   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   3.0   1.0    -    1.25    1.83  Halogenated derivatives of corticosteroidal hormon 
91 293723   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   3.0   1.0    -    1.25    1.83  Oestrogens and progestogens 
92 300120   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   3.0   1.0    -    1.25    1.83  Extracts of glands or other organs or of their sec 
93 300190   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   3.0   1.0    -    1.25    1.83  Dried glands and other organs for organo-therapeut 
94 321410  7.0   5.0   5.0   7.5   5.0   5.0   0.0   5.0    6.19    1.85  Glaziers'' putty, grafting putty, resin cements, c 
95 321490  7.0   5.0   5.0   7.5   5.0   5.0   0.0   5.0    6.19    1.85  Non-refractory surfacing preparations for facades, 
96 390920  3.5   5.0   5.0   1.5    -   4.0   5.0   2.5    3.31    1.85  Melamine resins, in primary forms 
97 251690  7.0   5.0   5.0   3.0   5.0   3.0   1.0   3.0    4.00    1.85  Porphyry, basalt and other monumental or building 
98 310100   -   2.5   5.0    -   1.4   3.0    -    -    1.49    1.87  Animal or vegetable fertilisers, whether or not mi 
99 300110   -    -   5.0   1.0    -   3.0    -    -    1.13    1.89    
100 871390   -    -   5.0   1.5    -   3.0    -    -    1.19    1.89  Carriages for disabled persons, motorised or other 
101 902690   -    -   5.0   1.5    -    -   3.0    -    1.19    1.89  Parts and accessories for instruments and apparatu 
102 390450  7.0   5.0   5.0   1.5   2.5   3.0   5.0   2.0    3.88    1.90  Vinylidene chloride polymers, in primary forms 
103 390940  3.5   5.0   5.0   1.5    -   5.0   5.0   3.0    3.50    1.91  Phenolic resins, in primary forms 
104 270400   -    -   5.0    -    -   1.0    -   3.3    1.17    1.94  Coke and semi-coke of coal, of lignite or of peat, 
105 391290  2.3   1.7   5.0   1.5    -   3.0   5.0    -    2.31    1.95  Cellulose and chemical derivatives thereof, n.e.s. 
106 285200   -   5.0    -    -    -    -   3.3    -    1.04    1.98  Compounds, inorganic or organic, of mercury (excl. 
107 380290  7.0   5.0   5.0   1.5   5.0   4.3   5.0   1.0    4.23    2.00  Activated kieselguhr and other activated natural m 
108 300630   -   1.3   5.0   1.5    -   1.0   5.0   2.5    2.03    2.00  Opacifying preparations for x-ray examinations; di 
109 293790   -   5.0   5.0   1.0   1.7   2.0   1.0    -    1.96    2.00  Hormones, natural or reproduced by synthesis; deri 
110 300220   -   3.8   5.0    -    -   1.0    -    -    1.22    2.01  Vaccines for human medicine 
111 390330   -   5.0   5.0   1.5   4.0   3.0   5.0   6.0    3.69    2.05  Acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene copolymers "ABS", 
112 010110   -    -   5.0    -    -   4.0   1.0    -    1.25    2.05  Pure-bred breeding horses and asses 
113 490199  3.5    -   5.0    -    -   3.7    -   2.5    1.83    2.07  Printed books, brochures and similar printed matte 
114 252510  7.0   5.0   5.0   5.0    -   3.0   5.0   3.0    4.13    2.10  Crude mica and mica rifted into sheets or splittin 
115 252530  7.0   5.0   5.0   5.0    -   3.0   5.0   3.0    4.13    2.10  Mica waste 
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ANNEX C: WELFARE EFFECT OF 6.1% CET ON ASEAN MEMBER STATES AT HS 2-DIGIT LEVEL 
 
Table C.1: Impact of Uniform CET Rate of 6.1 Percent on Government Revenue from Non-ASEAN Country Imports 
  Sub-
Heading Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Myanmar Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Total ASEAN 
Total 74,082,852  138,018,980  2,036,870,412  31,020,700  106,702,208  5,214,883,837  2,076,539,764  6,088,004,245  4,851,551,097  1,609,119,132  22,226,793,225  
01 81,207   -  351,398   28,861  3,273   740,788  397,003  283,254  1,022,362  145,026  3,053,172  
02 189,695  5,633  3,139,651  2,336  3,655  2,462,894   3,495,902  15,890,630   816,067   97,752  26,104,216  
03  788,098  139,925  2,080,408  50,264  2,311  23,524,794   3,464,657  15,438,451  78,780,194  9,705,279  133,974,381  
04  805,405  295,145  24,818,361   173,696   1,914,325  17,671,719   19,971,170  20,622,201  26,701,423  11,216,463  124,189,909  
05  -  1,256   405,349   11  11,138  219,556   93,251  478,680   1,599,221   780,230   3,588,692  
06  72,037   197   66,409   18,987   58  253,815   23,017  500,225   273,396   276,796  1,484,938  
07 537,182  18,386  10,332,317   10,528   15,690  17,657,173   2,844,867   6,866,787  8,984,010  2,204,326  49,471,266  
08 523,198  259,588  18,507,212  22,024   2,167   6,916,996   3,396,754  11,385,092  12,070,307  7,340,445   60,423,784  
09 155,636  8,062  1,695,176   1,744  43,256  9,049,448  1,046,759   4,053,643  4,572,439   1,223,527  21,849,689  
10 1,285,118  372,681  38,995,060   178,407   92   50,462,185   78,708,736  3,263,012  7,987,860   8,185,082  189,438,234  
11 155,322  253,737  6,283,644  85,658   159,748   5,564,102  3,115,445  2,114,374  5,374,693   1,942,558   25,049,282  
12  22,859   21,212  1,190,111  25,909  23,957   5,187,056  1,505,781  3,305,219   4,061,143  1,671,975  17,015,223  
13 11,867   16,001  1,551,756   1,263  5,711   1,246,993  903,362   816,831  3,049,920   474,422  8,078,128  
14 858   0   60,960  1  214   233,279  56,604   100,357   477,502   141,173  1,070,948  
15  347,004  300,746  3,856,778  99,574   3,559,778   37,061,905   9,322,286  1,783,012  6,700,376  17,202,261  80,233,718  
16  242,643  80,968   726,547  74,802   250  3,225,975   512,463  6,513,327  2,302,346   189,021  13,868,342  
17  328,995   1,540,676  25,629,802   317,276   20,198  14,563,315   6,637,582   8,647,368  3,198,604  11,774,227   72,658,042  
18  203,888   1,919   1,702,898   1,396  2,793   3,083,091  1,565,355  5,451,960  2,498,080   487,045  14,998,424  
19  1,030,355  892,071   4,085,971   201,569   366,153   16,037,328   8,902,960   4,044,093   14,033,418   12,767,764  62,361,681  
20 438,218  78,679   2,270,108  8,846  3,697  4,806,592  2,880,617   5,594,333  8,533,916  629,991   25,244,998  
21  736,008  417,498   10,972,457  237,858  662,367   15,502,498  13,550,601  10,426,168  12,878,799  4,252,422   69,636,676  
22  1,272,458  262,139  2,647,053   100,802  65,254  8,224,597   4,339,699   51,814,165  16,694,676  2,997,074  88,417,915  
23  1,529,841  1,761,988  29,283,654  345,488  70,493  9,725,937  7,531,617  1,554,870  18,715,119   13,596,374  84,115,382  
24 629,391   4,400,925  12,529,731   109,276   2,657,850  11,525,122   9,695,694   11,162,777  40,434,415  23,590,444  116,735,626  
25 3,265,734   5,249,726   14,706,242  780,590  1,238,844  15,521,017  2,817,580  6,641,949  5,525,757  11,848,472  67,595,910  
26 1,337   -  11,875,120  -   7,718  14,531,810   4,606,586   413,568  1,249,442  123,875   32,809,456  
27  1,429,749   12,885,898   12,744,966  10,903,879  27,371,585  333,191,647  33,969,316  863,199,948  155,068,533  252,540,298   1,703,305,819  
28  575,323  388,556  29,008,555  242,460  560,477   38,445,918  13,628,551   32,629,637  46,305,051  11,943,028  173,727,555  
29  920,853  985,227  171,930,785   177,069  590,390  112,689,277  32,692,241  188,499,604  199,608,734  29,909,040  738,003,219  
30  1,796,308   3,270,527  12,999,711  320,728   2,324,267  30,857,084   24,227,793   70,626,549  46,720,860   21,863,262  215,007,088  
31 316,534  840,024   28,366,186  113,605  359,026   35,718,560  14,487,289  453,382   51,514,330  24,088,805  156,257,741  
32 521,537  524,226  23,543,950  230,738   461,006  30,997,702   8,004,550  38,105,706   41,612,737   13,427,384  157,429,537  
33  582,636  827,553  31,383,951  323,843   359,981  24,256,209  14,004,531   46,953,855  29,381,522  11,363,461  159,437,541  
34 513,765  943,485   17,307,233  239,886  393,896   16,770,295   7,870,292  12,330,993  24,456,338   6,483,517   87,309,700  
35 67,122  205,660   6,679,418   56,175   183,662  6,275,090  5,051,387   9,292,329  6,924,690   4,032,130   38,767,662  
36 23,122  3,006  134,608   2,271   253   127,631   19,850   854,881   524,625  18,944   1,709,191  
37  60,295  36,929  4,275,432  2,255  132,471  6,507,468  2,961,967  36,081,381  10,483,436   3,149,847  63,691,482  
38 384,814  234,922  27,921,314  23,362   545,261  23,964,985  12,834,100   49,662,557   43,043,171  22,161,569  180,776,056  
39  1,624,787   3,884,843  106,873,614  1,045,272   6,225,759   277,326,122  73,363,441  144,050,354  271,669,785  103,093,801  989,157,778  
40 410,408   1,326,131   39,667,515   423,710  1,390,698  76,435,897  11,484,533   33,200,604  57,208,107   26,192,922   247,740,526  
41 70   33   3,607,713   3  201  513,283   2,430,469  1,436,169  313,187  190,249  8,491,377  
42  249,646   110,372   2,584,175   16,220   32,314  3,443,473  1,630,547   20,585,350  8,727,708   500,042   37,879,847  
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43 68   13   3,924  -   982   85,553  6,364  39,879   201,000   435,389   773,172  
44 250,317   61,791  10,154,514  8,844   55,155   17,994,233  10,756,529  3,421,696  26,937,082  23,430,984  93,071,145  
45 999  5,630  67,160  3,633   1,034   40,224  45,724   45,013  157,717   44,322   411,455  
46 10,832  1,972   89,890  3,797  2,708  219,358   20,561   176,653   195,362  136,097  857,232  
47 262  1,097   34,136,804   5,251  78,625   10,798,405  3,197,807   913,392  22,600,350   4,762,318  76,494,313  
48 1,137,105   3,269,243   28,172,596  229,747  2,393,016  40,504,909   27,360,776  17,688,900  35,865,759  18,866,159  175,488,209  
49  2,362,541  156,544  1,673,716  11,773  29,423  10,431,929   4,090,947  16,686,418  7,220,913   2,701,724   45,365,925  
50 117,453  6,760  24,731  29,423   12,360   747,605   129,726  1,601,782  213,179  2,945,852   5,828,872  
51  2,846  307,259  612,623   92  42,458   707,729  1,604,540   467,108  3,123,592   804,306   7,672,552  
52 2,027,878   3,350,669   10,034,365  141,001  637,600  13,100,747  16,185,495   3,788,069  19,099,982   36,568,281  104,934,087  
53 307   509   377,848  1,413  1   121,025   431,685  78,397  1,605,334  401,774  3,018,294  
54 42,170  605,182   15,946,402   41,625   930,188   11,071,731   6,736,999   2,644,786  23,445,968   16,530,533   77,995,583  
55  80,533   25,555,795   13,952,111  22,676   12,179,422  11,396,610  11,675,232  6,163,624  16,929,896  69,366,477  167,322,377  
56  74,267  209,672  1,333,126   73,013  391,961   2,315,233  1,003,465  3,091,448  3,058,871  6,794,005  18,345,060  
57 102,901  5,638  516,494  2,572  86,739  1,901,548   239,516  2,897,175  521,731   893,274  7,167,588  
58  686,534   4,539,080  1,573,971   955  1,248,407  3,017,155   5,033,454   3,942,565  8,421,592   18,020,275   46,483,988  
59  25,650  1,301,059  6,639,870  10,881   162,995   4,417,822  2,840,162   4,585,824   12,475,713  8,548,904  41,008,880  
60  4,962  6,728  4,095,009   6  9,337  8,147,415   22,444,330  885,623  2,317,058  6,967,025   44,877,493  
61  733,403  349,153   1,942,935  34,110   18,806  7,836,322  2,712,946   41,701,991  8,678,502   1,962,099   65,970,268  
62  734,036   7,813,797   2,439,817   69,521   41,059   12,886,006   2,978,300  41,600,039   16,133,326  6,884,599  91,580,500  
63 184,424  97,157  1,264,150  91,241  11,649  5,108,916  1,052,415   5,763,395  4,980,735  543,810  19,097,890  
64 316,531  294,247  4,866,032  86,238   183,797  6,639,325   3,208,727  11,275,663  8,983,789  8,966,634   44,820,984  
65 19,853  10,383   532,864  2,905  21,134   206,285   117,075  629,068   338,483   56,088  1,934,136  
66  9,200  8,208   542,485  2,111   19,786   97,986  209,784  359,229  397,511   12,912  1,659,212  
67 14,842  4,774   293,904   116  -   76,599  64,208   146,094   259,516  61,408   921,461  
68 603,681  378,272  4,936,642   278,501  283,484   13,782,703   2,065,747  10,070,350  10,417,217  5,935,117  48,751,714  
69  637,638   1,558,399  7,901,316  211,175  262,965  9,237,883   4,496,587  5,991,844  17,305,050  3,836,802  51,439,658  
70  307,092  357,071  3,886,362  94,867  429,795  17,952,116   2,903,655  11,283,811  15,399,970  7,376,267  59,991,006  
71 19,639   114,359  156,520   27  -   89,410,867  12,870,249   49,848,686  71,959,337  1,781,630   226,161,314  
72 2,258,037   1,477,590  93,806,205  497,790   2,153,841   143,983,345   32,047,440  73,016,956  242,860,024  74,798,688  666,899,915  
73 5,605,863  1,429,177  66,749,049  530,385  3,451,574   208,228,018   20,748,975  127,593,635  213,405,784  42,929,733  690,672,195  
74 319,825   301,120  9,803,444  22,673  78,637  117,304,610  21,947,225  66,991,679   133,722,713  21,751,365   372,243,292  
75  8,903   -   759,875   466   6  2,057,086   219,362  12,567,416   4,165,781   346,608  20,125,503  
76  442,250  2,162,156  25,496,151   105,456   544,321   69,562,718   9,795,305   79,708,734  73,024,646  14,251,671   275,093,408  
78  3,838  7,217   4,218,278   5  16,141  3,805,687  496,393  10,156,042  5,768,650  754,018   25,226,268  
79 10,504  179,560   12,527,964   77,081   83,851   9,126,493   2,964,956  14,772,967  5,659,610  2,656,734  48,059,721  
80  381  6,895   394,894   23   51,879  9,127,107  377,498  1,620,869  10,290,922   184,771   22,055,238  
81 1,671   74  724,661   92  105  7,144,821  392,743   3,777,064  2,770,721  314,063   15,126,014  
82  1,149,674   115,875   8,990,185   71,027   106,883  22,930,558  1,744,826  44,126,343  38,285,658  4,422,204  121,943,235  
83  284,605  715,269  9,192,185   4,688,705   196,852   23,441,042  5,310,759   14,439,116   18,051,574  6,967,207  83,287,314  
84  9,534,126   12,191,331  379,968,744   1,701,712  13,807,965   924,442,331   324,630,837  1,374,722,654  940,850,724  237,840,676   4,219,691,099  
85 5,744,079   4,895,734  152,316,225   539,601  3,315,111  1,470,591,562  819,201,242  1,337,932,265  983,881,002   132,744,677   4,911,161,498  
86 30,171  3,615   1,989,384   5,581  238,506   4,221,383   4,720,224   4,569,952   592,553  1,367,162  17,738,533  
87 8,940,067   15,941,591  172,198,376   3,893,243   4,585,269   220,813,609  143,808,338  190,744,109  300,797,091   78,361,469  1,140,083,163  
88  1,389,336  21,259   55,186,866  79,579   560,371   88,346,215  31,373,767  333,713,673  58,795,331   94,652  569,561,050  
89  23,955  212,572  83,803,048   98   4,566,643  43,176,791  2,856,212   41,071,313   12,028,198   4,165,239  191,904,069  
90  1,678,723  1,192,857   28,048,491  272,844  1,027,420   188,344,366  41,578,189  295,116,845   141,707,965  35,077,222   734,044,923  
91  -   -   -  -  -   -  -  -  -   -  -  
92  28,447  6,804  2,245,797   642  8,034   1,968,633  328,750  3,169,399   1,847,518   718,715  10,322,739  
93  -  6,582   453,287  -  -  1,127,958   519,361  393,350   1,310,407   151,757   3,962,703  
94 1,261,751  815,411  8,691,101  55,000   306,128   24,692,163   6,283,229  26,545,511  18,261,561   7,533,122   94,444,978  
95 416,887  172,967  5,615,413  14,122  49,705   9,183,376  4,513,942   27,700,979  9,896,338  1,806,491  59,370,221  
96 310,471   2,946,307  6,729,311  8,420  245,844   8,489,103  4,149,981   8,635,200  12,233,490   8,423,501  52,171,630  
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Table C.2: Impact of Uniform CET Rate of 6.1 Percent on Consumer Welfare from Non-ASEAN Country Imports 
   Sub-
Heading Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Myanmar Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Total ASEAN 
Total 11,530,529,654 12,596,616,557 1,687,004,114,649 2,882,976,506 21,287,722,191 4,622,872,980,351 469,243,504,565 7,585,233,535,903 3,545,015,888,865 596,337,735,988 18,554,005,605,228 
01 16,436,173 - 127,208,854 400,275 48,345 192,150,314 124,968,035 (15,720,249) 70,904,235 37,762,735 554,158,717 
02 2,132,037 792,590 (238,737,777) 18,786 32,641 (188,390,126) (304,110,994) (369,737,388) (37,773,126) (3,501,309) (1,139,274,666) 
03 179,967,791 26,780,867 123,218,598 9,976,590 5,304,143 5,387,850,133 (93,099,056) 3,649,846,408 (1,415,465,072) (117,485,312) 7,756,895,091 
04 (60,257,699) (3,113,218) (2,125,688,124) (11,574,993) (3,861,230) (852,867,828) (204,052,782) (85,765,204) (842,365,790) (1,053,063,707) (5,242,610,575) 
05 - (105,651) 37,675,060 216 (888,662) (9,178,613) (2,311,502) 11,241,064 18,845,592 (32,334,912) 22,942,593 
06 (44,988,785) 4,999 (5,606,739) (1,613,972) (7,613) (7,833,494) (897,191) 14,122,740 (19,892,409) (2,957,329) (69,669,793) 
07 (13,615,474) (1,126,120) 293,401,648 (82,223) 336,669 66,381,590 (34,115,356) (76,134,012) (6,503,455) 30,026,819 258,570,087 
08 10,335,763,507 10,418,462,439 576,542,740,692 1,202,871,460 28,541,721 131,891,872,725 164,649,784,883 231,668,254,584 516,998,439,813 130,829,585,449 1,774,566,317,273 
09 32,745,743 136,469 (15,000,643) 106,498 311,803 319,282,814 (65,949,908) 232,152,533 145,564,627 53,411,005 702,760,941 
10 37,177,841 4,717,623 6,008,310,976 5,120,967 898 3,202,437,868 2,716,416,909 90,345,049 407,868,402 1,257,798,340 13,730,194,874 
11 (20,348,036) (50,670,249) (357,042,766) (7,523,421) (6,075,533) (348,345,240) (309,885,866) (500,705,244) (907,314,028) (249,995,279) (2,757,905,662) 
12 (5,052,101) 326,570 (560,361,075) 1,166,624 (5,336,716) (46,368,812) (496,102,089) (358,986,502) (1,646,069,504) (339,998,182) (3,456,781,787) 
13 2,505,670 (56,535,075) 13,035,049 (3,338,992) (16,624,716) (214,806,244) (110,176,090) 90,575,892 (2,098,524,778) (501,656,430) (2,895,545,714) 
14 35,640 1 1,748,249 17 5,889 6,614,437 2,335,470 2,781,026 (27,543,985) 5,885,319 (8,137,937) 
15 10,270,992 5,842,329 203,394,809 4,463,840 106,877,597 (21,547,558,969) 294,670,140 (42,411,754) 213,496,260 360,531,092 (20,390,423,662) 
16 (8,763,292) (2,313,797) (57,429,531) 4,344,687 (75,522) 77,771,813 (159,643,951) (789,813,332) (159,775,952) (14,725,803) (1,110,424,680) 
17 (112,381,788) (108,410,803) (3,395,911,597) (50,064,722) (704,357) (1,052,626,631) (1,182,254,163) (2,371,586,820) (1,068,947,141) (667,953,735) (10,010,841,756) 
18 (84,427,706) (41,159) (546,874,185) (96,628) 423,224 (1,399,479,628) (586,164,070) (2,130,040,104) (844,771,389) (224,321,331) (5,815,792,976) 
19 73,857,092 29,834,022 81,573,383 17,588,937 66,148,957 1,334,990,834 238,791,938 275,630,957 1,102,073,947 503,540,411 3,724,030,479 
20 12,410,944 18,222,012 326,581,386 3,269,602 1,673,239 523,155,976 349,278,025 156,766,897 686,671,552 140,839,267 2,218,868,900 
21 (76,408,855) (49,589,015) (1,462,069,399) (25,666,257) (73,659,490) (2,254,779,466) (1,784,858,413) (1,230,325,778) (1,635,156,347) (554,093,733) (9,146,606,753) 
22 45,275,959 38,901,070 89,482,580 2,946,192 11,739,792 491,595,375 91,615,043 3,462,858,436 863,859,670 209,926,306 5,308,200,424 
23 104,234,268 126,159,808 895,659,901 24,357,243 4,687,606 68,897,489 310,519,016 24,315,407 742,737,831 8,954,432 2,310,523,001 
24 3,372,971 (15,224,379) 43,356,447 1,706,968 15,277,541 20,732,198 213,899,690 90,945,645 273,007,624 24,932,136 672,006,841 
25 61,850,258 46,402,185 479,577,917 6,670,120 8,008,704 385,706,263 128,368,072 169,483,062 418,505,708 244,577,800 1,949,150,088 
26 6,873 - 54,716,372 - 109,692 (423,273,244) 29,761,815 2,372,775 6,578,200 (11,138,726) (340,866,243) 
27 100,861,994 136,611,395 2,037,649,105 116,687,130 511,372,453 2,777,603,534 92,886,975 10,481,671,582 3,165,842,300 4,516,568,742 23,937,755,210 
28 (23,114,210) (55,326,392) 716,450,560,023 1,319,512,550 19,207,982,114 3,933,577,700,387 170,815,892,068 7,113,580,191,185 2,547,227,506,252 353,753,392,575 14,855,854,296,554 
29 (4,968,810) 66,450,295 272,861,018 6,710,963 179,051,931 5,315,000,060 504,702,553 8,655,857,323 9,500,783,002 2,982,860,031 27,479,308,366 
30 742,221,741 804,751,512 2,676,207,012 (116,159,605) 1,092,392,873 9,684,330,788 5,486,325,760 24,358,994,969 14,619,487,012 5,777,577,504 65,126,129,565 
31 (8,351,991) (17,108,618) (259,216,744) (4,813,014) (4,557,175) 282,640,062 (1,292,316,342) 15,084,042 (5,673,575,239) (1,181,957,197) (8,144,172,216) 
32 20,645,704 (4,717,801) (141,179,271) 12,050,574 9,679,911 1,443,850,045 339,133,448 519,309,175 1,634,004,749 529,048,037 4,361,824,570 
33 (83,234,421) (234,027,741) 2,415,125,471 (84,355,437) (37,832,720) 386,436,095 (237,392,866) 3,758,385,865 3,143,196,836 1,129,939,704 10,156,240,787 
34 (9,724,997) (138,936,441) 1,653,278,874 (44,797,955) (123,429,566) 806,544,779 (700,437,562) 199,515,945 2,228,702,453 571,193,367 4,441,908,896 
35 11,396,157 26,064,463 689,753,265 13,314,815 25,628,470 776,393,674 600,584,208 1,419,177,862 1,490,709,464 564,160,077 5,617,182,454 
36 780,230 116,675 7,062,962 310,164 7,887 4,955,339 1,525,024 59,055,680 28,508,787 1,435,091 103,757,838 
37 21,645,187 14,692,411 1,780,924,931 2,469,709 26,060,567 2,415,599,140 1,505,552,990 9,315,193,536 3,388,952,115 1,718,172,322 20,189,262,905 
38 (7,017,965) (93,401,530) 4,575,497,755 (5,732,583) (124,669,287) 6,000,325,890 452,356,111 5,344,717,544 2,472,130,376 (2,909,429,729) 15,704,776,584 
39 156,192,961 516,485,969 7,667,449,473 (45,508,335) 561,735,602 28,873,389,599 8,028,584,284 14,245,111,963 26,145,271,901 7,998,043,980 94,146,757,397 
40 50,820,053 80,542,324 (2,042,890,388) 23,657,936 135,800,924 (9,089,982,224) (240,024,154) 1,497,244,805 (753,070,539) (1,605,816,037) (11,943,717,299) 
41 (6,526) (3,390) 98,978,069 (312) (18,477) (47,052,816) (1,706,784) 2,964,847 (15,679,331) 385,887 37,861,165 
42 12,815,131 2,044,932 189,280,378 1,760,191 (666,551) 202,521,495 93,470,607 2,686,548,961 662,407,451 28,081,709 3,878,264,304 
43 3,122 362 49,478 - 8,546 1,958,227 225,876 1,239,425 4,697,085 12,972,257 21,154,379 
44 (7,093,446) (1,692,824) 153,210,037 (512,081) 631,810 (307,192,907) 125,165,409 (158,428,443) 486,074,312 836,213,717 1,126,375,584 
45 (38,435) 1,165,108 11,701,201 (688,926) 462,261 (4,119,769) (10,434,828) (3,952,750) 24,510,580 (8,944,012) 9,660,431 
46 (651,055) (310,616) (5,902,803) 41,074 (344,290) (15,487,671) (757,386) (13,266,221) (15,780,624) (15,890,826) (68,350,418) 
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47 792 98,784 3,397,343,703 (729,603) 2,368,623 3,137,702,377 170,843,148 292,265,426 1,098,363,011 520,811,939 8,619,068,201 
48 74,293,681 284,689,184 (67,155,981) 17,665,253 301,194,345 4,729,669,904 3,152,557,021 1,966,982,653 5,209,028,976 2,363,167,354 18,032,092,389 
49 (694,075,341) 6,282,890 218,601,368 1,546,709 880,153 3,759,523,136 1,690,006,046 4,901,316,952 1,281,623,769 938,805,549 12,104,511,231 
50 5,552,633 412,239 1,210,179 1,337,085 355,762 24,037,453 5,249,097 63,510,925 7,872,469 131,753,202 241,291,042 
51 92,029 20,232,724 6,100,669 10,381 4,322,230 3,708,642 42,835,807 21,667,182 (25,643,789) 5,676,870 79,002,745 
52 1,491,433,214 (299,188,863) 2,430,014,404 2,532,418 7,071,319 3,759,758,760 817,550,001 218,679,588 2,127,680,998 1,375,222,446 11,930,754,285 
53 (929) 12,683 1,140,228 161,190 5 21,350,174 16,163,596 9,519,466 25,068,580 11,497,845 84,912,837 
54 1,108,973 (10,079,648) 629,594,963 (1,823,849) 42,140,384 (12,889,348) 37,702,176 104,743,099 (87,304,920) 753,821,195 1,457,013,025 
55 (4,889,377) 404,955,016 694,590,046 234,455 (57,596,049) 765,110,781 568,823,633 71,750,541 650,014,660 2,040,669,811 5,133,663,517 
56 1,389,968 1,608,754 1,440,050,610 (5,679,435) (12,757,909) 481,660,552 793,074,722 2,427,271,314 1,310,791,641 693,478,106 7,130,888,322 
57 2,488,998 145,992 29,029,426 40,370 4,899,354 83,877,592 7,448,815 78,767,995 23,266,508 27,510,979 257,476,030 
58 (18,396,816) 89,120,704 (55,245,472) 56,078 (123,798,449) (85,642,643) (732,168,612) (216,217,180) (907,143,839) (545,079,217) (2,594,515,444) 
59 1,640,371 13,256,730 (478,196,302) 792,926 (32,010,151) 4,404,261,963 191,300,864 2,380,277,509 3,115,439,459 654,767,314 10,251,530,683 
60 191,287 877,016 277,579,941 150 194,186 324,104,071 515,488,844 24,206,162 276,851,091 86,268,762 1,505,761,511 
61 (401,633,697) (42,593,632) (564,455,668) 1,376,177 (3,007,767) (2,000,282,111) (128,561,252) (14,617,266,544) (1,363,921,368) 41,168,698 (19,079,177,163) 
62 3,652,457 56,154,059 24,327,566 144,777 1,569,071 222,710,133 169,299,319 (93,738,959) 506,496,208 236,622,882 1,127,237,514 
63 13,274,293 17,945,160 67,242,929 7,387,534 351,000 431,856,165 179,584,996 711,439,944 1,168,729,246 65,760,014 2,663,571,281 
64 28,604,187 2,201,407 118,313,091 822,592 5,320,099 1,256,279,709 288,185,597 1,281,848,900 856,290,297 226,476,714 4,064,342,593 
65 (3,229,517) (5,140,221) (241,665,932) (1,315,473) 905,693 (17,690,412) (29,734,734) (163,501,767) (20,856,021) (22,947,078) (505,175,463) 
66 492,565 343,859 28,961,235 154,542 880,236 5,223,577 9,493,583 24,244,454 25,880,389 829,791 96,504,231 
67 1,052,191 253,798 9,380,671 8,917 - 5,556,517 3,803,982 9,554,177 12,835,548 3,465,664 45,911,464 
68 (39,902,812) (5,421,767) 992,434,669 (32,221,064) (26,606,070) (209,808,955) 94,401,147 1,178,199,846 1,586,734,754 394,509,712 3,932,319,459 
69 70,089,112 928,396,657 793,029,147 7,487,959 97,589,298 (4,669,273,827) 1,877,713,020 23,406,763 (8,176,968,618) (155,186,718) (9,203,717,206) 
70 40,419,299 43,059,290 605,670,207 8,808,145 35,011,206 2,136,216,941 326,545,133 877,948,608 1,768,889,995 942,852,281 6,785,421,104 
71 516,327 5,761,592 4,522,770 673 - 4,444,835,867 642,108,935 1,842,506,449 1,290,326,967 60,541,045 8,291,120,625 
72 24,048,952 (20,650,497) 538,014,361 19,072,856 (448,455,216) (5,949,161,356) 1,785,307,347 2,672,916,458 (25,213,702,441) 145,900,434 (26,446,709,101) 
73 617,802,595 (56,267,793) (2,917,419,765) (11,247,374) (136,870,411) (3,885,387,212) (376,618,890) (2,007,588,202) (6,426,198,402) 776,837,032 (14,422,958,423) 
74 8,959,710 1,232,399 1,679,451,367 11,417,756 3,590,195 8,918,830,906 1,661,615,877 6,122,107,353 9,071,394,582 436,593,187 27,915,193,333 
75 214,913 - 38,871,230 28,303 135 809,761 (5,367,624) (702,208,157) (275,440,318) 7,784,694 (935,307,062) 
76 4,946,088 49,332,764 272,158,711 3,097,574 (20,109,678) 13,550,958,446 838,542,488 2,836,010,269 3,803,432,592 471,361,855 21,809,731,109 
78 (111,810) 93,268 276,482,148 111 675,742 236,207,063 8,074,898 659,080,602 438,619,376 9,606,031 1,628,727,429 
79 (2,457,433) 6,518,360 467,950,928 (14,926,374) 3,838,852 352,925,072 125,371,076 546,669,840 199,748,973 137,969,768 1,823,609,062 
80 (31,826) 241,057 7,096,105 263 549,081 208,362,311 10,052,353 49,912,087 347,402,766 10,133,343 633,717,540 
81 (357,227) (32,359) (298,242,575) 4,550 (14,878) (22,938,526) (4,103,430) 7,622,969 (189,518,994) (15,198,241) (522,778,711) 
82 (711,557,781) 52,160,089 1,847,808,084 (4,354,507) (16,681,770) 2,363,977,559 309,033,170 8,631,322,239 5,832,196,273 922,006,517 19,225,909,874 
83 (1,904,871,979) (320,893,780) (20,433,940,178) 73,798,716 (724,627,271) (34,403,485,054) (24,240,932,733) (53,666,502,498) (99,852,179,051) (9,818,564,964) (245,292,198,791) 
84 (860,088,356) (2,311,432,387) 320,808,982,075 65,634,471 267,905,590 295,370,452,449 80,722,710,584 132,295,541,749 300,338,084,555 47,031,772,590 1,173,729,563,321 
85 393,345,115 220,217,750 17,177,390,179 68,283,344 412,890,028 126,179,629,976 31,878,276,591 103,613,584,732 107,559,172,893 15,973,700,996 403,476,491,604 
86 2,822,663 (41,408) (1,534,756,136) 237,391 (334,082,517) (1,484,601,554) (506,877,855) (1,847,122,826) (298,898,632) (25,634,871) (6,028,955,746) 
87 2,215,147,052 1,279,159,618 28,025,518,541 122,800,709 110,076,591 43,761,379,027 8,205,844,959 24,823,720,092 46,910,697,692 5,908,746,585 161,363,090,868 
88 (878,394,536) 466,333 1,740,013,920 (41,485,184) 5,156,558 (4,060,141,037) (4,416,204,523) (121,629,855,013) (10,103,410,682) (54,601,526) (139,438,455,691) 
89 576,502 (12,928,057) (1,904,297,427) 12,086 31,520,749 (147,366,262) (17,984,891) 865,643,306 8,351,620 20,792,621 (1,155,679,752) 
90 253,628,384 203,512,851 9,476,001,903 194,914,620 211,268,379 48,899,635,302 11,065,124,856 39,433,620,153 71,956,030,163 16,047,596,261 197,741,332,873 
91 - - - - - - - - - - - 
92 4,172,550 891,493 341,813,746 58,460 2,737,636 492,015,795 84,216,521 327,377,002 242,477,172 79,956,117 1,575,716,492 
93 - 53,214 (20,577,524) - - (26,777,455) (39,304,408) (703,976) (318,264,688) (35,138,878) (440,713,715) 
94 206,077,338 109,681,584 1,412,487,240 1,427,061 35,734,750 2,895,232,441 863,290,526 4,915,614,561 1,638,092,522 789,393,070 12,867,031,094 
95 46,006,421 35,422,040 1,485,780,213 170,821 (1,000,512) 342,666,051 46,367,118 389,229,813 54,533,400 (372,836,067) 2,026,339,298 
96 71,507,982 313,642,001 3,367,749,105 6,237,273 32,751,685 7,568,554,365 1,157,232,677 5,543,076,466 6,529,792,053 2,404,541,747 26,995,085,353 
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ANNEX D 
MEETINGS HELD WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ASEAN MEMBER STATES 
 
 
Brunei Mr. Nazmi, Deputy Permanent Secretary  
Mr. Vincent Kong, Director, Trade Development  
Ms. Tutiaty Wahab;  
Ms. Noramali Jumat 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Cambodia Mr. Uy Sambath, Director, Min of Economy and Finance 
Ms. Bun Neary, Deputy Director, Min of Economy and Finance 
Indonesia Mr. Hotman Sitanggang 
Ministry of Trade of Indonesia 
Lao PDR Mr. Khampoun Inpenglasabout, Director for International Cooperation 
Division 
Customs Department, Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia Ms. Jaysiwanta Kaur, Director, Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry 
Mr. Norman Peter, Principal Assistant Director, Min of International 
Trade and Industry 
Representative from Ministry of Primary Commodity and Industry 
Philippines Representative from Dept of Trade Industry-Bureau of International 
Trade Relations;  
Representative from Bureau of Customs 
Singapore Ms. Venetta Miranda  
Ms. Karen Yeo Meng Keow 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Thailand Mrs. Pongwaiai Puapan 
Min of Commerce 
Representatives from Ministry of Finance 
Vietnam Ms. Nguyen Thi Hong Thuy, Director Min of Industry and Trade 
Representative from Min of Finance 
 
